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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc.' declared that claims of same-sex sexual harass-
ment are cognizable under Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
This decision ended the debate in the federal courts over this ques-
tion by expressly disapproving of the Fifth Circuit's rejection of such
claims. At the time of the Supreme Court's decision in Oncale, the
trend in the judiciary was decidedly in favor of recognition of same-
sex sexual harassment claims; courts have been at odds, however, in
their struggle to define what constitutes actionable same-sex sexual
harassment. One federal appeals court has announced a rule that
requires a prima facie showing of the alleged harasser's homosexual-
ity for a same-sex claim to survive a motion to dismiss.3 Another ap-
peals court has expressly rejected this approach and looks only to the
alleged harasser's conduct to evaluate actionability.4 Two other cir-
cuit courts of appeals have as yet not expressed whether such harass-
ment is actionable only when the harasser is a homosexual.' The
struggle continues in light of Oncale's cryptic message about when
same-sex sexual harassment is actionable.6
1. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
2. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 120 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd,
118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
3. SeeWrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 141 (4th Cir. 1996);see also Hop-
kins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 752 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996)
(holding that male victim of harassment must attempt to prove that harasser is homosexual to
show harassment occurred because of victim's sex); McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Super-
visors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996) (stating that claim of hos-
tile work environment cannot be sustained where both parties are same gender and not homo-
sexual).
4. SeeQuickv. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1378 (8th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he key inquiry is
whether 'members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employ-
ment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.'" (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg,J., concurring))).
5. See Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1997)
(concluding that decision would not indicate whether harassment based on sexual orientation
serves as grounds for Title VII claim), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1184 (1998); Yeary v. Goodwill In-
dus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 1997) (declining to address issue of whether
same-sex sexual harassment can be sustained when the harasser is homosexual).
6. See Dominic Bencivenga, Same-Sex Harassment; Ruling Puts Work Environment Under Scru-
tiny, N.Y. LJ., Mar. 12, 1998, at 5 ("While the Court made clear that discrimination because of
sex can be shown in a variety of ways, it gave little guidance for determining when untoward
conduct crosses the line to sex-based discrimination.");John Cloud, Harassed or Hazed? Why the
Supreme Court Ruled That Men Can Sue Men for Sexual Harassment, TIME, Mar. 16, 1998, at 55
("Having said what it doesn't mean, however, the high court left wide open what it does mean
to discriminate 'because of' gender.");Jan Crawford Greenburg, Liability at Crux of Sex Harass-
ment Case; Suit May Settle When Employers Must Pay, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 24, 1998, at N1 (stating that
Oncale "offered lower courts little practical guidance in determining whether a person makes a
valid claim of same-sex harassment); Randy McClain, The Same-Sex Harassment Issue; Louisiana
Same-Sex Case Stirs Nation-Wide Interest, BATON ROUGE SUN. ADVOCATE, Mar. 22, 1998, at I1
(noting Supreme Court's failure precisely to define when sexual remarks or suggestive behav-
ior "crosses the line between horse play and harassment"). But seeJeffrey M. Schlossberg, The
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Commentators on same-sex sexual harassment mirror the circuit
courts in expressing widely varying viewpoints on what approach the
judiciary should adopt in evaluating same-sex sexual harassment
claims brought under Title VII and its state analogues.7 These view-
points rest on equally varying bases, from appeals to the plain lan-
guage of Title VII, to policy arguments grounded in concern for the
civil rights of gays and lesbians." Some scholars argue simply that
same-sex sexual harassment claims are consistent with Supreme
Court precedent and the plain language of Title VII alone and thus
should be evaluated the way opposite-sex harassment claims are.9
Others, most notably Catharine MacKinnon, argue that same-sex
harassment claims advance Title VII's underlying goal of outlawing
gender role stereotyping in the workplace but do not advocate a spe-
cific method for evaluating such claims.' Those who disagree with
MacKinnon argue that same-sex harassment claims subvert the objec-
tives of Title VII no matter how they are evaluated." Scholars, par-
ticularly those concerned with gay and lesbian rights, contradict the
views of gay rights activists and claim that same-sex harassment claims
operate to the detriment of gays and lesbians in the workplace.'
2
These commentators believe that courts will use these claims to exac-
erbate the already regrettable state of gay and lesbian civil rights by
perpetuating notions of "normal" sexuality.'3 The feared result is that
gays and lesbians will continue to suffer disproportionate censure of
their sexual expression and, in the absence of legislation prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, will encounter esca-
lating discrimination in the workplace. 4
Pendulum Swings Back in Sexual Harassment Cases, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 17, 1998, at 1 (stating that On-
cale court's articulation of parameters of permissible behavior helps define and reduce spec-
trum of actionable conduct).
7. See infra Part III (outlining different perspectives on same-sex harassment).
8. See infra notes 240-80 and accompanying text.
9. See Katherine H. Flynn, Note & Comment, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: Sex, Gender and
the Definition of Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1099, 1110-11 (1997)
(explaining that some courts have used Congressional intent behind Title VII as reason to re-
ject same-sex harassment claims).
10. See Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691,
715 (1997) (characterizing MacKinnon's primary objection to sexual harassment as concern
about sexual stereotyping).
11. See id. at 753 (describing some courts' interpretation of Title VII as remedy for dis-
crimination against subordinate groups, by privileged groups).
12. See PamelaJ. Papish, Homosexual Harassment or Heterosexual Horseplay? The False Dichot-
omy of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Law, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 201, 203-04 (1996)
(indicating that these fears are based on view that courts may interpret some sexual conduct as
"horseplay" if performed by heterosexuals, but not if performed by homosexuals).
13. See Carolyn Grose, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: Subverting the Heterosexist Paradigm of
Title VI, 7 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 375, 389 (1995) (claiming that courts have based their deci-
sions in same-sex harassment cases on traditional notions of "normal" heterosexual behavior).
14. See Kara L. Gross, Note, Toward Gender Equality and Understanding: Recognizing That
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These approaches to the question of the evaluation of same-sex
claims are incomplete. On the one hand, the majority of commenta-
tors ignore the reality that, under current law, same-sex cases are not
evaluated in the same manner as opposite-sex cases." There is a pre-
sumption of heterosexuality in opposite-sex cases that alleviates the
need for courts to evaluate the causation prong of sexual harassment
claims.16 In same-sex cases, however, presumptive heterosexuality is
not applied in the same way,' 7 rendering the causation prong of Title
VII sexual harassment claims the object of much attention and analy-
sis. Moreover, although application of presumptive heterosexuality
in same-sex cases is prevalent, application of presumptive homosexu-
ality in same-sex cases is rare. ' On the other hand, commentators
fearful of the negative effects of litigating same-sex claims argue from
empirically unsupportable premises, ultimately overstating the dan-
gers that the existence of same-sex harassment claims poses to gay
and lesbian rights and failing to note the more serious problems of a
legal system devoid of such claims.' 9
Now that the Supreme Court has recognized same-sex sexual har-
assment claims because such claims are consistent with the language
and objectives of Title VII, it bears noting that recognition of such
claims under Title VII will have several desirable effects. First, these
claims will not be used as a new tool in the oppression of gay men
and lesbians under the law, as some commentators claim. ° Instead,
same-sex harassment claims will be a vehicle for outlawing sexual ori-
entation discrimination by creating an incentive for the heterosexual
majority, via illustrations in individual cases that heterosexuality is
not a characteristic protected by Title VII, to lobby for passage of an
amendment to Title VII or for passage of the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act. Same-sex harassment claims will likewise high-
Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Is Sex Discrimination, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1996)
(speculating that some courts pursue Title VII claims against homosexuals more vigorously
than against heterosexuals).
15. See Franke, supra note 10, at 731 (explaining that the use of presumptive heterosexual-
ity results in different outcomes for same-sex and opposite-sex harassment cases).
16. See id. (asserting that courts automatically conclude that heterosexual males harass
women sexually).
17. See id. (finding that presumptive heterosexuality causes courts to view similar conduct
differently depending on whether it is directed at members of the harasser's own gender or
members of the opposite sex).
18. See infra notes 387-425 and accompanying text (discussing presumption of heterosexu-
ality often used in same-sex cases).
19. See Papish, supra note 12, at 220-21 (clarifying that Title VII recognition of same-sex
harassment will help homosexuals as they are the most frequent victims of sexual harassment in
the workplace).
20. See E. Gary Spitko, He Said, He Said. Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under Title VII and the
"Reasonable Heterosexist" Standard, 18 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 56, 81 (1997) (claiming that
recognition would create new ways of regulating homosexual behavior).
1998] SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS AFTER ONCALE 681
light cases of gender stereotyping in the workplace and will empha-
size the need for Title VII to address and consistently proscribe such
stereotyping. This emphasis will ultimately inspire the judiciary to
recognize sexual orientation discrimination as sex discrimination,
rendering new legislation unnecessary for the protection of gays and
lesbians in the workplace.
Second, same-sex harassment litigation will shed light on the in-
consistencies in Title VII jurisprudence created by the use of pre-
sumptive heterosexuality in sexual harassment cases. As a result, the
public will begin to recognize that certain conduct now deemed
horseplay or the product of homophobic animus (and thus under
current law not proscribed by Title VII) in fact has sexual desire as its
cause and should therefore be actionable as sexual harassment. In
addition, recognition will remove the negative effects of the law's
trivializing or altogether ignoring homosexual subjectivity and desire,
as is currently the case under anti-discrimination law,2' and will pre-
vent these effects from influencing workplace relations. For all these
reasons, the Supreme Court has taken the right step in recognizing
same-sex sexual harassment claims. The issues raised by the now re-
solved cognizability question have far-reaching implications for Title
VII sexual harassment jurisprudence and thus warrant discussion. A
detailed study of how courts will evaluate the actionability of same-sex
sexual harassment claims in light of Oncale is especially crucial at this
juncture.
Part I of this Article summarizes the contours of sexual harassment
law and emphasizes the inquiry undertaken to evaluate hostile work
environment claims. Part II unravels the tangle of case law in the
area of same-sex sexual harassment to reveal that there is a trend in
the courts to define the parameters of impermissible conduct in the
workplace between persons of the same sex quite apart from inquir-
ies into the sexual orientations of those persons. In this way, the
courts are gradually aligning the inquiry in these cases with the in-
quiry in cases of opposite-sex sexual harassment. Part III of this Arti-
cle explores commentators' opinions on the subject and challenges
the views of those who maintain that same-sex sexual harassment
claims cannot be adequately evaluated until Title VII prohibits dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Part IV of this Article
explores the likely desirable effects of the litigation of same-sex sex-
ual harassment claims. Specifically, the litigation of same-sex har-
assment claims improves the prospects of passage of an amendment
21. See id. at 83 (criticizing juries for failing to take into account the perspective of homo-
sexual defendants in same-sex harassment cases).
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to Title VII or passage of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act.
Both of these pieces of legislation would outlaw discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation. In addition, judicial recognition in
same-sex harassment jurisprudence that Title VII sex discrimination
proscriptions encompass sex stereotyping of both men and women
will by extension lead to judicial acceptance of sexual orientation dis-
crimination as sex discrimination. This will render new anti-
discrimination legislation unnecessary. Finally, same-sex harassment
claims will inspire judicial efforts to streamline and unify the analysis
of all sexual harassment claims by exposing the undesirable effects of
the presumption of heterosexuality on sexual harassment jurispru-
dence. These efforts will promote consistency, judicial economy,
and, ultimately, a more reasoned and just application of Title VII.
I. SEX DISCRIMINATION AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination by
employers "against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's... sex."2 The statute in its current form, as amended by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991,23 provides a cause of action for victims of
such sex discrimination to obtain equitable relief, compensatory, or
punitive damages.24 It also grants the right of a jury trial to either
party to a dispute.-
Although not expressly mentioned in Title VII, sexual harassment.... 26
is a form of sex discrimination. Recognition of sexual harassment as
a form of sex discrimination is based on the theory that it is a barrier
to equality of the sexes in the workplace: "Surely, a requirement that
a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the
privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be as de-
meaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets. 2 7 Sex-
ual harassment may consist of either quid pro quo harassment, where a
supervisor makes employment or employment benefits contingent
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
23. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h).
24. See42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(1), (b)(1).
25. See id. § 1981 (c) (1).
26. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (explaining that Title VII for-
bids sexual harassment that results in abusive work environment). This position has been criti-
cized. See, e.g., Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm,
8 YALE L. & POL'YREv. 333, 351-52 (1990) (explaining that equation of sexual harassment with
sex discrimination poses problems in cases involving "equal opportunity" harassers); Michelle
Ridgeway Peirce, Note, Sexual Harassment and Title VI-A Better Solution, 30 B.C. L. REV. 1071,
1098-99 (1989) (highlighting problems associated with characterizing sexual harassment as
gender discrimination under Title VII).
27. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982).
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upon some type of sexual consideration from the employee," or hos-
tile work environment harassment, in which sexual conduct towards
an employee, engaged in by a supervisor or co-worker because of the
employee's sex, adversely affects the employee's work performance
or renders the employment environment intimidating or offensive.2
In either case, the victim's employer is liable for damages if knowl-
edge of the harassment can be imputed to the employer and the em-
ployer fails to take corrective action." The perpetrator, however,
normally is not liable."
28. SeeMerito, 477 U.S. at 65.
29. See id. at 65-66 (reviewing case law that established Title VII right to be free from dis-
crimination in the workplace).
30. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (c)-(d) (1996) (applying liability to employers for harassment by
co-workers if the employer had actual or constructive notice of the behavior and if the em-
ployer did not take immediate and effective steps).
There is a split of authority in the lower courts as to whether an employer, in order to be
held liable, must have knowledge of the actions which create a hostile work environment. See
SUSAN M. OMILIAN &JEAN P. KAMP, SEX-BASED EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 11.08 (1990).
The EEOC's guidelines, however, impose strict liability on employers for sexual harassment by
supervisory employees. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (c)-(d). Strict liability is also imposed in cases of
quid pro quo harassment by supervisory employees. See generally OMILIAN & KAMP, supra,
§§ 23.01, 23.05 (employer liable for quid pro quosexual harassment by supervisors). Strict liabil-
ity is still debated. Even though a company has an anti-sexual harassment policy, any such pol-
icy is insufficient for the employer to avoid liability. See Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211 (9th
Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court recently heard oral argument in a case involving this issue,
Faragherv. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 438 (1997); see
also Linda Greenhouse, High Court Hears 2 Sex-Harassment Liability Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26,
1998, at A19. Likewise, the Supreme Court is poised to decide whether, to recover in a quid pro
quo case, the plaintiff must have suffered tangible job detriment after rebuffing the unwelcome
advances. SeeJansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. granted sub
nom. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 876 (1998).
31. SeeJoseph M. Kelly & Bob Watt, Damages in Sex Harassment Cases: A Comparative Study of
American, Canadian, and British Law, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 79, 90 (1996)
("Damages pursuant to the [Civil Rights Act of 1991] may not be assessed against the harassing
supervisor." (citing Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1993))); Robert
Lukens, Comment, Workplace Sexual Harassment and Individual Liability, 69 TEMPLE L. REv. 303,
305 (1996) (noting that majority of courts prohibit individual liability in Title VII sexual har-
assment cases); see also Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that Title
VII does not define "employer" to mean supervisor in individual capacity); Tomka v. Seiler
Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1317 (2d Cir. 1995) (deciding that Title VII does not hold the agent of
employer liable as an individual); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (asserting
that harassment victim cannot sue supervising employee in supervisor's personal capacity);
Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1504 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating that employees cannot be per-
sonally liable under Title VII); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994)
(refusing to find workplace harasser individually liable because harasser was not victim's em-
ployer). But see, e.g., Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 667 (10th Cir. 1995) (suggesting that em-
ployee with "employer-like authority" may be held individually liable under Title VII); Garcia v.
Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451 (5th Cir. 1994) (defining immediate supervisors as em-
ployers when they possess those with the power to hire and fire employees); Paroline v. Unisys
Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that employee in supervisory position with
"significant control" over "hiring, firing or conditions of employment" can be held personally
liable under Title VII); Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1231 (6th Cir. 1986)
(implying that agents of employer can be held personally liable under Title VII); Caldwell v.
KFC Corp., 958 F. Supp. 962 (D.N.J. 1997) (noting claim for individual liability could be
brought under state antidiscrimination law).
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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is the
administrative body charged with enforcing Title VII12 The EEOC
defines actionable sexual harassment as "sexual advances, requests
for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual na-
ture. 33  Sexual harassment exists when any one of three criteria is
met:
(1) Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implic-
itly a term or condition of an individual's employment,
(2) Submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is
used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individ-
ual, or
(3) Such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably inter-
fering with an individual's work performance or creating an in-
timidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.3
According to the EEOC, discrimination claims that do not involve
one or more of these criteria are not sexual harassment.35
32. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.1 (1996) (setting out EEOC civil rights enforcement procedures).
33. Id.§ 1604.11(a).
34. Id.
35. See UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC COMPLIANCE
MANUAL § 615.6(a) (1987) [hereinafter EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL]. The EEOC withdrew
proposed guidelines, see 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266, 51,267-68 (1993) (discussing proposed 29 C.F.R.
§§ 1609.1-1609.2), that would have clarified that non-sexual sex-based conduct is actionable
under Titie VII. See id. at 51,267; see also Sarah E. Bums, Evidence of a Sexually Hostile Workplace:
What Is It and How Should It Be Assessed After Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 357, 401 n.310, 422-23 n.404 (1995) (discussing potential effects of proposed
regulations).
Nonetheless, the majority rule in the federal courts is that nonsexual sex-based conduct
(termed "gender-based" conduct by some courts, see, e.g., Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp.,
905 F. Supp. 1368, 1378-80 (C.D. Cal. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 114 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir.
1997) (per curiam)), can create a hostile environment. See, e.g., Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90
F.3d 1372, 1377 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that harassment need not be explicitly sexual in nature,
nor have explicit sexual overtones); Kopp v. Samaritan Health Sys., Inc., 13 F.3d 264, 269 (8th
Cir. 1993) (rejecting argument that offensive acts constituting sexual harassment claim must be
of an overfly sexual nature); Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990)
(stressing that sexual content does not always have to be present in offensive behavior for be-
havior to count as unlawful discrimination); Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 905 (1st
Cir. 1988) (suggesting that misogynistic but non-sexual harassment creates hostile work envi-
ronment); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that in-
timidation and hostility toward women can result from non-sexual advances); Hicks v. Gates
Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing cases that expand the definition of
sexual harassment to include actions that lack overtly sexual conduct); McKinney v. Dole, 765
F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (defining sexual harassment as any unequal treatment that
would not occur but for the victim's gender); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp.
1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (noting causation element satisfied by behavior that targets women
and is based on gender). Commentators have concurred. See, e.g., L. Camille H6bert, Sexual
Harassment is Gender Harassment, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 565, 567 (1995) (positing that "the issues
implicated by gender harassment are no different than those raised by sexual harassment");
Joshua F. Thorpe, Note, Gender-Based Harassment and the Hostile Work Environment, 1990 DuKE
LJ. 1361, 1366 (arguing that gender-based harassment can meet the criteria for an actionable
hostile work environment); Susan Perissinotto Woodhouse, Comment, Same-Gender Sexual Har-
assment: Is It Sex Discrimination Under Title VII?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1147, 1156 (1996)
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A. Judicial Treatment of Hostile Work Environment Claims
To prevail in a Title VII hostile work environment action, a plain-
tiff must assert and prove that: (1) she belongs to a group protected
by the statute;-" (2) she was subjected to unwanted harassment "in the
form of sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature"; 7 (3) the harassment was based
on sex;s (4) the sexual harassment had the effect of unreasonably in-
terfering with the plaintiff's work performance and creating an
"intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment"; 9 and
(5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and
failed to take proper remedial action."
In any sexual harassment action, the plaintiff's membership in a
protected class depends solely on that plaintiffs status as a man or a
woman." As such, both men and women can bring suits for sexual
harassment.42 In opposite-sex sexual harassment cases, the causation
issue of whether the harassment was based on sex is generally not a
disputed element." Either the conduct itself in such cases is pre-
sumed to reveal sexual attraction," or the perpetrator's failure to
(explaining that conduct need not be sexual for sexual harassment claim (citing Dillon v.
Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992))). But see Bolden v. PRC, Inc.,
43 F.3d 545, 551 (10th Cir. 1994) ("General harassment if not racial or sexual is not action-
able."). For a discussion of how courts, even in jurisdictions which recognize gender-based
misconduct as sexual harassment, relegate nonsexual misconduct "to a separate disparate
treatment analysis or disregard it altogether," see Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Serual Harass-
ment, 107YALELJ. 1683, 1732-38 (1998).
36. SeeYeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1997) (laying
out elements of prima facie claim of hostile environment created by sex discrimination).
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. Id.; see also Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-6 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (explicating the cor-
rect concept of hostile work environment).
40. See, e.g., Yeary, 107 F.3d at 445; Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 142
(4th Cir. 1996) (describing elements of hostile work environment claim); Quick, 90 F.3d at
1377 (discussing requirements for claim); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05
(11th Cir. 1982).
Some jurisdictions have adopted a somewhat different formulation. See, e.g., Drinkwater v.
Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 860 (3d Cir. 1990) (citingAndrews, 895 F.2d at 1482). The
Andrews test requires intensive and ongoing sexual harassment that affects plaintiff and would
affect a reasonable person. See id.
41. See Quick, 90 F.3d at 1377; cf McCoy v. Macon Water Auth., 966 F. Supp. 1209, 1216
(M.D. Ga. 1997) (clarifying that Title VII protects both genders; the sex of the victim or har-
asser is irrelevant).
42. See Drinkwater, 904 F.2d at 860 (referring to cases in which men brought sexual har-
assment claims); Huebschen v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 547 F. Supp. 1168, 1176-77
(D. Wis. 1982) (describing facts of male employee's sexual harassment suit), rev'd on other
grounds, 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1983).
43. See, e.g., Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1986) (noting no conflict
in opposite-sex harassment cases that harassment is based on sex); Rasmusson v. Copeland
Lumber Yards, Inc., No. 96-258, 1997 WL 769366, at *5 (D. Nev. Oct. 31, 1997) ("There is a
general presumption that when a woman is harassed by a man, it is 'because of' her sex.").
44. See Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 752 (4th Cir.) (stating that
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treat members of the opposite gender in a similar fashion reveals
animus towards the victim's gender.4
where individual is sexually harassed by someone of the opposite sex, there is a presumption
that the harassment is because of the victim's gender), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996); Burns v.
McGregor Elec. Indus., 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1992) (clarifying that, when a man harasses
a woman in a sexual manner, his behavior raises the inference that his actions are based on
sex); Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482 n.3 ("The intent to discriminate on the basis of sex in cases in-
volving sexual propositions, innuendo, pornographic materials, or sexual derogatory language
is implicit, and thus should be recognized as a matter of course."); Henson, 682 F.2d at 904
(explaining that differential treatment based on sex occurs when male supervisor expresses
feelings of sexual attraction to female employee); Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 926 F. Supp.
1044, 1049 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (describing presumption of sexual attraction that arises from sexu-
ally harassing behavior of men towards women); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAws 359 (1992) (asserting that
gender-based motivation is often easy to prove and is evident when female alleges that male
harassed her); Deborah N. McFarland, Note, Beyond Sex Discrimination: A Proposal for Federal
Sexual Harassment Legislation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 493, 494 n.6 (1996) (stating that, in opposite-
sex harassment cases, courts assume that attraction explains harasser's behavior toward victim;
discrimination exists, therefore, because the sexes are not treated equally).
Note that despite the use of "but-for" in certain courts' construction of the causation ele-
ment, the harassing conduct need not have occurred solely because of the sex of the victim; sex
need only have been a contributing factor. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994) (establishing
that sex need only have been "motivating factor"); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228, 240 n.6 (1989) ("[T]o construe the words 'because of' as colloquial shorthand for
'but for causation' is to misunderstand them." Plaintiff does not have to show but-for causation
to prevail, but "if she does so, she prevails."); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d
1044, 1047 n.4 (3d Cir. 1977) (explaining that sex of victim need only be a"substantial factor"
in harassment). But see Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1137 (C.D. Ill.
1995) (deciding that claim for harassment must demonstrate that offensive conduct would not
have occurred but for victim's sex). Note, too, that in opposite-sex cases, it is not a defense for
the employer to allege that the harasser was gay. See Anne-Marie Harris, Sex Harassment Enters
the Same-Sex Era, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 13, 1998, at A20 ("[Ihf same-sex harassment is only actionable
under Title VII when the harasser is homosexual, then a 'homosexual defense' ought to exist
in cases in which harasser and victim are of the opposite sex.").
45. See, e.g., Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., 32 F.3d 1007, 1009 (7th Cir. 1994)
(characterizing critical question as whether plaintiff was harassed because of her sex); Rabidue
v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that harassment victim
must establish hostile workplace claim by showing that, but for her gender, victim would not
have been subject to harassment); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(reaffirming "but for" causation test for harassment); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55
(D.C. Cir. 1977) ("In each instance, the legal problem... [is] the exaction of a condition
which, but for his or her sex, the employee would not have faced."); Griswold v. Fresenius USA,
Inc., 978 F. Supp. 718, 728 (N.D. Ohio 1997) ("(A]n employee may suffer harassment based on
sex that is motivated by pure misanthropy or misogyny.").
The causation standard and the methods by which causation can be shown have sparked de-
bate in both the courts and in the legal academy about whether Title VII contains a loophole
allowing harassing acts perpetrated by either a bisexual or an equal opportunity harasser to go
unpunished. See, e.g., Bundy, 641 F.2d at 942 ("Only by a reductio ad absurdum could we imag-
ine a case of harassment that is not sex discrimination where a bisexual supervisor harasses
men and women alike."); Ecklund v. Fuisz Tech., 905 F. Supp. 335, 350 (E.D. Va. 1995) (noting
that a harasser who harasses both men and women poses no disparate treatment problem);
Sandra Levitsky, Footnote 55: Closing the "Bisexual Defense" Loophole in Title VI Sexual Harassment
Cases, 80 MINN. L. REv. 1013, 1014 (1996) (explaining Barnes v. Costle court's establishment of
the bisexual defense loophole); Schultz, supra note 35, at 1780 n.502 (noting tenuous exten-
sion of courts' focus on sexual attraction to cases involving bisexual harassers); Jessica Block,
Case and Statute Comment, Same-Sex Harassment-Employment Discrimination-Civil Rights, 82
MASS. L. REv. 250, 252 (1997) (objecting to "imposing on a same-sex harassment plaintiff the
burden of comparing the treatment of the two genders in the workplace, especially where the
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Whether the activities complained of are unwelcome, however,
generally is disputed.46 In order to constitute harassment, the con-
duct must be "unwelcome in the sense that the employee did not so-
licit or incite it, and in the sense that the employee regarded the
conduct as undesirable or offensive."
4 7
To be actionable, the sexual harassment must be sufficiently severe
and pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and bring
about an "abusive working environment."48 "[T] he required showing
of severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct varies inversely
with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct." 9 In order to es-
tablish that the harassment was sufficiently pervasive and severe, the
plaintiff must show a practice or pattern of sustained and nontrivial
harassment against her.0 She must also reasonably perceive5' the
conduct at issue is ... clearly sexual in nature," since doing so allows an equal opportunity har-
asser to escape liability and places inappropriate focus on the "subjective intentions of the har-
asser, as opposed to any objective evaluation of the repugnancy of his or her behavior"); Mi-
chael D. hay, Comment, The Harms of Asking. Towards a Comprehensive Treatment of Sexual
Harassment, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 328, 348 nn.85-86 (1988) (noting that Title VII contains bisexual
loophole). But see Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994)
("[E]ven if [the harasser] used sexual epithets equal in intensity and in an equally degrading
manner against male employees, he cannot thereby 'cure' his conduct toward women....
[W]e do not rule out the possibility that both men and women working [for defendant) have
viable claims.., for sexual harassment."); Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 288
(D.D.C. 1995) (finding that bisexual harassment actionable if harasser targets only one gen-
der); Debra R Wolland, Recent Case, A Quick Case for Including Same-Sex Harassment under Title
VII: Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 90F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996), 20 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 615,
617 n.24, 622 (1997) (explaining that Quick reaches "a result more faithful to Title VII" than
do other same-sex sexual harassment cases and explaining that the problem of the bisexual
harasser is avoided by viewing disparate treatment as a sufficient but not necessary condition of
liability). See generally Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1336-37 (D. Wyo.
1993) (explaining difference between bisexual and equal opportunity harasser and concluding
there is viable claim against the equal opportunity harasser who does not harass men and
women in the same way); Steven S. Locke, The Equal Opportunity Harasser as a Paradigm for Rec-
ognizing Sexual Harassment of Homosexuals under Title VII, 27 RUTGERS LJ. 383, 407 n.127 (1996)
(differentiating between bisexual harasser ("one who harasses out of sexual desire") and equal
opportunity harasser ("one who harasses out of an intent to demean")).
46. See Moylan, 792 F.2d at 749 (determining that whether conduct was unwelcome or not
is a question of fact); Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697, 712 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (stating that
no per se rules exist to define "unwelcome"; instead courts must examine facts of each case and
the "intimidation, frequency, and interference" of harassment (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1993))).
47. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
48. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (citing Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
49. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991);see also Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43
STAN. L. REV. 813, 843-47 (1991) (arguing that courts use pervasiveness standard to excuse ob-
jectionable harassment that occurs infrequently or irregularly).
50. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.
51. The existence of a hostile environment should be evaluated from both an objective
and a subjective perspective:
[C]onduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or
abusive work environment-an environment that a reasonable person would find hos-
tile or abusive-is beyond Title VII's purview. Likewise, if the victim does not subjec-
tively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the
conditions of the victim's employment, and there is no Title VII violation.
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conduct as an alteration of employment conditions that create a hos-
tile working environment. 2
In considering whether sexual harassment created a hostile envi-
ronment, courts determine whether the totality of the circumstances
reveals that the harassment was sufficiently severe and pervasive to
create a discriminatorily abusive work environment.5s There need be
no tangible job detriment for a plaintiff to prevail.M The trier of fact
must judge the circumstances according to how a reasonable person
would respond under similar conditions. 5 For purposes of this
Id. at 21-22.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 23 (considering factors that include "frequency," "severity," and physically
threatening nature of harassment).
In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the Commis-
sion will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the circumstances, such as
the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents oc-
curred. The determination of the legality of a particular action will be made from the
facts, on a case by case basis.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1996).
54. SeeHarris, 510 U.S. at 17.
55. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986). Some controversy
surrounds whether the standard to be used in this inquiry is that of the reasonable person, the
reasonable woman, or the reasonable victim. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination
and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1210 (1989) (objecting to use
of subjective standard because equality between the sexes would not benefit from a"pretextual
or wholly idiosyncratic" point of view); Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect,
111 HARv. L. REV. 445, 450 (1997) (promoting the standard of a respectful person to address
the shortcomings of current inquiries into reasonableness); Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as
Censorship. Hostile-Environment Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. LJ. 481, 537-40
(1991) (arguing that cases applying reasonable woman standard engage in form of censor-
ship); Martha Chamallas, Writing About Sexual Harassment: A Guide to the Literature, 4 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 37 (1993) (noting feminist theorists' belief that"[iln the hands of some courts,
deployment of the reasonable person standard makes it appear as if there can only be one ob-
jective assessment of human behavior, masking the reality that men and women often experi-
ence sexual conduct differently"); Paul B. Johnson, The Reasonable Woman in Sexual Harassment
Law: Progress or Illusion?, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 666-67 (1993) (remarking that reason-
ableness standard has traditionally been used to determine liability by evaluating defendant's
behavior); Susan M. Mathews, Title VII and Sexual Harassment: Beyond Damages Control, 3 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 299, 313 (1991) ("A standard that makes more sense within the context of Titie
VII's goal of eliminating the employment barriers facing victims of discrimination is the view-
point of a 'reasonable woman' or a 'reasonable victim.'"); Paul, supra note 26, at 362 n. 116
(hypothesizing that the term "reasonable person" assumes that object of description is male
even though most victims of sexual harassment are female; courts prefer gender-neutral lan-
guage because it seems likely to lead to consistent application of law in cases brought by both
females and male victims); George Rutherglen, Sexual Harassment: Ideology or Law?, 18 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POLY 487, 496 (1995) (emphasizing that gender-neutral standards like"reasonable
person" overlook fact that gender was primary motivation behind harassment); Walter Christo-
pher Arbery, Note, A Step Backward for Equality Principles: The "Reasonable Woman" Standard in
Title VII Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claims, 27 GA. L. REV. 503, 505 (1993)
(noting that Title VII aims are to eradicate employment discrimination and encourage equal
treatment for all workers);Jolynn Childers, Note, Is There a Place for a Reasonable Woman in the
Law? A Discussion of Recent Developments in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 42 DUKE L.J.
854, 902 (1993) (arguing for standard that would examine inappropriateness of defendant's
alleged behavior from the perspective of the putative "reasonable victim"); Catherine M.
Maraist, Note, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton: An Analysis of the Subjective Perception Test Required
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analysis, it is sufficient that "members of one sex are exposed to dis-
advantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members
of the other sex are not exposed. ' 6
B. Same-Sex Sexual Harassment
The Supreme Court has stated that Title VII is meant "'to strike at
the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in
employment."' 7  Noting the paucity of legislative history revealing
Congress's intentions in enacting the relevant portion of the statute,5
the Court has interpreted the statute's plain language in a gender-
neutral fashion. 9 The Supreme Court has deemed the plain lan-
guage of the statute and its previous use of gender neutral language
to construe the statute to be evidence that hostile environment sex-
ual harassment of a subordinate by a supervisor of the same gender is
actionable under Title VII in the same way that harassment of a sub-
ordinate of the opposite gender is.60 Prior to the Supreme Court's
ruling, five federal courts of appeals and numerous federal district
courts looked to the plain language of the statute and to the Su-
preme Court's use of gender-neutral language as support for their
conclusion that same-sex sexual harassment was cognizable.6' Some
by Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 57 LA. L. REv. 1343, 1352-57 (1997) (canvassing commentary
of courts about how and when the subjective prong laid down in Harris can be fulfilled).
56. Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg,J., concurring).
57. Meritor Sav. Bankv. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Wa-
ter & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n. 13 (1978)).
58. There has been discussion surrounding the question of whether the legislative history
of Title VII reveals that the inclusion of "sex" in the statute was a last-minute attempt to under-
mine its passage. SeeRobert C. Bird, More Than a CongressionalJoke: A Fresh Look at the Legislative
Histoiy of Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, S WM. & MARYJ. WOMEN & L. 137, 139
(1997); Schultz, supra note 35, at 1697 n.50.
59. See Mentor, 477 U.S. at 64; see also EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1102
(M.D. Tenn. 1995) (explaining that language used by the Mentor court in defining sexual har-
assment as discrimination based on sex was not limited to opposite sex situations). But see Mar-
tin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 926 F. Supp. 1044, 1048 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (noting that hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment is different from sex discrimination because it derives from judicial
interpretation; an evaluation of its reach involves other considerations (citing Meritor, 477 U.S.
at 57)).
60. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
61. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 573 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that Title
VII draws no distinction based on gender, anyone may bring suit regardless of their sex or har-
asser's sex), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998); Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d
1503, 1505 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1184 (1998); Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-
Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 447 (6th Cir. 1997) (ruling that same-sex sexual harassment cases
fall within "'traditional' notions of sex discrimination"); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99
F.3d 138, 142 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that language of Title VII is gender-neutral); see also
Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1378 (8th Cir. 1996); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec.
Co., 77 F.3d 745, 751 (4th Cir.) (explaining that protection of Title VII extends to all employ-
ees, not only to specific disadvantaged groups), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996); Caldwell v.
KFC Corp., 958 F. Supp. 962, 968 (D.NJ. 1997) (finding that victim need not be opposite sex of
harasser); Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697, 702 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (noting that language of
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courts also found the cognizability of same-sex claims supported by
the recognition of reverse discrimination claims under Title VII6 and
Title VII is so broad that it does not limit actions to heterosexual harassment); Rasmusson v.
Copeland LumberYards, No. CV-N-96-258, 1997 WL 769366, at *3 (D. Nev. Oct. 31, 1997); Sto-
rey v. Chase Bankcard Servs., Inc., 970 F. Supp. 722, 725 (D. Ariz. 1997); Griswold v. Fresenius
USA, Inc., 978 F. Supp. 718, 729 (N. D. Ohio 1997); Swage v. Inn Phila., Civ. A. No. 96-2380,
1996 WL 368316, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 1996) (stating that same-sex sexual harassment is
actionable under Title VII); Peric v. Board of Trustees, 96 C 2354, 1996 WL 515175, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 4, 1996) (acknowledging that statute contains gender-neutral terms); Williams v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1996) (rejecting claim that Title VII does not apply
to same-sex harassment); Ton v. Information Resources, Inc., 95 C 3565, 1996 WL 5322, at *5-6
(N.D. III. Jan. 3, 1996) (noting broad language of Title VII and fact that it is unlawful to dis-
criminate on basis of sexual factors), afJ'd sub nom. Bolaszewski v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS 29139 (2d Cir. Nov. 8, 1996); King v. Town of Hanover, 959 F. Supp. 62, 66
(D.N.H. 1996) (finding that nothing in Title VII places restrictions on same-sex sexual harass-
ment cause of action), aFid, 116 F.3d 965 (1st Cir. 1997);Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp.
1403, 1409 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (stating that victim does not have to be opposite sex of harasser),
affid, 125 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 1997);Johnson v. Community Nursing Servs., 932 F. Supp. 269, 273
(D. Utah 1996) (noting that anti-male harassment does not require showing that environment
was poisoned for all males); Easton v. Crossland Mortgage. Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368, 1378-80
(C.D. Cal. 1995) (explaining that plain language of Title VII does not preclude same-sex sexual
harassment), rev'd on other grounds, 114 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); Sardinia v. Dell-
wood Foods, Inc., 94 Civ. 5458, 1995 WL 640502, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1995) (asserting that,
under Title VII, same sex discrimination is plainly illegal); Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F.
Supp. 283, 287 (D.D.C. 1995) (noting that EEOC unequivocally found that same-sex harass-
ment to be illegal); Nogueras v. University of P.R., 890 F. Supp. 60, 63 (D.P.R. 1995) (stressing
that plain language of Title VII makes same-sex harassment unlawful); Griffith v. Keystone Steel
& Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1136-37 (C.D. Ill. 1995) (finding same-sex harassment illegal under
Title VII); Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1550 (M.D. Ala.
1995) (challenging Goluszek's narrow focus on an anti-male environment as not reflective of the
.current state of anti-discrimination jurisprudence"); McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Servs.
Inc., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (reasoning that same-sex sexual harassment violates
Title VII); Ladd v. Sertoma Handicapped Opportunity Program, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 766, 767
(N.D. Okla. 1995) (stressing that Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII to prohibit same-sex
harassment); Sardinia, 1995 WL 640502, at *4-5 (criticizing Goluszek for reasoning from vague,
gender-neutral language of student Note published two years prior to Meritor). But seeSchoiber
v. Emro Mktg. Co., 941 F. Supp. 730, 739 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (going beyond holding of GoluSZk to
hold that harassment by one gender of another is only scenario proscribed and that same-sex
sexual harassment could never be gender discrimination); Martin, 926 F. Supp. at 1048
(suggesting that plain language argument is unrevealing because sexual harassment is a prod-
uct ofjudiciai interpretation).
Several states have recognized same-sex sexual harassment claims under state law analogues
to Title VII. See, e.g., Storey, 970 F. Supp. at 731 (recognizing claim of same-sex sexual harass-
ment under Arizona Civil Rights Act); Doe v. Capital Cities, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 122, 126 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996) (interpreting California law as applying equally to both same-sex and opposite-sex
harassment); Melnychenko v. 84 Lumber Co., 676 N.E.2d 45, 48 (Mass. 1997) (noting that sex-
ual harassment is not limited to opposite-sex misconduct); Barbour v. Michigan Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 497 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (citing federal courts' consensus that same-
sex harassment is actionable); Cummings v. Koehnen, 556 N.W.2d 586, 589 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996) (finding that same-sex harassment violates state law), afd, 568 N.W.2d 418 (Minn. 1997);
Zalewski v. Overlook Hosp., 692 A.2d 131, 136 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (stating that
same-sex harassment claim based on gender stereotyping was cognizable); Yukoweil v. IBM,
Inc., 643 N.Y.S.2d 747, 748 (App. Div. 1996); Tarver v. Calex Corp., No. 96 CA 149, 1998 WL
74378, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App.Jan. 29, 1998) (holding same-gender sexual harassment cognizable
under Ohio analogue to Title VII); Doe v. Department of Transp., 931 P.2d 196, 199-200
(Wash. 1997).
62. See, e.g., Fredette 112 F.3d at 1506 (stating that acknowledgment of reverse-
discrimination claims supports recognition of same-sex sexual harassment); Storey, 970 F. Supp.
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the EEOC's position on the matter.63 Other federal courts of appeals
stated in dicta or implied that same-sex hostile environment sexual
harassment claims were cognizable under Title VII. 64 Still other
at 726; Caldwell, 958 F. Supp. at 968 (noting that same-sex harassment claims are analogous to
reverse discrimination, which is actionable under Title VII); King v. M.R. Brown, Inc., 911 F.
Supp. 161, 167 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (insisting that same-sex harassment claims must be actionable to
comport with reverse discrimination claims under Title VII); Easton, 905 F. Supp. at 1379
(noting that "people of color are not the only individuals that can the claim protection of Title
VII"); Nogueras, 890 F. Supp. at 63 (determining that Title VII expressly prohibits discrimina-
tion in any form based on both sex and race); Grffith, 887 F. Supp. at 1137 n.4 (allowing that
same-sex harassment claims could be viewed as similar to reverse discrimination claims); Wal-
den Book Co., 885 F. Supp. at 1103 (stressing that it would be illogical to permit reverse dis-
crimination claims but invalidate same-sex claims under Title VII); Prescott, 878 F. Supp. at 1550
(noting similarity between same-sex harassment claims and reverse discrimination claims under
Title VII); Swage, 1996 WL 368316, at *3 (arguing that it is illogical to allow reverse discrimina-
tion claims but disallow same-sex harassment claims under Title VII).
Naturally, the more analogous case would concern discrimination against a member of a
protected group by another member of that group. Such claims are cognizable. See, e.g., Cas-
taneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 489 (1977) (reasoning that discrimination against Mexican-
American was unlikely because many Mexican-Americans hold elected positions in country);
Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 158 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that discharge of
white woman by white supervisor might constitute race discrimination); Hansborough v. City of
Elkhart Parks & Recreation Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 199, 201 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (stating that dis-
crimination by black person against black person on the basis of race violates Title VII);
Franceschi v. Hyatt Corp., 782 F. Supp. 712, 724 (D.P.R. 1992) (asserting that discrimination by
a Puerto Rican against another Puerto Rican is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
63. The text of the EEOC's position is as follows:
The victim does not have to be of the opposite sex from the harasser. Since sexual
harassment is a form of sex discrimination, the crucial inquiry is whether the harasser
treats a member or members of one sex differently from members of the other sex.
The victim and the harasser may be of the same sex, where, for instance, the sexual
harassment is based on the victim's sex (not on the victim's sexual preference) and the
harasser does not treat employees of the opposite sex the same way.
EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 35, § 615.2(b) (3) (emphasis in original); see also Fre-
dettte 112 F.3d at 1505 (stating EEOC's view that victim does not have to be opposite sex of har-
asser); Caldwel/ 958 F. Supp. at 968 (asserting that Title VII protects employees from same-sex
discrimination); Hondo, 940 F. Supp. at 1409 (noting that EEOC finds sex to be irrelevant in
Title VII claims); Williams, 916 F. Supp. at 8 (recognizing that EEOC inquiry focuses on gender
rather than sexual orientation); Peric, 1996 WL 515175, at *3 (stating that EEOC makes it clear
that victim does not have to be opposite sex of harasser); Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc.,
919 F. Supp. 351, 355 (D. Nev. 1996) (granting Title VII protection to same-sex harassment);
Swage, 1996 WL 368316, at *2 (reporting that EEOC applies Title VII regulations to same-sex
harassment); Community Nursing Sews., 932 F. Supp. at 271 (noting that EEOC regards same-sex
harassment as actionable under Title VII); Ecklund v. Fuisz Tech., Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335, 337
(E.D. Va. 1995) (concluding that EEOC has clearly articulated its position that Title VII pro-
tects victims of same-sex discrimination); Ladd, 917 F. Supp. at 767 (contending that victim and
harasser do not have to be of opposite sexes); Sardinia, 1995 WL 640502, at *6 (delineating
EEOC position that same-sex harassment is actionable); Raney, 892 F. Supp. at 287
(determining that EEOC works against acts of same-sex harassment); Storey, 970 F. Supp. at 725
(D. Ariz. 1997); Rasmusson, 1997 WL 769366, at *3; Griswo, 978 F. Supp. at 729 (N.D. Ohio
1997).
64. See, e.g., McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 1996) (observing that disal-
lowing homosexual actions under Title VII is inherently unfair); Steiner v. Showboat Operating
Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that members of both genders have claims
against male harassers under Title VII); Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134,
148 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that same-sex harassment claims are actionable under Title VII);
Bundy v.Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (charging that sexual harassment en-
compasses same-sex harassment); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1047
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courts declined to address cognizability in cases involving evidence
deemed insufficient to amount to actionable sexual harassment.6
There has been agreement among most courts that quid pro quo
claims involving parties of the same sex are cognizable under Title
VII," as are sex discrimination claims not involving allegations of
sexual or gender-based harassment.67 Prior to Oncale, a minority of
courts denied recognition of same-sex sexual harassment claims in-
volving allegations of either quid pro quo or hostile environment
harassment.6s These courts described such claims as at odds with
Congress' intent to outlaw sex discrimination resulting from "'the
exploitation of a powerful position to impose sexual demands or
pressures on an unwilling but less powerful person."' ' Thus, these
n.4 (3d Cir. 1977) (observing that Title VII claims are not contingent on gender characteristics
alone); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding that discrimination
claims concerning sexual misconduct should be based on "but for" standard in regard to vic-
tim's gender).
65. See, e.g., Pasqua v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 101 F.3d 514, 517 (7th Cir. 1996)
(suggesting that showing that conduct was based on gender is an elementary requirement);
Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co., 81 F.3d 48 (6th Cir. 1996) (making clear that allegations must
demonstrate sexual misconduct), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 170 (1996); Purrington v. University of
Utah, 996 F.2d 1025, 1028-31 (10th Cir. 1993) (resolving that claim of sexual harassment is
barred due to fact that numerous factors were not established); Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen.
Hosp., 901 F.2d 186, 192 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that sexual harassment claim must be clearly
demonstrated to have cause of action under Title VII); Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 887
F. Supp. 1178, 1181-82 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (stating that conduct in question is not actionable);
Ryczek v. Guest Servs., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 754 (D.D.C. 1995) (granting summary judgment on
plaintiff's claim of sexual harassment); see also Schmitz, 1997 WL 218258, at *2 (noting that Ohio
law contains analogous section to Title VII that includes broad prohibition of employment dis-
crimination).
66. See, e.g., Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990 n.55 (noting that both opposite-sex and same-sex quid
pro quo actions present identical legal problems); Waag v. Thomas Pontiac, Buick, GMC, Inc.,
930 F. Supp 393, 399 (D. Minn. 1996) (noting that Title VII protects employees against same-
gender sexual harassment); Ton, 1996 WL 5322, at *7 (discussing EEOC standards for sexual
harassment showing under Title VII); Prescott, 878 F. Supp. at 1549-50 (detailing that defendant
corporation was strictly liable for quid pro quo requirements of sexual favors).
67. See, e.g., Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 142 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting
that key inquiry is whether employee was discriminated against because of his or her sex, re-
gardless of employer's sexual preference).
68. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 120 (5th Cir. 1996),
rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (noting that Fifth Circuit holds that same-sex sexual harassment is
not actionable under Title VII); Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-53 (5th Cir.
1994) (holding that same-sex harassment could not constitute claim under Title VII); Jackson
v. Arthur Anderson & Co., No. 3:96-CV-2206-D, 1997 WL 74709, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 1997)
(stating that Fifth Circuit does not recognize same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII); Har-
ris v. National Precision Blanking, No. 95 C 6022, 1987 WL 448042, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 30,
1997) (denying Title VII claim of same-sex harassment); Sarff v. Continental Express, 894 F.
Supp. 1076, 1082 (S.D. Tex. 1995), affid, 85 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that Title VII does
not ban sexual discrimination based on sexual orientation); Benekritis v. Johnson, 882 F. Supp.
521, 526 (D.S.C. 1995) (acknowledging that same-sex harassment was not cognizable under
Tide VII); Myers v. City of El Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1546, 1548 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (explaining that
Fifth Circuit does not allow Title VII claim for same-sex harassment); Goluszek v. H.P. Smith,
697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Il1. 1988) (noting that male-on-male sexual harassment was not
actionable where harassment did not create anti-male environment in the workplace).
69. See Benekritis, 882 F. Supp. at 525 (quoting Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456).
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courts reasoned, a male in a male-dominated environment has no
claim for sexual harassment against another male, since, even if the
victim was harassed because he was male, there would be insufficient
evidence to show the existence of an anti-male environment in the
workplace. 71 Other courts deemed same-sex sexual harassment non-
cognizable, even where an anti-male or anti-female environment
could be shown. These courts reasoned that Congress did not intend
to recognize same-sex sexual harassment, and that same-sex sexual
harassment claims were inherently claims of sexual orientation dis-
crimination, discrimination on the basis of sexual prudery, or dis-
crimination on the basis of effeminacy, mental disability or other
vulnerability.
7'
II. DEVELOPING THE CONTOURS OF ACTIONABLE SAME-SEX
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Courts' prior disagreement concerning the cognizability of same-
sex sexual harassment has been resolved by the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. Oncale came on the
heels of a spate of Fifth Circuit and district court decisions determin-
ing that same-sex sexual harassment was noncognizable2 but ex-
pressed doubt as to the rationale for this position. In Oncale, Joseph
Oncale, a roustabout on an offshore oil rig, was threatened with ho-
mosexual rape, was restrained by a co-worker while a second placed
70. See id.; see also Oncale 83 F.3d at 120 (clarifying that same-sex harassment is not tanta-
mount to sexual discrimination, absent showing that employer treated plaintiff differently be-
cause of gender); Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489, 494 (W.D. Wash. 1995)
(collecting cases and noting that "plaintiff [did] not allege that his workplace was other than
predominantly male, or that an anti-male environment was created").
71. See, e.g., Oncake 83 F.3d at 120; Garcia, 28 F.3d at 451-53 (noting that same-sex harass-
ment claims are distinct from male/female claims and do not fall within intended protection of
Title VII); Harris, 1997 WL 448042, at *3 (finding that same-sex harassment claims were not
intended to fall within scope of Title VII); Torres v. National Precision Blanking, 943 F. Supp.
952, 958-61 (N.D. Il. 1996) (contending that Congress did not intend to encompass same-sex
claims in enacting Title VII); Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 926 F. Supp. 1044, 1050 (N.D. Ala.
1996) (determining that not all harassment with sexual overtones is actionable under Title
VII).
72. See, e.g., Oncafr 83 F.3d at 118; Garcia, 28 F.3d at 445. District courts within the Fifth
Circuit were constrained to follow Garcia's language as binding, albeit not altogether com-
fortably. See, e.g., Larry v. North Miss. Med. Ctr., 940 F. Supp. 960, 963 (N.D. Miss. 1996); Hahn
v. Bentsen, No. CIVA.93-3820, 1996 WL 383129, at *9 (E.D. La.July 3, 1996); Sarff, 894 F. Supp.
at 1082; Blake v. City of Laredo, 58 F.3d 637 (5th Cir. June 9, 1996) (per curiam)
(unpublished); Myers v. City of El Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1546, 1548 (W.D. Tex. 1995); Polly v.
Houston Lighting & Power Co., 803 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Tex. 1992); Rodriguez v. Valteau, No. Civ.
A. 97-0658, 1997 WL 602191 (E.D. La. Sept. 29, 1997). But see Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate
Management Co., No. CIV. A. 93-2351, 1995 WL 241855, *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 25, 1995); Castel-
lano v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., No. H.-94-2673, slip op. at 7-8 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 1995); Riser
v. Haggar Clothing Co., No. 3:95-CV-3129-G, 1997 WL 361644, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 25, 1997)
(in action for attorney's fees, declining to find plaintiffs claim "frivolous and baseless" given
conflict in the courts and the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Oncale).
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his penis on Oncale's neck, and finally was restrained by a co-worker
in the shower while a second co-worker forced a bar of soap into On-
cale's anus.73 The appellate court questioned the precedential value
of Garcia, noting that "so long as the plaintiff proves that the harass-
ment is because of the victim's sex, the sex of the harasser and victim
is irrelevant,"74 but nonetheless concluded it was bound by Garcia "in
the absence of an intervening contrary or superseding decision by
the Court en banc or the Supreme Court. 75 In reaching its determi-
nation, the Oncale Court did not address the harassers' sexual orien-
tations or whether their conduct exhibited a sexual attraction to On-
cale, suggesting that conduct aimed at the genitals is enough to
constitute actionable sexual harassment.76 The defendant appealed,
77and the Supreme Court, after requesting advice on the matter, was
advised by the Department of Justice to grant certiorari. 8 The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari79 and unanimously reversed the Fifth
Circuit's decision.
The Supreme Court's decision in Oncale contains remarkable par-
allels to Merito ° in that it establishes a cause of action for sexual har-
assment, this time by plaintiffs against those of the same sex,8 but
leaves the "work of defining standards to the lower courts."82 Like
73. See Oncale, 83 F.3d at 118-19.
74. Id. at 119.
75. Id. (citing Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458, 465 (5th Cir. 1991)). At least one
commentator, has argued that the Garcia court's pronouncement against the cognizability of
same-sex claims was dicta. See Shahan, infra note 168. There is little support for this statement,
given that noncognizability was one of the court's grounds for rejecting Garcia's claim. Unlike
district courts in circuits where pronouncements on the coguizability of same-sex claims is un-
questionably found in dicta, see, e.g., Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir.
1995); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994); Saulpaugh v.
Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir. 1993); Bundyv.Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942
n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1047 n.4 (3d Cir.
1977); Barnes v. Coste, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977), district courts within the Fifth
Circuit have been constrained to follow Garcia's language as binding, albeit not altogether
comfortably. See, e.g., Larry, 940 F. Supp. at 963; Hahn, 1996 WL 383129, at *9; Sarff, 894 F.
Supp. at 1082; Blake, 58 F.3d at 637; Myers, 874 F. Supp. at 1548; Polly, 803 F. Supp. at 1. But see
Pritchett, 1995 WL 241855, *2; Castellano, No. H-94-2673, slip op. at 7-8 (stating that the Garcia
court's pronouncement was dicta).
76. Note that in Quick v. Donaldson Co., 895 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D. Iowa 1995),rev'd, 90
F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996), the court described the conduct,"bagging," as sexual only insofar as
"the aggressor aims his non-sexual aggression on genitals."
77. The Department's position is that "the law protects all employees from sex discrimina-
tion, regardless of their gender or sexual orientation." Edward Felsenthal, U.S. Urges Court to
Hear Same-Sex Harassment Case; WALL ST.J., May 27, 1997, at B8.
78. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 117 S. Ct. 607 (1997).
79. See Oncale; 118 S. Ct. at 998-1000.
80. See Schlossberg, supra note 6, at 1 (describing Oncale as "[rlestating principles estab-
lished over a decade ago in Meritor").
81. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001-02.
82. Marcia Coyle, Justices Tackle Sex Harassment; Four Cases Offer Chances to Rewrite This Area
of Law, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 23, 1998.
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Meritor, Oncale offers "little practical guidance"83 to courts trying to
determine the actionability of allegations of sexual harassment be-
yond the admonition to pay "careful attention to the requirements of
the statute"" and to use "common sense."85 The Court did make it
clear that homosexuality is relevant in cases where perpetrators solicit
sexual activity from victims of the same sex but that the severity and
pervasiveness requirements and due regard paid to "social context"
would assist courts and juries in distinguishing horseplay from dis-
crimination.6 Notably, the Oncale decision does not indicate disap-
proval of the Fourth Circuit's decision in McWilliams and Wrightson,
discussed below. It merely states that in the absence of showing ho-
mosexuality to prove a harasser's motivation by sexual desire, a plain-
tiff could allege gender-based discrimination. This statement is con-
sistent with the Fourth Circuit's position and that of other courts
which even before McWilliams and Wrightson recognized the distinc-
tion between harassment of a sexual nature and gender-based har-
assment.
The struggle for courts after Oncale is defining the contours of ac-
tionable same-sex sexual harassment.87 Although there are similari-
ties between the courts' application of the prima facie elements of
sexual harassment to opposite-sex cases and their application of these
elements to same-sex cases, there are salient differences as well.ss
The most marked difference is the greater emphasis some courts
place on the importance of the causation element in same-sex har-
assment cases.9 As noted above, the causation prong requires essen-
tially that the plaintiff show that the harassment would not have oc-
curred had he or she been of the opposite sex.* Some courts have
suggested that the causation element is as presumptive in same-sex
cases as it is in opposite-sex cases,9' but, given that motive and causa-
83. See Greenburg, supra note 6, at N1.
84. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
85. See id. at 1003.
86. See id.
87. See Thorpe, supra note 35, at 1392 (identifying various shortcomings of courts that al-
ready recognize gender-based discrimination as actionable per se).
88. See Dale Carpenter, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under Title VI, 37 TEx. L. REv. 699, 717
(1996) (comparing different modes of inquiry applied to both same-sex and opposite-sex har-
assment claims).
89. See Levitsky, supra note 45, at 1018 (discussing causation standards applied by courts in
analyzing Title VII claims).
90. See Caldwell v. KFC Corp., 958 F. Supp. 962, 969 (D.NJ. 1997) (noting that key inquiry
in harassment claim is establishing that gender is a substantial factor in conduct (citing
Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1047 n.4 (3d Cir. 1977))). The court in
Blake v. Grede Foundries, Inc., No. 96-1322, 1997 WL 157126, at *4 (D. Kan. Mar. 20, 1997), gave
a unique twist to the causation language: "[Ihf either the motivation or the manner of expres-
sion of offensive behavior is sexually based, sexual harassment has occurred."
91. See, e.g., Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1507 (11th Cir. 1997),
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tion may be less evident in same-sex cases,92 many courts view causa-
tion as the linchpin of same-sex sexual harassment claims. In evaluat-
ing the actionability of the conduct in these cases, courts have looked
with special care at different aspects of the charged conduct in judg-
ing whether it meets the causation requirement of Title VII. Reason-
ing that sexual harassment is a reflection of the harasser's sexual at-
traction to the harassee, courts have looked to whether sexual
attraction of the harasser towards the victim is apparent to satisfy the
causation requirement.93 For a plaintiff to make this showing, some
courts require proof of the homosexuality of the harasser,94 while
other courts deem sexual orientation merely relevant95 or completely
revu 905 F. Supp. 1034 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (finding similarity in intent behind same-sex and op-
posite sex harassment), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1184 (1998); Gerd v. United Parcel Serv., 934 F.
Supp. 357, 361 (D. Colo. 1996) (finding claim for relief under Title VII); Martin v. Norfolk S.
Ry. Co., 926 F. Supp. 1044, 1049 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (when harassment of male by a homosexual
male is "sexually oriented," the harassment is presumed to be based on sexual attraction); Tiet-
gen v. Brown's Westminster Motors Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495 (E.D. Va. 1996) (asserting presump-
tion that sexual harassment occurs because victim is male); McCoy v. Johnson Controls World
Servs., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. Ga. 1995) ("[S]exual harassment of any kind is in fact 'based
upon sex' and is considered sexual discrimination."); Papish, supra note 12, at 208 (discussing
various approaches of federal courts in analyzing same-sex harassment claims).
92. See Gerd, 934 F. Supp. at 361 (noting that motive and causation are often less evident in
same-sex harassment actions); Martin, 926 F. Supp. at 1049 (noting that same-sex harassment is
often difficult to establish due to lack of conclusive evidence of causation); Tielgen, 921 F. Supp.
at 1501 (remarking that same-sex harassment is more difficult to discern as misconduct than
heterosexual harassment); Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 805, 807 (N.D. Ind.
1995) (suggesting that causation is more nebulous in same-sex cases than in opposite-sex
cases).
93. See, e.g., Caldwel4 958 F. Supp. at 962 (noting that plaintiff must establish attraction
element and that conduct occurred because of victim's sex); Shermer v. Illinois Dep't of
Transp., 937 F. Supp. 781, 784 (C.D. Ill. 1996) ("[W]ithout proof that a harasser acted out of
sexual attraction, it is very difficult for a plaintiff to prove a same-sex hostile environment
claim.").
94. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 752 (4th Cir.) (noting that
proving homosexuality must include more than suggestive conduct), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 70
(1996); McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir.) (iterating that
homosexual harassment claims under Title VII should be substantiated and proven in estab-
lishing underlying basis of claim), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996); Martin, 926 F. Supp. at 1050
(reasoning that evidence of homosexuality is key inquiry in same-sex harassment claims under
Title VII); Dixon v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 926 F. Supp. 548, 550-51 (E.D. Va. 1996)
(discussing burden of proving harasser's sexual orientation). But see Ford v. Rigidply Rafters,
Inc., No. Y-96-1699, 1998 WL 154409, at *2 (D. Md. Apr. 1, 1998) (characterizing Oncale as a
rejection of this approach).
95. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998); McCoy v. Macon
Water Auth., 966 F. Supp. 1209, 1217 (M.D. Ga. 1997) (holding that Title VII recognizes a
cause of action where male employee was harassed by same-sex, homosexual superior); Wehrle
v. Office Depot, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 234, 236 (W.D. Okla. 1996) (articulating that homosexual
superior's misconduct toward member of same sex was illicit under Title VII); Miller v. Vesta,
Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697, 711-12 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (describing homosexuality as relevant only to
the victim's subjective view of the harassment); Johnson v. Community Nursing Servs., 932 F.
Supp. 269, 273 (D. Utah 1996) (arguing that homosexual harassment by member of same sex
establishes cause of action); Waag v. Thomas Pontiac, Buick, GMC, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 393, 402-
03 (D. Minn. 1996) (discussing defendant's sexual orientation in assessing sexual harassment
claim); Martin, 926 F. Supp. at 1049 (presuming causation where homosexual harasses member
of same sex); Tietgen, 921 F. Supp. at 1501-02 (finding link between causation and harasser's
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irrelevant.9 Other courts use the perpetrator's conduct to infer sex-
ual attraction 7 or sexual orientation." At least one court looks solely
to the explicit sexual nature of the conduct, be it an "intrusion upon
sexual privacy" or "explicit comments on gender."' Inability to show
sexual orientation); EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (M.D. Tenn. 1995)
(stating that, if harasser is homosexual, causation is presumed); Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods,
Inc., No. 94 Civ. 5458, 1995 WL 640502, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that harassment and
discrimination can occur without sexual attraction); Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F.
Supp. 537, 544 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (noting that homosexual harassment caused job detriment in
violation of Titie VII); Griswold, 978 F. Supp. at 730 n.5 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
96. See, e.g., Wehrle, 954 F. Supp. at 236 (finding homosexuality of perpetrator irrelevant);
Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 355 (D. Nev. 1996) ("Just as courts do
not inquire into the sexual preferences of the victim in cases of opposite sex harassment, the
sexual preference of the victim should be a non-issue in a same-sex sexual harassment case.");
Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403, 1411 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (holding that perpetrator's
sexuality was irrelevant and opining that proof of harasser's homosexuality does not establish
that the victim was harassed because of his gender), afl'd, 125 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 1997); Williams
v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1996) (asserting that sexual orientation of
harasser is irrelevant under Titie VII); Marciano v. Kash N' Karry Foodstores, Inc., No. 94-1657-
CA-T-17A, 1996 WL 420879, at *34 (M.D. Fla.July 1, 1996) (holding homosexuality irrelevant
in same-sex hostile environment case and noting factual disputes as to the actionability of the
conduct); Ecklund v. Fuisz Tech., Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335, 338-39 (E.D. Va. 1995) (noting impor-
tance of differential treatment because of one's gender); Shermer, 937 F. Supp. at 784
(criticizing requirement of proof of harasser's homosexuality as relying on trait not mentioned
in Titie VII rather than on conduct that statute prohibits); see also Cummings v. Koehnen, 556
N.W.2d 586, 589 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that Minnesota Human Rights Act does not
require proof of harasser or victim's gender, but only that a hostile work environment was cre-
ated), affd, 568 N.W.2d 418 (Minn. 1997).
A related concern has been raised by gay advocates that "same-sex harassment cases will turn
into witch hunts if they are permitted to hinge on the sexual orientation of those involved."
Robin Estrin, Mass. High Court Takes up Issue of Same-Sex Harassing, COMMERCIAL APPEAL
(Memphis), Oct. 11, 1996, at A5 (quoting Mary Bonauto, a lawyer with Gay & Lesbian Advo-
cates & Defenders).
97. See, e.g., Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 1997)
(stating that aggressor's conduct is actionable when it appears that he finds male co-worker at-
tractive); Tielgen, 921 F. Supp. at 1501 ("If a male employer touches a male employee in a sex-
ual manner, or invites the male employee to engage in sexual conduct, the employer likely
does so because the employee is male."); see also Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of
Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1 (1992) (arguing
that sex discrimination can be found solely in the sexual nature of the conduct in a sexual har-
assment case).
98. See, e.g., Dixon, 926 F. Supp. at 551 (arguing that sexual solicitation was sufficient to
draw conclusion that harasser was homosexual); Tietgen, 921 F. Supp. at 1500 n.8, 1502 (noting
that solicitation for sexual favors from individual of same sex supports inference that alleged
harasser is either homosexual or bisexual); Waag, 930 F. Supp. at 401 (recognizing that unwel-
come homosexual advances, like unwelcome heterosexual advances, arise presumptively be-
cause of plaintiff's gender); Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate Management Co., Civ. A. No. 93-
2351, 1995 WL 241855, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 25, 1995) (stating that it is improper to exempt a
supervisor's conduct from Title VII claim solely because of supervisor's sexual orientation).
Waag and Caldwell assert, and Pritchett suggests, that without such presumptions, a homosexual
supervisor will escape liability for conduct for which a heterosexual supervisor would be liable.
See McFarland, supra note 44, at 494 n.6 (concluding that perpetrator's choice of victim indi-
cates sexual orientation because it is presumed that victim was harassed because of gender).
99. See Gerd v. United Parcel Serv., 934 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D. Colo. 1996) (noting that de-
terminative inquiry focuses on causation and sexual nature of acts); Waag, 930 F. Supp. at 401;
Peric v. Board of Trustees, No. 96 C 2354, 1996 WL 515175, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 1996)
(observing that harasser's sexual demands could only be demanded of another man). But see
Ward v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 810, 812-13 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (requiring showing of sex-
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attraction frustrates claims, unless the perpetrator's treatment of the
opposite gender, in the form of discriminatory intimidation, ridicule
and insult,'00 the EEOC's "crucial inquiry,"' reveals animus towards
his or her own gender.1
2
On the other side of the spectrum, some courts have required the
allegation of an anti-male environment to show causation.0 3 One
court has even required a showing of an imbalance of power between
the perpetrator and the victim.' 4 Other courts have declared that an
anti-male environment is merely relevant. 5
ual attraction because not all sexual conduct directed by one man towards another is action-
able), affid, 124 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1997).
100. See Rasmusson, 988 F. Supp. at 1301 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21).
101. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 35, § 615.2(b)(3) ("[T]he crucial inquiry is
whether the harasser treats a member or members of one sex differently from members of the
other sex."). But see Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697, 702 (E.D. 'Wis. 1996) (rejecting posi-
tion that whether the harasser treats a member or members of one sex differently from mem-
bers of the other sex is crucial to inquiry).
102. SeeEschbach v. County of Lehigh, No. Civ. A. 95-7276, 1997 WL 109611, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 28, 1997) (attributing significance to female supervisor's statement that she liked male
coworker better because he had a penis); Shermer v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 937 F. Supp.
781,784 n.2 (C.D. Ill. 1996) (signifying proof that harasser dislikes own gender (citing Sardinia
v. DelIwood Foods, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 5458, 1995 WL 640502 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1995))); Tietgen,
921 F. Supp. at 1501 (observing that male supervisor may display bitterness or malignity to male
employee because he prefers to work with females); Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford, Inc., 896 F.
Supp. 805, 807 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (requiring showing of anti-male bias and noting difficulty of
doing so via sexually explicit words or conduct); see also Sneed v. Montgomery Hous. Auth., 956
F. Supp. 982 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (failing to establish hostile work environment or show that co-
worker had animus towards own gender); Andrews v. City of Phila., 713 F. Supp. 760, 770 n.6
(E.D. Pa. 1989) (finding sexual harassment despite minimal evidence of sexual conduct), af'd
in part and vacated in part, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990); Paul, supra note 26, at 350 (describing
general animus toward any member of the scorned group as an essential attribute of discrimi-
nation).
103. See, e.g., Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489, 494 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (ruling
that plaintiff failed to prove that an anti-male environment existed); Blozis, 896 F. Supp. at 806
(reasoning that workplace atmosphere was not anti-male); Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp.,
887 F. Supp. 1178, 1180 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (requiring showing of gender-biased atmosphere but
noting that anti-male environments are rarely shown); Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co., No. C-3-94-
182, 1995 WL 386793, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 1994) (stating that sexual harassment claim
depends on creation of anti-male work environment); Polly v. Houston Lighting & Power Co.,
803 F. Supp. 1, 5 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (determining that failure to show anti-male work environ-
ment was factor in dismissal); Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(concluding that harassment did not create an anti-male work environment). But see Paul, su-
pra note 26, at 335 (arguing that inclusion of abuse of power in definition of sexual harassment
is too restrictive because definition does not reflect what occurs in many hostile work environ-
ment situations between co-workers, unless one assumes that males in any position enjoy more
power than women); Susan Silberman Blasi, Comment, The Adjudication of Same-Sex Sexual Har-
assment Claims Under Title VII, 12 LAB. LAw. 291, 301 (1996) (stating that it cannot be assumed
that creating a hostile environment for one person represents the creation of a hostile envi-
ronment for everyone else in that person's category).
104. SeeBenekritis v.Johnson, 882 F. Supp. 521, 525 (D.S.C. 1995) (requiring an imbalance
of power for harassment to be actionable).
105. See, e.g., Waag v. Thomas Pontiac, Buick, GMC, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 393, 402 (D. Minn.
1996) (describing determination concerning whether members of one sex were treated differ-
ently as relevant but not necessary); Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1137
(C.D. II. 1995) (concluding that impact on other workers of the same sex is relevant but not
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Recent rulings by courts exhibit less concern solely with causation
than with the character of the harassing conduct and how it embod-
ies evidence both of causation and a hostile work environment.
0'6
Courts, largely unguided by the Supreme Court, are beginning to
evaluate how the nature of the conduct reflects causation, as it is said
107to do in opposite-sex cases. The struggle for courts now lies with
defining what constitutes sexual conduct between persons of the
same sex. Initial attempts to forge this definition have involved as-
sessing causation by evaluating whether the conduct in a given case is
of a sexual nature or merely constitutes non-sexual horseplay.' This
shift in the causation inquiry reflects a movement toward aligning the
contours of same-sex claims with the inquiry made in opposite-sex
claims.' °
Same-sex sexual harassment cases in the Fourth and Seventh Cir-
cuits are illustrative of the trends described. A discussion of the case
law in these circuits is important because these cases exemplify the
most significant analytical approaches currently employed in same-
sex cases, and factually, these cases reflect the full range of same-sex
sexual harassment cases nationwide. A study of case law in these cir-
cuits also reveals that district courts evaluating same-sex claims have
engaged in judicial activism by subtly questioning and ultimately de-
parting from binding precedent, thereby influencing the analysis of
future same-sex claims.
A. The Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit recognized same-sex sexual harassment claims
essential to prevailing on sexual harassment claim). But see Paul, supra note 26, at 360-61
(arguing that sexual harassment claims are essentially individual and not group-rights claims).
106. See, e.g., Gerd v. United Parcel Serv., 934 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D. Colo. 1996)
(emphasizing "but for' standard for sexual harassment determination (citing Williams v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1996))); Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F.
Supp. 1334, 1336 (D. Wyo. 1993) (characterizing the Meitor standard as reflecting movement
away from "but for" analysis of gender harassment toward analysis of whether conduct creates a
hostile work environment); seealsoPapish, supra note 12, at 232.
107. See infra notes 150-77 and accompanying text
108. See, e.g., Blake v. Grede Foundries, Inc., No. 96-1322, 1997 WL 157126, at *4 (D. Kan.
Mar. 20, 1997) (holding that sexual harassment has occurred if offensive behavior motivated by
sex or manner of expression was sexual in nature (citing Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79
F.3d 996, 1000 (10th Cir. 1996))); King v. Town of Hanover, 959 F. Supp. 62, 66 (D.N.H. 1996)
(inferring that conduct occurred because plaintiff was male, despite defendant's contention
that harasser was not homosexual and behavior was merely "workplace banter"), afd, 116 F.3d
965 (1st Cir. 1997); Gerd, 934 F. Supp. at 360 (noting that even where"locker room" activity has
occurred, the conduct may be actionable in a mixed motive context if it violates Title VII);
McCoy v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (noting that all sexual
harassment is based on sex and can be considered sexual discrimination).
109. See Ecklund v. Fuisz Tech., Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335, 340 (E.D. Va. 1995) (determining
that the behavior involved is more important than the sex of the perpetrator).
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beginning with McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors.n° In
McWilliams, the court ruled that same-sex sexual harassment was ac-
tionable only where the homosexuality of the harasser could be
shown."' This ruling was confirmed by the court in the case of
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc."2 Same-sex sexual harassment
jurisprudence in this circuit's district courts is evolving to the point
where allegations that the harasser's conduct reveals a sexual attrac-
tion to the victim, regardless of the harasser's sexual orientation,
form the basis of an actionable claim. In this way, despite the posi-
tion of the Fourth Circuit, causation can be shown entirely apart
from any showing of the harasser's "true" orientation.
1. McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors and
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc.
In McWilliams, a cognitively disabled male named Mark McWilliams
was subjected by his co-workers to teasing, questions about his sexual
activities, requests to masturbate him, and physical assaults involving
placing a broomstick to his anus and fondling him to the point of
erection."' Forced to his knees on one occasion, McWilliams was
blindfolded and made to "fellate" a harasser's finger." 4 The court
held that sexual behavior between heterosexuals of the same sex is
never actionable under Title VII. 5 In dicta, the court suggested that
the claim would be actionable in a same-sex case where the perpetra-
tor's homosexuality or sexual attraction toward the victim is shown."6
110. 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996).
111. Seeid.at1193.
112. 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996). Before McWilliams and Wrightson, the District of South
Carolina had issued conflicting opinions on this matter. Compare Benekritis v. Johnson, 882 F.
Supp. 521, 526 (D.S.C. 1995) (finding no cognizability based on Garcia and Gola.szen), with Roe
v. K-Mart Corp., No. CIVA.2:93-2372-18AJ, 1995 WL 316783, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 28, 1995)




115. See id. at 1196.
116. See id. at 1195. This dicta regarding the homosexuality of the harasser was rendered
binding precedent by the court in Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 141 (4th
Cir. 1996). In Yeary v. Goodwill Industries-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 1997), a homo-
sexual supervisor "notorious for harassing male employees" touched an employee's arm, chest
and stomach, forced the employee to the wall in his office and whispered obscene comments
about his physical appearance, and called the employee at home to make further lewd com-
ments. See id. at 444. The court, noting that the Fourth Circuit requires proof of the perpetra-
tor's homosexuality, ruled that same-sex sexual harassment is cognizable under Tite VII. See
id. at 447-48. The court declined to address the issue whether same-sex sexual harassment is
actionable only when the harasser is a homosexual. See id. at 448.
The court in Fredette v. BVP Management Associates, 112 F.3d 1503 (11 th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 1184 (1998), a factually similar case, likewise declined to decide the question, stating,
The distinction the Fourth Circuit has recognized is easily perceived. We readily un-
derstand a homosexual male's advances towards another male to occur "because of
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This dicta regarding the homosexuality of the harasser was rendered
binding precedent by the court in Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America,
inC.
17
In Wrightson, Arthur Wrightson's gay supervisor and gay fellow em-
ployees attempted, over a period of seven months, to induce him and
two other heterosexual male employees to engage in homosexual sex
acts."" The harassment suffered by Wrightson consisted not only of
verbal descriptions of homosexual sex and invitations to engage in
sex but involved touching of a sexual nature as well."19 The court,
noting the reservation of the question by the McWilliams court, held
that "a claim under Title VII for same-sex 'hostile work environment'
harassment may lie where the perpetrator of the sexual harassment is
homosexual." ' The court based its holding on the "simple logic"
that "an employer of either sex can discriminate against his or her
employees of the same sex because of their sex."'
In the Fourth Circuit at least, knowing that the harasser is homo-
sexual appears to entail the same presumption-that the conduct was
based on sex-that applies to opposite-sex cases where the sexual
orientation of the harasser is never questioned. The difference is
that in opposite-sex cases, the heterosexuality of the harasser is pre-
sumed, and the presumption is irrebuttable'22 In same-sex cases,
homosexuality must be alleged and can be rebutted.'23 Absent proof
sex"; we understand this both out of common experience and in recognition of the
parallels between this situation and the paradigm case of harassment involving a het-
erosexual male and a female victim, in which we have determined that the causation
element of Title VII is easily met. Whether the kind of harassment at issue in McWil-
liams.., occurs "because of sex" is a more difficult question, both in terms of com-
mon experience and the law.
Id. at 1507.
117. 99 F.3d at 141.
118. See id. at 139.
119. See id. at 139-40.
120. Id. at 141.
121. Id. at 142.
122. See generally Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 748-49 (4th Cir. 1996)
(distinguishing same-sex sexual harassment from opposite sex harassment by observing that
plaintiff in same-sex harassment case must overcome presumption that actions were not based
on sex), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996).
123. Objecting to the Fourth Circuit's rebuttable presumption that all parties are hetero-
sexual, Shahan states inaccurately that "[any presumption regarding the parties' sexual pref-
erence is new to Title Vi jurisprudence." Amy Shahan, Comment, Determining Whether Title VII
Provides a Cause of Action For Same-Sex Sexual Harassment, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 507, 517 (1996). In
fact, it is a staple in opposite-sex cases to assume the heterosexuality of the parties. See Moylan
v. Maries County, 742 F.2d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1986). Even same-sex cases address and make this
point. See, e.g., Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 752 (finding that opposite gender sexual harassment is cou-
pled with presumption that harassment occurred because of the victim's gender and would not
have been directed toward another male); Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry., 926 F. Supp. 1044, 1049
(N.D. Ala. 1996) (arguing that presumption of sexual gratification and sex discrimination are
improper in same-sex sexual harassment cases because it cannot be assumed that alleged con-
duct occurred because of employee's gender); Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc.,
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from McWilliams of the homosexuality of his harassers, the court
presumed that McWilliams' harassers were heterosexual. 4  It thus
characterized the harassing conduct as puerile horseplay and McWil-
liams as hyper-sensitive.1 as This characterization of the events was
aided by the court's abridged version of the facts of the case. Not un-
til the dissent does the reader learn that one of the perpetrators in
the case "fondled" McWilliams' penis to erection, asked to be permit-
ted to masturbate him, and made sexual overtures to him in the
men's restroom
2 6
The majority, noting the "heterosexuality" of the perpetrators,
stated simply that causation could not be inferred from this conduct,
because it was "merely suggestive of homosexuality.' 27  Conclusive
homosexuality was available in Wrightson, on the other hand, only be-
cause the homosexuality of the perpetrators was known. In seeking
to define what constitutes sexual conduct between men, McWilliams
and Wrightson stand for the proposition that such conduct does not
occur where the plaintiff cannot establish the aggressor's homosexu-
ality independent from conduct-based inferences, even where that
conduct includes fondling the victim's genitals and soliciting sexual
contact.
2. Departures from McWilliams and Wrightson
Although at least one district court within the Fourth Circuit fol-
921 F. Supp. 1495, 1501 (E.D. Va. 1996) (observing that causation is more difficult to establish
in same-sex sexual harassment cases because society is more accustomed to heterosexual inter-
actions); Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368, 1383 (C.D. Cal. 1995), rev'd
on other grounds, 114 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (remarking that male-female or fe-
male-male context sexual or gender-oriented comments are presumptively discriminatory, but
same-sex conduct of this nature is not, since it is "uncommon in society"); Blozis v. Mike Raisor
Ford, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 805, 807 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (establishing that harassment based on gen-
der is more important in same-sex sexual harassment cases); Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l
Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (characterizing male-female distinction as im-
portant only in same-sex harassment cases); see also Leigh M. Leonard, A Missing Voice in Femi-
nist Legal Theory: The Heterosexual Presumption, 12 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 39 (1990) (describing
the "heterosexual presumption," which takes for granted that all women and men are hetero-
sexual and originates from socialized heterosexual bias). But see Waag v. Thomas Pontiac,
Buick, GMC, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 393, 401 (D. Minn. 1996) (concluding that unwelcome homo-
sexual advances, like unwelcome heterosexual advances, occur presumptively because of the
plaintiff's gender).
124. See McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195-96 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996).
125. See id.
126. See id. at 1198-99 (Michael, J., dissenting). Judge Michael asserted that the acts in the
case were sufficiently direct and suggestive by themselves to support the claim. See id. at 1198.
The judge concluded that Titie VII is implicated whenever a person physically abuses a co-
worker for sexual satisfaction or propositions or pressures a co-worker out of sexual interest or
desire. See id.
127. Id. at 1195-96.
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lowed McWilliams,"8 the Fourth Circuit and certain district courts
within it, as if anticipating Oncale, soon added glosses to the McWil-
liams holding that significantly diluted its force. '29 Hopkins v. Baltimore
Gas & Electric Co.'s was the first case to depart from the bright line
drawn by McWilliams, presenting a view of same-sex claims that com-
ports more with the McWilliams dissent. In Hopkins, George Hopkins'
supervisor bumped him, placed a magnifying glass over his crotch,
kissed him at his wedding, stared at him in the bathroom, com-
mented on his appearance, and made inappropriate sexual com-
ments.'"' Although the court agreed with the McWilliams court that
sexually suggestive conduct between two men is presumed to be de-
void of sexual desire, it nonetheless stated that showing the harasser's
sexual attraction to the victim is the principal way to prove causa-
tion.3 2 The court admitted that to show such sexual attraction re-
quired more than "merely suggestive" conduct,33 but did not follow
the McWilliams court's stated requirement that the plaintiff allege
and prove the harasser's homosexuality.TM
Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc.3 ' was decided after McWil-
liams and Hopkins. In that case, Tietgen's supervisor embarked on a
"campaign of ridicule, intimidation, embarrassment and harassment
at work" that ultimately became "uncontrollable and bizarre.' ',3  The
128. See, e.g., Gibson v. Tanks, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1107, 1109 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (granting par-
tial summary judgment because there was no allegation in the complaint or in evidence that
either the plaintiff or the harasser was homosexual; declining to draw an inference of sexuality
from harassing conduct); see also Ward v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 810 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(finding harassment was not because of plaintiffs sex, and therefore granting summary judg-
ment for defendant pursuant to McWilliams), aff'd, 124 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1997).
129. Notably, many courts before the decision in McWilliams had declined to view same-sex
sexual harassment as a homosexuality issue. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp.
1403, 1411 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (stating that harasser's sexual preference is irrelevant), af'd, 125
F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 1997); Gerd v. United Parcel Serv., 934 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D. Colo. 1996)
(ruling, without consideration of homosexuality issue, that sexually offensive touching by male
defendants of male plaintiff was actionable under Title VII); Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts,
Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 354 (D. Nev. 1996) (finding that Title VII does protect individuals from
same-sex sexual harassment); Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1996)
(observing that text of Title VII is gender neutral); Ecklund v. Fuisz Tech., Ltd., 905 F. Supp.
335, 337-38 (E.D. Va. 1995) (stating that gender-neutral interpretation by EEOC clearly sup-
ports proposition that Title VII does not require cross-gender discrimination); Blozis v. Mike
Raisor Ford, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 805, 806-07 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (finding same-sex harassment ac-
tionable if harassment occurs because of victim's gender); Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp.,
887 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (D. Minn. 1996) (reasoning that same-sex harassment is actionable
under Title VII only if plaintiff alleges harassment because of sex).
130. 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996).
131. See id. at 747-48.
132. See id. at 752.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 751 (identifying proof of sexual attraction as chief way to demonstrate sex-
based harassment).
135. 921 F. Supp. 1495 (E.D. Va. 1996).
136. Id. at 1497.
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court distinguished this conduct from the "particularly cruel" horse-
play in McWilliams and found that the alleged conduct occurred be-
cause of the employee's gender.37 In Tietgen, the court reasoned that
the supervisor's "earnest sexual solicitations" permitted-even absent
an allegation on the part of the plaintiff-an inference that the har-
asser was a homosexual."8 The court supported its holding with the
rationale that, "[i]f a male employer touches a male employee in a
sexual manner, or invites the male employee to engage in sexual
conduct, the employer likely does so because the employee is
male.)
3 9
This presumption is remarkably similar to the presumption made
by courts in opposite-sex sexual harassment cases and represents a
shift from the McWilliams court's sole focus on the harasser's sexual
orientation,'" to what constitutes sexual conduct between persons of
the same sex. Notably, the conduct in Tietgen was no more sexual than
was the conduct in McWilliams, in the main, the Tietgen court's ruling
conflicts with McWilliams while purporting to be in harmony with it.
Further, the Tietgen court did not limit proof of causation in same-sex
cases to a showing of sexual attraction as did the McWilliams and HOp-
kins courts. Proof of causation, stated the court, does not have to be
about sexuality; a male could just as inappropriately subject other
males to "vitriolic treatment" because he prefers working with fe-
males.141 The rule emanating from the case is as follows: if a plaintiff
can show that a supervisor "did indeed solicit sexual acts from him,
the jury may properly infer that [the supervisor] did so because of
[the plaintiffs] sex within the meaning of Tite VII.'
'
In Dixon v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co.,' Dixon's male
supervisor called him nightly and gave him gifts, cards, letters and
hugs over a period of five years.'" Expanding on Tietgen, the court
found that this conduct satisfied causation because the sexual attrac-
tion of the perpetrator could be shown not only by direct invitations
137. See id. at 1502.
138. See id.
139. Id. at 1501.
140. See McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir.)
(refusing to extend Title VII to situations where both victim and harasser are homosexuals),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996).
141. See Tielgen, 921 F. Supp. at 1501. This view conflicts with Blasi's assertion that a'true"
case of same-sex sexual harassment requires a showing of sexual attraction. See Blasi, supra note
103, at 322; see also Blake v. Grede Foundaries, Inc., No. 96-1322, 1997 WL 157126 (D. Kan.
Mar. 20, 1997) (plaintiff suffered harassing taunts calling his sexuality into question); Eschbach
v. County of Lehigh, No. CIVA95-7276, 1997 WL 109611 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 1997) (female
plaintiff subjected to vitriolic treatment by female supervisor.)
142. See Tielgen, 9 1 F. Supp. at 1502.
143. 926 F. Supp. 548 (E.D. Va. 1996).
144. See id. at 549.
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to sex but by behavior revealing of "some degree of intimacy.' 45 At
the end of this analysis, the court reiterated the McWilliams dissent's
concern that the inquiry not shift from the perpetrator's conduct to
an examination of his "true" sexual orientation.4 6 The importance of
the case is its position that sexual attraction can be inferred from in-
dications of romantic interest, conduct less susceptible to being char-
acterized as locker room antics than that which gave rise to McWi1-
liams or Tietgen.
Within the Fourth Circuit, and apparently consistently with Oncale,
district courts have departed from the Court of Appeals' rulings that
homosexuality or sexual attraction must be shown in same-sex sexual
harassment cases, 47 and have even gone so far as to characterize On-
cale as a rejection of both McWilliams and Wrightson.'4 8 These courts
now allow inferences from conduct suggestive of homosexuality or
sexual attraction to satisfy the causation requirement. 49  Moreover,
the conduct allowed to support such inferences varies. Whereas the
facts of Tietgen are suggestive of a sexual attraction of the supervisor
toward the employee, the facts of Dixon could easily be characterized
(and were by the defendant in that case) as love and affection lacking
a sexual component, especially in the absence of any invitations to
engage in sex.' 50 Dixon represents that indications of romantic inter-
est are consistent with sexual attraction, however, which supports
causation altogether apart from any discussion of sexual orientation.
B. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit, after much disagreement among district
courts within the circuit, declared same-sex sexual harassment claims
cognizable.'5' An examination of Seventh Circuit district courts'
opinions released prior to this declaration illustrates the varied lines
along which these district courts have disagreed with one another.
145. See id. at 551 n.l.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 551 (reasoning that plaintiffs showing of obsessive behavior by male supervi-
sor was enough to show that harassment occurred because of gender, thus, not requiring proof
of homosexuality or attraction); Tietgen, 921 F. Supp. at 1500 (holding that Title VII addresses
sex discrimination regardless of the employer/employee gender combination involved).
148. See Ford v. Rigidply Rafters, Inc., No. Y-96-1699, 1998 WL 154409, at *2 (D. Md. Apr. 1,
1998) (in a retaliation case, characterizing Oncale as rejecting McWilliams and Wrightson). 'But
see Harris, supra note 44, at A20 (noting that Oncale"did not directly address the question of the
parties' sexual orientation in same-sex harassment cases").
149. See supra notes 150-77 and accompanying text.
150. See Dixon, 926 F. Supp. at 549.
151. SeeJohnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403, 1409 (E.D. Wis. 1996), aff'd, 125 F.3d
408 (7th Cir. 1997).
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Early decisions within the Seventh Circuit were in conflict.'52 In
one of the first same-sex harassment cases in the country, Wright v.
Methodist Youth Services,53 the court denied a motion to dismiss
brought by the employer in a same-sex quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment action.'5 On the question of cognizability, the court stated that
"Title VII should clearly encompass" the claim.'55 The court cited
Bundy v. Jackson'6 and Barnes v. Costle 57 for the proposition that a
male supervisor's sexual advances towards a male employee that
would not be made towards a female employee are cognizable as sex
discrimination to the same extent as the conventional scenario, a
male supervisor's advance towards a female employee that would not
be made towards a male employee./ss Anticipating other decisions,
the court made no mention of the sexual orientation of either the
harasser or the victim, noting simply that the advances themselves
were "homosexual."'5 9
In Goluszek v. H.P. Smith 5" the court reached the opposite conclu-
sion in a same-sex hostile environment sexual harassment case. An-
thony Goluszek, a factory worker, was repeatedly questioned about
being unmarried, urged to have sexual relations with women, and
accused of being gay.' 61 The only physical contact mentioned in the
court's report of the facts was that a co-worker poked Goluszek in the
buttocks with a stick.62
In a much more detailed analysis than that which appeared in
Wright, the court determined that, although Goluszek had satisfied
the elements of actionable sexual harassment, his claim would fail
because Congress did not intend Title VII to outlaw such conduct.5'
According to the court, Congress intended to outlaw abuses by the
powerful against the vulnerable to degrade the victim by attacking his
or her sexuality.164 Because he worked in a predominantly male envi-
152. Compare Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. Il. 1981)
(holding same-sex quid pro quo sexual harassment actionable), with Goluszek v. H.P. Smith,
697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that same-sex hostile environment is not ac-
tionable in the absence of proof of an anti-male environment).
153. 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
154. See id. at 319.
155. See id. at 310.
156. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
157. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
158. Wright, 511 F. Supp. at 310.
159. See id. at 308; see also Parrish v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 89 C 4515, 1990 WL
165611, at *2 (N.D. III. Oct. 16, 1990) (stating that evidentiary showing of homosexual advances
is sole requirement).
160. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
161. See id. at 1453-54.
162. See id. at 1454.
163. Seeid. at 1456.
164. Seeid.
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ronment, the court concluded that Goluszek could not make such a
showing. 65
The courts following this approach reasoned that Congress' only
purpose in enacting Title VII was to foster equal employment oppor-
tunity and that this purpose was not furthered by protecting employ-
ees from harassment by co-workers of the same gender.'6'
Although the reasoning of Goluszek was initially well received, and
was adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Garcia v. Elf Atochem North Amer-
ica,'67 it faltered soon thereafter, inviting excoriating criticism, most
notably from a decision of the Southern District of New York, Sar-
dinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc.'6' In that case, Richard Sardinia's supervi-
sors grabbed his genitals and buttocks, called him "babe" and
"faggot," told him he had a "nice ass" suitable for anal intercourse,
discussed the size of Sardinia's penis and threatened him with dis-
missal.'6 Sardinia alleged that no harassment of females took place
at Dellwood Foods.' 7' Denying the defendant's motion for judgment
on the pleadings, the court asserted that Goluszek constituted artful,
sua sponte argument and was utterly devoid of merit.17' More rele-
165. But see Sprogis v. United Airlines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding that it is not
integral to finding a Title VII violation that the discrimination be directed at all members of
gender).
The Quick court took issue with the Goluszek court's suggestion that protection under Title
VII is limited to disadvantaged or vulnerable groups. See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372,
1379 (8th Cir. 1996). Quick comports with Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F.
Supp. 1495, 1503 (E.D. Va. 1996), in its explanation that actionable sexual harassment does not
depend on sexual conduct: A worker "'need not be propositioned, touched offensively, or
harassed by sexual innuendo'" in order to have been sexually harassed. See Quick, 90 F.3d at
1379 (quoting Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 964 (8th Cir. 1993)). In-
timidation and hostility may occur without explicit sexual advances or acts of an explicitly sex-
ual nature. Moreover, physical aggression, violence, or verbal abuse may amount to sexual
harassment. See id. (citing Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988)). Hav-
ing been settled, the Quick case will not proceed to trial. See Ann Davis, Wen Ribaldry Among
Men is Sex Harassment, WALL ST. J., June 5, 1997, at B1 (noting that Quick was settled after the
Eighth Circuit found that the plaintiff could have been a victim of sexual harassment and the
case could thus proceed to trial).
166. See Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456 (stating Title VII's objective as equal opportunity);see
also Harris v. National Precision Blanking, No. 95 C 6022, 1997 WL 448042, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May
30, 1997) (noting that Title VII violations concern employment discrimination complaints);
Torres v. National Precision Blanking, 943 F. Supp. 952, 953 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (ruling, consistent
with Schoiber, that same-sex harassment claim was not actionable); Schoiber v. Emro Mktg. Co.,
941 F. Supp. 730, 739 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (going beyond the holding of Goluszek to find that har-
assment by one gender of another is the only scenario proscribed and that same-sex sexual
harassment could never be gender discrimination); Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp.
489, 494 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (asserting that plaintiff must allege anti-male environment).
167. 28 F.3d 446, 452 (5th Cir. 1994).
168. No. 94 Civ. 5458, 1995 WL 640502, at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1995).
169. Seeid. at*1.
170. See id.
171. See id. at *4. The Sardinia court criticized most roundly the Goluszek court's reliance on
a student Note that employed gender neutral language and did not discuss the legislative intent
behind the enactment of Title VII. See Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environ-
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vant to this discussion, however, the court decided that Sardinia had
stated a claim for sexual harassment, because his allegations permit-
ted the inference that he was discriminated against on the basis of his
sex and that unwelcome sexual advances had created a hostile envi-
ronment.1
72
Contrary to what some courts have characterized as Goluszek's bald
statement of the non-cognizability of same-sex harassment claims'73
the opinion itself makes no such statement but instead presents a
unique approach to evaluating such claims. The defendant, H.P.
Smith, did not question the claim's general cognizability; the em-
ployer asserted only that Goluszek could not prove the essential cau-
sation element of the claim.'7 In fact, the court stated bluntly that
the harassment faced by Goluszek was pervasive and continuous and
that a woman in his position would have had a valid claim of sexual
harassment.' 75 The court even implied, making no reference to the
sexual orientation of Goluszek or of his harasser, that the plaintiff
was harassed because of his sex. 76 Goluszek owed his failure to satisfy
the causation element of the claim to his inability to show that H.P.
Smith's premises was "an environment that treated males as infe-
rior.', 77 One would assume that Goluszek would, according to this
reasoning, need to show that other males were similarly harassed to
satisfy the causation element. The court implied, however, that even
this showing would not be sufficient to prove causation. 78 According
ment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1450 (1984) (arguing that Title VII does not ade-
quately compensate victims of sexual harassment or deter civil rights violations). The court
commented that the Note was published two years before the Supreme Court's decision in
Meritor. See Sardinia, No. 94. Civ. 5458, 1995 WL 640502, at *4 n.4; see also Raney v. District of
Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 286-87 (D.D.C. 1995) (questioning Goluszek's use of the Note as
evidence of legislative history because it does not discuss such history); Williams v. District of
Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 8-9 (D.D.C. 1996); Rasmusson v. Copeland Lumber Yards, No. CV-N-
96-258, 1997 WL 76366 (D. Nev. Oct. 31, 1997); Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F.
Supp. 351, 354 (D. Nev. 1996).
172. See Sardinia, 1995 WL 640502, at *6. But seeJohnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403,
1410 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (characterizing conduct in case similar to Sardinia as mere crude behav-
ior), aff'd, 125 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 1997).
173. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998); Storey v. Chase Bank-
card Servs., 970 F. Supp. 722, 729 (D. Ariz. 1997).
174. SeeGoluszekv. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. Id. In support, the court cited the following language from the dissent in Rabidue v.
Osceola Refining Co.: "The overall circumstances of plaintiffs workplace evince an anti-female
environment." Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 623 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., dis-
senting). Of course this language merely describes the environment in that particular case and
does not refer to an element of a sexual harassment claim. The Goluszek court's reference to
Rabidue suggests that a showing of environmental animus towards the plaintiffs gender is re-
quired to advance any hostile environment sexual harassment claim, whether opposite-sex or
same-sex.
178. See Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456.
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to the court, the fact that an environment is male-dominated, either
by virtue of the number of men in the workplace or because males
are in positions of power, makes it impossible as a matter of law to
show that males were treated in an inferior way. 79 The import of this
language is that if a plaintiff could show an environment inimical to
his or her gender, by showing that members of the opposite gender
were not treated in an inferior way, then that plaintiffs same-sex har-
assment claim could proceed.' 8
Goluszek is unrepresentative of the current state of hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment law in requiring a showing of environmental
animus towards the plaintiff s gender.'8 ' Only one court, reversed on
appeal, has followed Goluszek's reasoning.'8 2 Other courts have used
selective citations to Goluszek to hold that same-sex harassment is
never cognizable under Title VII. 83 At least one court has used
Goluszek as support for the cognizability of same-sex claims and has
179. See id.
180. Two years after Goluszek, the Northern District of Illinois entertained another claim of
same-sex hostile environment sexual harassment in Parrish v. Washington National Insurance Co.,
No. 89 C 4515, 1990 WL 165611 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 1990). InParrish, the plaintiff alleged that
he had been the victim of brushing against his leg by an unknown male supervisor. See id. at *1.
The court did not analyze the cognizability of same-sex harassment claims and did not cite
Goluszek, but deemed the alleged conduct not sufficiently pervasive or sexual enough to consti-
tute actionable sexual harassment. See id. at *3. "Indeed," wrote the court, "Mr. Parrish has
stopped short of characterizing his allegations as a homosexual incident." Id. at *4.
181. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-04 (1 lth Cir. 1982) (holding that key
element of Title VII claim of sexual harassment is intentional adverse treatment on the basis of
gender).
182. Quick v. Donaldson Co., 895 F. Supp. 1288, 1295 n.6, 1296 (S.D. Iowa 1995),rev'd, 90
F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996), came closest to reflecting Goluszek's rationale, declining to hold that
same-sex sexual harassment is never cognizable. Instead the court held that male-to-male har-
assment without any discriminatory treatment is not prohibited by Title VII. See id.
183. Some courts acknowledged Goluszek's rationale but decided ultimately that same-sex
claims are never cognizable. See Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 926 F. Supp. 1044, 1049 (N.D.
Ala. 1996) (interpreting Goluszek's references to dominance and vulnerability to require that
harasser and victim be of opposite gender); Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489, 494
(W.D. Wash. 1995) (rejecting same-sex sexual harassment); Polly v. Houston Lighting & Power
Co., 803 F. Supp. 1, 6 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (ruling that same-sex harassment claims are not cogni-
zable). The Martin court interpreted Goluszek's references to dominance and vulnerability as
requiring that the harasser and the victim be of opposing genders. See Martin, 926 F. Supp. at
1049. Cases outside the Fifth Circuit have also deemed same-sex harassment claims noncog-
nizable. SeeMcWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir.) (affirming
unreported lower court decision finding that employers had no knowledge of coworkers' con-
duct), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996); Mayo v. Kiwest Corp., 898 F. Supp. 335, 336 (E.D. Va.
1995) (holding that there was no claim for same-sex sexual discrimination under Title VII),
affd, 94 F.3d 641 (4th Cir. 1996); Benekritis v. Johnson, 882 F. Supp. 521, 525 (D.S.C. 1995)
(accepting Goluszek reasoning and dismissing plaintiff's claim of same-sex sexual harassment);
Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co., C-3-94-182, 1995 WL 386793 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 1994), affd on
other grounds, 81 F.3d 48 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 170 (1996); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas
& Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 834 (D. Md. 1994) (finding no cause of action for same-sex sex-
ual harassment), affd on other grounds, 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996);
Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (ruling that plaintiff's
claim must be dismissed because Title VII does not address same-sex sexual harassment).
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implied that if a plaintiff could show that he was harassed because of
his gender, this showing would be sufficient to demonstrate an anti-
male atmosphere.'
8 4
Later developments in the Seventh Circuit underscored the disa-
greement among the district courts. Although Chief Judge Richard
Posner of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit announced
twice in dicta that same-sex harassment claims are cognizable,ss one
judge in the Northern District of Illinois questioned the import of
this dicta.8 6 Stating that "the court may not forecast a superior
court's holding prior to its issuance," Judge Charles Norgle went be-
yond the holding of the Goluszek court in Schoiber v. Emro Marketing
Co.18 7 to rule that harassment by one gender of another is the only
type of sexual harassment proscribed by Title VII.1ss In reaching this
conclusion, Norgle cited Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., a case involving
a transsexual that brought a claim for sex discrimination under Title
VII after being fired. 9 The Ulane court determined that the tradi-
tional definition of sex excluded transsexuals from the purview of the
statute in the same way that it excluded homosexuals and transves-
tites.'9 Using this language, Norgle concluded that "same-gender
sexual harassment cannot be wholly separated from sexual orienta-
tion, preference, identification, and affectation. "19' Therefore, Nor-
184. See Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 805, 808 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (suggesting
that anti-male atmosphere could be established through the causation prong).
185. SeeMcDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that excluding
same-sex sexual harassment from coverage would necessitate too literal an interpretation of sex
discrimination); Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995) (declining to
conclude that sexual harassment of women by men is the only actionable type of claim).
186. See Schoiber v. Emro Marketing Co., 941 F. Supp. 730, 738 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (asserting
thatJudge Posner's dicta in Baskerville must be disregarded).
187. Id. (citing Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1365-66 (7th Cir. 1996),vacated, 118 S.
Ct 275 (1997)). In Schoibe, the supervisor touched, grabbed, kissed, made sexually explicit and
degrading remarks to, and exposed his genitalia to the plaintiff. See id. at 731-32. The supervi-
sor also made other unwelcome sexual advances and requests for sexual favors. See id. at 732.
In Torres v. National Precision Blanking, 943 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1996), in which Norgle used
the identical opinion he had used to dismiss Schoiber, the supervisor inserted his finger into the
plaintiff's rectum, bragged about how much of the finger he was able to insert, and held his
penis while asking male employees whether they wanted a "piece" of it. See id. at 952; see also
Harris v. National Precision Blanking, No. 95-C 6022, 1997 WL 448042, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 30,
1997).
188. See Schoiber, 941 F. Supp. at 740.
189. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
190. See id. at 1084.
191. See Schoiber, 941 F. Supp. at 739-40. This language contradicted the statement of an-
other Northern District of Illinois case, Parrish v. Washington National Insurance Co., No. 89 C
4515, 1990 WL 165611 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 1990), concerning the actionability of same-sex sexual
harassment:
This is not inconsistent with the general rule that discrimination based on homosexu-
ality is not actionable under Titie VII. If a plaintiff complains of unwelcome homo-
sexual advances, the offending conduct is based on the employer's sexual preference
and necessarily involved the plaintiffs gender, for an employee of the non-preferred
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gle reasoned, "a male cannot, as a matter of law, sue for sexual har-
assment by a fellow male under Title VII, no matter the sexual orien-
tations of the two.""'
Almost simultaneously, three other district judges announced posi-
tions contrary to Norgle's. In Ton v. Information Resources, Inc.,93
Judge Harry Leinenweber deemed same-sex quid pro quo sexual
harassment actionable, citing Wright as support.'" In Peric v. Board of
Trustees of the University of Illinois95 and Shermer v. Illinois Department of
Transportation,'" Judges Suzanne Conlon and Richard Mills respec-
tively deemed same-sex hostile environment sexual harassment ac-
tionable, each citing Baskerville as support.97 James Shermer's claim
was dismissed on summary judgment; his supervisor's suggestion that
Shermer slept with men was deemed an attack on Shermer's sexual
orientation, not on his gender, and thus was found not actionable.'9
Nick Peric's claim, on the other hand, survived the employer's mo-
tion to dismiss.'9 Although Peric's supervisor also made comments
suggesting Peric was gay, the supervisor solicited sex from Peric and
fondled Peric's genitals.2* The court combined causation and con-
duct, in the same way district courts in the Fourth Circuit have, by
stating that the supervisor "demanded Peric engage in homosexual
acts with him. Meyer could only have demanded such acts from an-
other man."2'
Simultaneously with Schoiber, the Eastern District of Wisconsin is-
sued two same-sex sexual harassment cases, Johnson v. Hondo, Inc.,
202
affirmed by the Seventh Circuit, and Miller v. Vesta, Inc. 13 In Johnson,
gender would not inspire the same treatment. Thus, unwelcome homosexual ad-
vances, like unwelcome heterosexual advances, are actionable under Title VII.
Id. at *7.
192. Schoiber, 941 F. Supp. at 737.
193. No. 95-C-3565, 1996 WL 5322 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 1996), afJ'd sub nom. Bolaszewski v.
Georgia-Pac. Corp., 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 29139 (2d Cir. Nov. 8, 1996).
194. See id. at *7.
195. No. 96-C-2354, 1996WL51575 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 1996).
196. 937 F. Supp. 781 (C.D. 11. 1996). Sherwefs predecessor in the Central District of Illi-
nois was Gnffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133 (C.D. Il1. 1995), in which the court
held same-sex sexual harassment claims to be actionable. See id. at 1137.
197. See Shenner, 937 F. Supp. at 783 (discussing probability that same-sex sexual harassment
constituted cause of action within the Seventh Circuit);Peric, 1996 WL 51575, at *2 (stating that
Baskerville supports finding that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable).
198. Note that in Goluszek, Goluszek was likewise accused of being gay or bisexual. See
Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1454 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
199. See Peric, 1996 WL 51575, at *3 (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment
on hostile environment claim).
200. See id. at *3.
201. Id.
202. 940 F. Supp. 1403 (E.D. Wis. 1996), af'd, 125 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 1997).
203. 946 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Wis. 1996). In Miller, the plaintiff was a married female whose
co-employee left notes in her locker expressing her desire to commence a sexual relationship.
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the court deemed same-sex sexual harassment claims cognizable, but
determined that Craig Johnson's allegations of harassment were not
actionable.20 1 In this case, Craig Johnson's co-employee Ollie Hicks
continually tauntedJohnson by suggesting thatJohnson would like to
fellate Hicks. On these occasions, Hicks would touch himself as if
masturbating. The two employees eventually came to blows, and
both were fired by the company.205 The district court granted sum-
mary judgment for the employer, noting that "Hicks never physically
touched Johnson, never threatened Johnson, never exposed himself
to Johnson, never called Johnson at home or came to his home, and
never sent him anything in writing."206 The district court concluded
that what did occur "was not sufficiently severe or pervasive" to be ac-
tionable harassment, and could not be characterized as harassment
because of Johnson's gender. 7 The appellate court concurred, not-
ing that the sexual content of harassment does not necessarily mean
the harassment is based on gender.0 8
Miller, discussed in more detail in Section IV below, was a case of
mild sexual harassment, ultimately deemed non-actionable .2  In
Miller, the court determined that same-sex sexual harassment was
cognizable,20 but parted company with nearly all other courts evalu-
ating the actionability of same-sex claims.21' The Miller court rejected
the EEOC's position that whether the harasser treats a member or
members of one sex differently from members of the other sex is
crucial to the inquiry. It found support for this departure in
McDonnell v. Cisneros,2 '3 a case in which a sexual harassment claim was
held actionable where verbal harassment occurred against both male
and female employees.1 The Miller court reasoned that "[d] isparate
treatment of the genders is evidence of [sexual] harassment, but it is
not a requirement. ''2' s Among other things, the Miller court empha-
sized that sexual harassment analysis should not focus on whether the
She also gave the plaintiff a birthday card. The plaintiff alleged that the alleged harasser stared
at her and followed her into the restroom. There was no allegation of touching. See id. at 708-
09.
204. See Hondo, 940 F. Supp. at 1406.
205. 125 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 1997).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 412.
208. See id.
209. See Miller, 946 F. Supp. at 713.
210. See id. at 702.
211. See id. at 703.
212. See id. at 705-06.
213. 84 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996).
214. See id. at 259.
215. Miller, 946 F. Supp. at 706.
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perpetrator sought sexual gratification through his or her conduct,216
but should instead evaluate the "unwelcomeness" of this conduct,
given Title VII's focus on the victim.
2 17
The Seventh Circuit's short-lived decision in Doe v. City of
Belleville,218 the first Seventh Circuit decision to hold that claims of
same-sex sexual harassment are cognizable, was a landmark ruling
with far-reaching implications for Title VII jurisprudence. In Doe,
coworkers subjected brothers H. and J. Doe to verbal abuse and
threats of rape.21 9 H., who wore an earring, received the brunt of the
abuse, which primarily focused on his gender and sexual orienta-
tion.220 He was called a "fag" and a "queer" by his co-workers, and was
asked whether he was a man or a woman.22' One of H.'s coworkers
repeatedly threatened to rape him, and was encouraged in this threat
by other coworkers.2 This same coworker eventually cornered H.
and placed his hand on H.'s genitals to confirm that H. was male.
At the trial level, the district court found in favor of the defendants,
concluding that the Does suffered conduct suggesting they were ho-
mosexuals and not conduct discriminating against them on the basis
of their sex.224 The court also implied that the conduct suffered by
the Does was non-sexual, since the Does testified that they were not
sexually propositioned.' 5
The Seventh Circuit reversed, characterizing the charged conduct
as sexual in nature22 because it focused on H.'s gender.227 More sig-
nificantly, however, the court found support for the Does' claim in
the fact that H. was harassed for not conforming to male standards.228
216. See id. at 712. Thus, the sexual orientation of the perpetrator is irrelevant. The Miller
court was not even willing to allow that the homosexuality of the perpetrator could factor into
the totality of the circumstances contributing to a hostile environment, but determined that
homosexuality was relevant only to considering the victim's subjective view of the harassment.
See id. at 713.
217. The Miller court invoked Meritor and the Seventh Circuit cases McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84
F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996), and Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Division, 32 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 1994),
in support of its victim-centered approach. See Miller, 946 F. Supp. at 711.
218. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998).




223. See id. at 567.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 568.
227. See id. at 576-77 (finding that overt remarks concerning H's gender and threats of sex-
ual assault constituted sufficient proof that the harassment was connected to H's gender); see
also id. at 580 (stating that grabbing of person's testicles undoubtedly was act related to that
person's gender).
228. See id.; see also id at 581 (asserting that a man is sexually harassed when his masculinity
is called into question by co-workers).
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The court disagreed with, and distinguished, the decisions of other
courts that have ruled that men discriminated against for exhibiting
nonconforming gender traits have no claim of sex discrimination
under Title VII. The court was less specific with regard to distin-
guishing between harassment and horseplay, concluding merely that
distinguishing between the two was "a matter of common sense."M It
did, however, call into question the presumption employed by a ma-
jority of courts that a harasser in an opposite-sex case is heterosex-
ual.23" ' The court remarked that conforming to this presumption
would be "a dramatic step in the evolution of sexual harassment law
with troubling implications for claims of opposite-sex harassment and
same-sex harassment alike. " s
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Doe was a significant departure
from case law on same-sex sexual harassment in two primary respects.
First, the Seventh Circuit did not require consideration of whether
similar treatment by the harasser of the opposite sex would constitute
sexual harassment.23 Second, the court refused to tie same-sex sex-
ual harassment claims to the harasser's sexual attraction to the vic-
tim.2 Doe, unlike existing case law, posited that unwelcome sexual
conduct in the workplace is deeply humiliating and is proscribed for
the simple reason that it is tied in some way to gender.ms The court
asserted that, where sexual harassment is of an explicitly sexual na-
ture, the male plaintiff need not offer proof that his gender moti-
vated the harasser and that a similarly situated female worker would
not have been harassed.236 In seeking to define the ambit of pro-
scribed sexual conduct, the court included behavior such as invasions
of sexual privacy or open remarks related to gender, even if that be-
havior did not constitute an overt sexual advance. 7 Doe ventured
further than any other decision in analyzing fully the various con-
cerns raised by same-sex cases, and it offered the most controversial
analytical paradigm for these cases to appear to date. It is thus not
229. See id. at 582 (distinguishing Rathert v. Village of Peotone, 903 F.2d 510 (7th Cir.
1989), and DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979)). But see Blake v.
Grede Foundries, Inc., No. 96-1322-JTM, 1997 WL 157126 (D. Kan. Mar. 20, 1997) (ruling that
same-sex harassment is actionable when it takes the form of remarks implying that man work-
ing in traditionally female position is homosexual); Zalewski v. Overlook Hosp., 692 A.2d 131,
136 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (holding that same-sex harassment claim based on gender
stereotyping was cognizable).
230. SeeDoe, 119 F.3d at 591; ef. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
231. SeeDoe, 119 F.3d at 587.
232. See id.
233. See id. at 574.
234. See id. at 591.
235. See id. at 574.
236. See id. at 575.
237. See id.
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surprising that the Supreme Court, after granting certiorari in Doe,
vacated the decision and remanded it to the Seventh Circuit to re-
consider its decision in light of Oncale.m This action on the part of
the Supreme Court suggests the Supreme Court's unwillingness to
allow instances of sex stereotyping to form the basis of sexual har-
assment claims2 9
III. COMMENTARY ON SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Like courts that have reached divergent conclusions as to how to
evaluate same-sex sexual harassment claims, commentators on the
subject disagree on how courts should approach such claims. Some
commentators maintain that Title VII prohibits same-sex sexual har-
assment to the same extent as it prohibits opposite-sex sexual har-
assment.2 0  Others assert that recognition of same-sex claims subverts
the objectives of Title VII2 4' and is contrary to the civil rights interests
both of victims of same-sex sexual harassment in general2 4 and of
gays and lesbians in particular. Under this view, gays and lesbians are
ill-advised to seek redress for sexual harassment under Title VII, at
least until discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is legisla-
tively proscribed.24
238. See Doe v. City of Belleville, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998), vacating 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir.
1997).
239. See Linda Greenhouse, Same-Sex Harassment Issue Furrows Court Brow, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
10, 1998, at A14 (suggesting disposition of Doe indicates that "not all the Justices were com-
pletely comfortable with allowing a same-sex harassment case to proceed far beyond the cryptic
boundaries of [Oncale]").
240. See generally Carlos R. Calleros, The Meaning of "Sex": Homosexual and Bisexual Harass-
mnnt Under Title VII, 20 VT. L. REV. 55, 79 (1995) (declaring that Title VII should apply to same-
sex harassment claims as well as to opposite-sex claims); Lisa Wehren, Same-Gender Sexual Har-
assment Under Title VII: Garcia v. Elf Atochem Marks a Step in the Wrong Direction, 32 CAL. W. L.
REV. 87, 91 (1995) (asserting that Titie VII should apply to same-gender claims because sexual
harassment involves sexual conduct based on gender); Blasi, supra note 103, at 317-23
(concluding that recognition of same-sex sexual harassment equalizes the norms of workplace
conduct for all people); Trish K. Murphy, Comment, Without Distinction: Recognizing Coverage of
Same-Gender Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 70 WASH. L. REv. 1125 (1995) (proposing that
Title VII should apply to same-gender sexual harassment because it will protect all victims of
discriminatory treatment based on sex); Shahan, supra note 123, at 527 (asserting that the
courts should interpret Title VII broadly in order to eliminate all workplace harassment and
discrimination); Regina L. Stone-Harris, Comment, Same-Sex Harassment-The Next Step in the
Evolution of Sexual Harassment Law Under Title VII, 28 ST. MARY's LJ. 269 (1996) (suggesting le-
gal basis for judicial consideration of same-sex cases and arguing gender irrelevant for sexual
harassment purposes).
241. See, e.g., McFarland, supra note 44, at 493 (arguing that same-sex sexual harassment is
not within the ambit of Title VII protection against sex discrimination); Woodhouse,supra note
35, at 1179-80 (asserting that Title VII is not intended to deter same-gender sexual harass-
ment).
242. See generally McFarland, supra note 44, at 536 (advocating broader proscriptions against
sexual harassment than Title VII currently provides).
243. See, e.g., Grose, supra note 13, at 378 (arguing that allowing Title VII protection of
same-sex harassment will promote homophobia in workplace); Spitko, supra note 20, at 60
15
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A. Approach One: In Support of Same-Sex Claims
Commentators that support the recognition of same-sex claims,2"
reflecting the view of certain courts,2 45 argue that all individuals can
be victims of sexual harassment and, depending on the conduct al-
leged in individual cases, can satisfy the requirements of a prima facie
case of sexual harassment regardless of the gender of the perpetrator
or victim. 216  From a policy standpoint, one commentator believes
that this view reflects the aim of Title VII to equalize the norms of
workplace conduct for all. 47 This commentator also claims that cer-
tain courts' past failure to recognize same-sex claims has been due to
the erroneous view that these claims are sexual orientation discrimi-
nation claims at their core, masquerading as sex discrimination
claims.248 According to this commentator, these courts overlooked
that, "while the sex and sexual orientation of the victim are inher-
ently involved with the harasser's choice of a victim," the victim is not
a participant in the selection process. 249 A related view is that same-
sex sexual harassment is sexual harassment, viewed not as a matter of
equality of opportunity or of different treatment but as a matter of
sexual subordination, because it perpetuates gender stereotypes in
(suggesting that Title VII application to same-sex harassment would encourage employers to
discriminate against gay applicants). But see Stone-Harris, supra note 240, at 311, 323
(advocating passage of federal legislation to ban workplace discrimination on the basis of sex-
ual orientation but arguing that, in the meantime, same-sex sexual harassment should be pro-
hibited under current case law).
244. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
245. See McWilliams v. Fairfax Co. Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir.) (holding
same-sex heterosexual harassment not actionable under Title VII), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72
(1996); Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994) (refusing to recognize same-
sex sexual harassment as valid cause of action under Title VII).
246. See Carpenter, supra note 88, at 702 (noting the lack of a doctrinal or logical basis for
distinguishing abusive treatment claims from unwelcome sexual advances claims in the same-
sex context where no distinction is made in the opposite-sex context); Wehren, supra note 240,
at 91 ("If the harassing conduct amounts to actionable sexual harassment in the cross-gender
context, the same exact conduct cannot be said to be outside the purview of Title VII merely
because it is directed at a person of the same gender."); Shahan, supra note 123, at 511
(concluding that plaintiffs in same-sex sexual harassment suits can satisfy prima facie elements
of sexual harassment in the same way that plaintiffs in opposite-sex suits can); Stone-Harris,
supra note 240, at 311 (arguing that same-sex sexual harassment should be prohibited under
current case law); Murphy, supra note 240, at 1137 (arguing that cognizability is supported by
Title VII's lack of gender limitations on the parties to a sexual harassment dispute); see also
Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1137 (C.D. Ill. 1995) (discussing how facts
alleged in same-sex case can satisfy each element of sexual harassment claim); McCoy v. John-
son Controls World Servs., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. Ga. 1995) ("To be sure, sexual ad-
vances can be 'unwelcome' regardless of the harasser's gender.").
247. See Blasi, supra note 103, at 319-20.
248. See id. at 308-09, 312, 321-22; see also Bencivenga, supra note 6, at 5 ("'Plaintiffs who are
unable to bring a sexual orientation case through city or state law, may bring these claims mas-
querading as Title VII and have their day in court,' said Gary D. Friedman, a partner at Mayer,
Brown & Platt.").
249. See Blasi, supra note 103, at 320.
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the workplace that have a detrimental effect on opportunities for
women. °  Some commentators conclude that the past controversy
surrounding recognition of same-sex sexual harassment claims em-
phasizes the need for a legislative amendment to Title VII-or sepa-
rate legislation altogether-outlawing discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation.2' These commentators share the view that the
sexual orientation of either the perpetrator or the victim should be
irrelevant in an analysis of a same-sex harassment claim and that
courts should instead focus on the nature of the harasser's conduct
and its effect on the victim. 2
Catharine MacKinnon, "the single individual most responsible for
raising the issue of sexual harassment," s espouses a combination of
these views. MacKinnon asserts that recognition of a claim of sexual
250. See Calleros, supra note 240, at 79 (asserting that "same-sex harassment presents the
same potential for domination and degradation of an employee on the basis of his or her gen-
der as does heterosexual harassment"); Carpenter, supra note 88, at 723; Mary Anne C. Case,
Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 105 YALE LJ. 1, 47 (noting that exclusion of effeminate men from Title VII pro-
tection is odd considering that such men exhibit characteristics associated with women, "the
subordinated group the statutory language was principally designed to protect"); Levitsky, supra
note 45, at 1041 (charging that sex stereotyping enhances traditionally dominant male roles in
workplace); Papish, supra note 12, at 230-31 (explaining Marcosson's argument that same-sex
harassment is actionable under Title VII because it perpetuates gender stereotypes in the
workplace); Schultz, supra note 35, at 1776; Stone-Harris, supra note 240, at 326 ("Such conduct
should be no more tolerated by the law than other forms of discrimination because it perpetu-
ates gender stereotypes of how 'real men' and 'real women' should behave, interferes with
productivity in the workplace, and stands as a barrier to the goal of Title VII-promoting
workplace equality."); Ronald Turner, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: A Call for Conduct-Based and
Gender-Based Applications of Title VII, 5VA.J. SOC. POL'Y& L. 151, 195 (1997) (arguing that Title
VII should prohibit "misconduct directed at males or females who are harassed because, in the
eyes of some, they are not sufficiently 'masculine' or 'feminine'").
251. See McFarland, supra note 44, at 541-42 (proposing new legislation that would outlaw
certain forms of harassment as well as discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation); Stone-
Harris, supra note 240, at 323 (advocating passage of federal legislation to ban workplace dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
252. See Locke, supra note 45, at 414 ("[Clontent-based inquiry more accurately reflects the
courts' current interpretation of the term and the underlying principles behind sexual harass-
ment jurisprudence."). Locke states that "it is the content of the harassment rather than the
motives of the harasser which courts should analyze in deciding a cause of action." Id. at 413.
Locke further advocates the rejection of the "based on sex" inquiry and its replacement by an
inquiry into the sexual nature of the harassing conduct, see id. at 408, and advocates application
of "a content-based analysis for all harassment which focuses on the sexual nature of the har-
assment and its effect on the victim." Id. at 401; see also Corey Taylor, Comment, Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace Under Title VII: The Legal Dilemma and the Tenth Circuit Solution, 46 U.
KAN. L. REV. 30 (1998) (arguing that courts should address the unwelcomeness of the conduct
and its effect on the victim); Turner, supra note 250, at 194 (positing that "determinations con-
cerning the actionability of [same-sex sexual harassment] claims should rest on an examination
of the alleged conduct directed at the target, and not on either the alleged harasser's sexual
orientation or the reason(s) underlying the harasser's actions."); Michelle Angelone, Note,
Same-Sex Harassment Under Title VII: Quick v. Donaldson Co. Breathes New Life Into The Post-
Garcia State of the Law, 9 U. FLA.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 82 (1997) (urging courts to examine the
conduct in a sexual harassment case "to determine if such harassment falls under a relevant
Title VII provision").
253. Rutherglen, supra note 55, at 487.
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harassment perpetrated by a lesbian against another woman is consis-
tent with Title VII's goal of equalizing the distribution of power be-
tween men and women.24 More recently, she has asserted that same-
sex sexual harassment, whether of males or females, is sex discrimi-
nation when it is based on singling out the victim for "gendered rea-
sons. " ss Further, MacKinnon posits that recognition supports gay
and lesbian challenges to a system of male dominance.2
B. Approach Two: Against Same-Sex Claims
Commentators against same-sex sexual harassment claims advance
the view that recognition of same-sex sexual harassment claims under
Title VII is a mistaken application of the law because, ultimately, such
claims do not reflect the goals of Title VII to empower the powerless
and to eliminate sex discrimination in the workplace. 7 These com-
mentators argue that same-sex claims are essentially claims of sexual
orientation discrimination.2s Another view is that, given the hetero-
sexism and homophobia of society,s ° recognition of these claims will
have an adverse impact on gays and lesbians in their struggle for
equal rights.
2
254. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SExuAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 206 (1979)
("A woman who is fired because of her refusal to submit to a lesbian supervisor isjust as fired-
and her firing isjust as related to her gender-as if the perpetrator were a man.").
255. Spitko, supra note 20, at 72 n.79 (referring to Catharine MacKinnon's response to his
article).
256. See id.
257. See Grose, supra note 13, at 380, 382; Woodhouse, supra note 35, at 1151 (claiming that
the better approach for same-sex sexual harassment victims is the claim of intentional infliction
of emotional distress).
258. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 254, at 205 ("Until discrimination on the basis of
homo-sexuality is considered sex discrimination for other purposes, one can predict that gay
sexual harassment will probably not be considered sex discrimination."); Grose, supra note 13,
at 385 (arguing that, absent proscriptions of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,
Title VII "offers no doctrinal basis to prohibit same-sex sexual harassment"); McFarland, supra
note 44, at 515 n.122 (stating that"sexuality, and thus sexual orientation, are integral factors in
sexual harassment analysis"); Woodhouse, supra note 35, at 1180 (arguing that, at their root,
same-sex sexual harassment claims are sexual orientation discrimination claims). But see Sha-
han, supra note 123, at 526.
Allowing Tite VII to apply in cases in which the aggressor chooses a victim based on
sexual preference is not analogous to protecting sexual preference. The aggressor
harasses the victim because of that victim's sexual characteristics. The victim need not
be homosexual. In essence, by not providing coverage for same-sex sexual harass-
ment, the courts are protecting sexual preference in that only heterosexual aggressors
are singled out for liability for harassment based upon sex.
Id. Shahan ignores that homosexuals could conceivably-and do-discriminate against other
homosexuals on the basis of their sexual orientation.
259. See Grose, supra note 13, at 389 ("In applying Title VII to [same-sex sexual harass-
ment], the courts have relied on society's notion of 'normal' sexuality and stereotypes about
lesbians and gay men."); Spitko, supra note 20, at 79-80 (contending that courts are homopho-
bic and heterosexist).
260. See Grose, supra note 13, at 385-86; Spitko, supra note 20, at 81.
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Carolyn Grose's version of this position is that Title VII should not
be employed to remedy same-sex sexual harassment because doing so
will increase tolerance for heterosexism and homophobia in the
workplace. 61 She believes that, absent protection for gay men and
lesbians against discrimination and harassment on the basis of their
sexual orientation, applications of "Title VII to same-sex sexual har-
assment [will] rely on and perpetuate society's commitment to regu-
late, if not to prohibit, any 'abnormal' expressions of sexuality,"
262
and will ultimately both obscure Title VII's objective of remedying
the oppression of women and ignore the reality that lesbians inhabit
a world apart from socially constructed male power.e
Professor Gary Spitko's objection to recognition of these claims is
that, in the absence of new legislation, courts hearing same-sex
claims will not adequately protect gays and lesbians from discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation. He suggests that until Title
VII proscribes discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,2
same-sex sexual harassment claims will disadvantage gay employees,
because the jury awards employers will face in same-sex cases relative
to opposite-sex cases will discourage them from hiring or retaining
gay employees. Professor Spitko theorizes that courts will view
same-sex sexual harassment claims through a lens of normative het-
erosexuality, resulting in disproportionate sanctions against expres-
261. See Grose, supra note 13, at 378-79.
262. Id. at 379.
263. See id. at 384-85.
264. Some scholars have argued that Title VII does prohibit discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. See generally Elvia R. Arriola, Law and the Gendered Politics of Identity: Who
Owns the Label "Lesbian"?, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S .J. 1, 22 (1997) (stating that discrimination on
the basis of gender nonconformism is sex discrimination); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimina-
tion Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Marcosson,
supra note 97, at 3 (arguing that "sexual orientation harassment is indistinguishable from gen-
der-based sexual harassment, for it is plainly sexual in nature, and it is based on the ultimate
gender stereotype"); Schultz, supra note 35, at 1786; Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and
Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex, " "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American
Law and Culture, 83 CAL. L. REV. 3, 304 (1995) [hereinafter Valdes, Queers] (suggesting that, if
Title VII sex and gender discrimination proscriptions were applied consistently, discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation would be prohibited); Wehren, supra note 240, at 123-25
(arguing that because one's sexual orientation depends on gender classification, sexual orien-
tation discrimination is essentially discrimination based on gender); I. Bennett Capers, Note,
Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1158, 1183-84, 1186 (1991) (reasoning that
consistent Title VII analysis by courts would prohibit sexual orientation discrimination, which is
essentially discrimination based on sex stereotyping); Marie Elena Peluso, Note, Tempering Title
VI's Straight Arrow Approach: Recognizing and Protecting Gay Victims of Employment Discrimination,
46 VAND. L. REv. 1533, 1536, 1560 (1993) (arguing sexual orientation is a suspect or quasi-
suspect classification meriting protection under Title VII).
265. See Spitko, supra note 20, at 80; see also id. at 86-89 (explaining that a reasonable het-
erosexist jury will find justified provocation for murder where victim made homosexual ad-
vances).
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sions of same-sex sexual conduct in the workplace.2
Although Grose's and Spitko's views differ,267 they both see an im-
balance in the way the legal system regulates expressions of sexuality
in the workplace.2 6 According to Grose, same-sex sexual harassment
cases tend to be brought by heterosexuals accusing gays and lesbians
of harassing them.269 Grose claims that the jurisprudence in this area
protects heterosexual expressions, leaving homosexual expressions
disproportionately censured and thus implicitly protecting hetero-
sexuals on the basis of their sexual orientation.70 According to
Grose, recognition results in a fundamental imbalance favoring im-
punity for heterosexuals and liability for homosexuals.27 ' This is es-
pecially problematic for Grose, given that discrimination on the basis
of homosexuality is not statutorily proscribed while discrimination on
the basis of heterosexuality impliedly is proscribed.2n
Spitko's version of this disproportionality argument employs more
empirical evidence than Grose's argument to posit that, absent statu-
tory prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,
heterosexist juries will issue higher damages awards in same-sex sex-
ual harassment cases than in opposite-sex cases,"' inspiring employ-
ers to discriminate in hiring against openly gay people. 4 Spitko also
asserts that heterosexistjudges will dismiss disproportionately cases of
266. See id. at 85-86. But see Fox v. Sierra Dev. Co., 876 F. Supp. 1169, 1174 (D. Nev. 1995)
(declining "to determine whether it is reasonable to perceive a work environment as hostile
and abusive merely because a person might be uncomfortable with homosexuality," and hold-
ing that "the homosexual content of the alleged conduct is not relevant to determining
whether the alleged conduct adequately demonstrates a hostile environment"); id. at 1175 n.6
("Alternatively, it may be hostile or abusive to plaintiffs because they are heterosexual or ho-
mophobic. In this case, the work environment is hostile or abusive to plaintiffs due to their
own sexual orientation or their hostility to another orientation. Such discrimination, or har-
assment is not prohibited by § 2000e."); id. at 1176 ("Pictures, literature and discussions of ho-
mosexual conduct do not inherently intimidate, ridicule, or insult men."); Melnychenko v. 84
Lumber Co., 676 N.E.2d 45, 48 (Mass. 1997) (holding that male employees that were sexually
harassed by male supervisor could recover from their employer under Chapter 151B, even
though supervisor was heterosexual); Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 5458, 1995
WL 640502, at *7 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1995) ("'[I]t is imperative to note that being homosex-
ual does not deprive someone of protection from sexual harassment under Title VII, it is
merely irrelevant to it.'" (quoting Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1180
(N.D. Ind. 1995)); Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d 186, 193 (1st Cir. 1990)
(holding, in same-sex sexual harassment case, that asking someone to dance does not affect
that person's psychological well-being).
267. See Spitko, supra note 20, at 89 n.160 (discussing differences between his analysis and
that of Carolyn Grose).
268. See id.
269. See Grose, supra note 13, at 377 n.8.
270. See id. at 388, 392; see also Locke, supra note 45, at 396 (claiming, based on early cases,
that courts hold only known homosexuals liable for same-sex sexual harassment).
271. See Grose, supra note 13, at 393.
272. See id.
273. See Spitko, supra note 20, at 73-74.
274. See id. at 80.
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opposite-sex harassment whose fact patterns are far more egregious
than same-sex cases.27 He concludes that recognition will not be a
civil rights gain for gay people.276 Spitko offers an alternative stan-
dard: courts should recognize same-sex sexual harassment claims in
the context of "mixed-sex interaction. '2 77 In other words, if the be-
havior in question would violate Title VII if it occurred between per-
sons of opposite sexes, similar conduct between members of the same
sex must also be found to violate Title VII.
278
C. Another Look
Current scholarship approving of same-sex sexual harassment
claims does little to address the concerns of those expressing disap-
proval. Blasi's and Shahan's view, that plaintiffs bringing same-sex
sexual harassment claims can fulfill the elements of a prima facie case
of sexual harassment in the same way that plaintiffs bringing cross-sex
claims do, although reflected in case law, does not address the poten-
tial for courts evaluating same-sex claims to dilute the civil rights of
gays and lesbians.2 7 Papish's and MacKinnon's ideas are grounded in
a narrow view of the intent of Title VII that has been used by courts
in the past to dismiss same-sex claims. These viewpoints do not fully
address whether same-sex claims will entail some social cost to gays
275. See id. at 86.
276. See id.
277. See id. at 95.
278. See id. at 96.
279. Woodhouse expresses no view on this subject; gay rights advocates, however, do. See
Cloud, supra note 6, at 55 (noting that most gays and lesbians praise the Supreme Court's On-
cafe ruling); Mark A. Cohen, Employees Recover for Same-Sex 151B Claim; Plaintiffs Harassed by Het-
erosexual Mal, MASS. LAW. WKIY., Feb. 24, 1997, at 1 (quoting Boston lawyer Mary Lisa Bonauto,
who filed an amicus brief in Melnychenko on behalf of the Massachusetts Gay & Lesbian Advo-
cates: "'There is no question that the [supervisor's] conduct would be punished if the three
employees [who were harassed] were women and the supervisor was a man.... There
shouldn't be a different result just because the employees happen to be men."') (alterations in
original); Haya El Nasser, Sexual Harassment's New Twist, USA TODAY, July 7, 1997, at SA
(reporting Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund's support for recognition of same-sex
harassment claims); John Gallagher & J. Jennings Moss, Hefty Cash Awards in Recent Bias Cases
Could Be a Sign that Juries Are Looking Beyond a Plaintiff's Sexual Orientation, ADvOCATE, June 24,
1997, at 78 (expressing views of some gay lawyers that "alleging harassment may be the best way
for a gay person who lives in an area without an anti-gay discrimination law to fight for his or
her rights"); Stephen Hudak & Sandra Clark, Ridge Tool Same-Sex Harassment Suit Rejected, PLAIN
DFALER, Jan. 10, 1997, at 1A (reporting Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund's support
for recognition of same-sex harassment claims) ;John Leo, The Lauyers are at It Again, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Mar. 16, 1998, at 10 (describing Oncaleas a victory for gays, given its potential to
turn "existing sexual harassment doctrine into the rough equivalent of a gay civil rights law");
Judy Peres & Glen Elsasser, High Court To Weigh Same-Sex Harassment; Oil Rig Worker Has Right To
Sue Former Employer, U.S. Says, CHI. TRIB., June 10, 1997, at N12 (writing that, although sexual
orientation not integral to Oncale case, gay rights groups support recognition of same-sex sex-
ual harassment); Deb Price, Supreme Court Heads in the Right Direction with Harassment Ruling,
DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 14, 1998, at C5 ("[A]ny time the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledges that
gay people ought to be treated like everyone else, it's headed in the right direction.").
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and lesbians that should be avoided.
On the other hand, neither Spitko's nor Grose's view that same-sex
claims will ultimately be a civil rights loss for lesbians and gays is sup-
ported either logically or by empirical evidence. Although oppres-
sion of gays and lesbians does exist and new legislation prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation may be desirable,
disapproval of same-sex claims does nothing to address such oppres-
sion and may even thwart the likelihood that legislative enactments
will follow. This is because same-sex sexual harassment jurispru-
dence is finally making clear that heterosexuality is not a protected
characteristic under Title VII.2 Recognition of this fact and its rami-
fications will be an incentive for heterosexuals to advocate such pro-
tection. Further, a legal system without same-sex claims would fore-
close claims of persons in same-sex sexual harassment cases not
involving gay defendants or victims, and would also fail to capture
self-styled heterosexuals' homophobic conduct, which is often
marked by acts of a highly sexual nature. In addition, the absence of
same-sex claims would perpetuate ignorance about the prevalence
and place of expressions of same-sex sexuality in the workplace,
which itself would be a civil rights loss for gays and lesbians.
1. Heterosexuality is not protected by Title VII
The disproportionality theory advanced by Grose and Spitko re-
quires acceptance of the view that discrimination on the basis of het-
erosexuality is proscribed by Title VII. This theory also depends on
acceptance of the view that heterosexual expressions are not prohib-
ited in the workplace to the same degree as homosexual expressions,
and that juries issue disproportionately higher damages awards in
same-sex sexual harassment cases. The evolving law of Title VII,
however, allows neither heterosexuals nor homosexuals to recover
for discrimination based on sexual orientation. Although new legis-
lation may be desirable to correct this gap in protection against in-
vidious discrimination, disapproval of same-sex sexual harassment as
a cause of action does not advance the likelihood of obtaining this
legislation.
In Grose's estimation, courts are likely to construe cases brought
by gays as cases of sexual orientation discrimination not covered by
Title VII while continuing to hold heterosexual harassment to be
gender-based discrimination within the ambit of Title VII. 28' Grose
presents a hypothetical to illustrate this theory. A lesbian employee is
280. See infra Part 11I.C.1.
281. See Grose, supra note 13, at 388.
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offended by her co-workers' explicit discussions about their hetero-
sexual sex practices, but has no sexual harassment claim under Title
VI.0 2 In an analogous scenario, a heterosexual female employee is
offended to hear her lesbian co-workers discuss their sexual prac-
tices.2" This time, according to Grose, the behavior is actionable
since "homosexual expression... is clearly actionable under Title
VII."2 84 Recent case law, however, indicates that homosexual expres-
sion, at least of the type described in Grose's hypothetical, is no more
actionable as sexual harassment than is heterosexual expression. In
other words, attacks on an employee's heterosexuality are no more
capable of forming the basis of a claim of sexual harassment than are
attacks on an employee's homosexuality. 
2
1
Grose raises two cases in support of her hypothetical. These cases
both involved homosexual harassers, but their approaches to same-
sex sexual harassment are anomalous. The decision in Hart v. Na-
tional Mortgage & Land Co., 286 for example, a California decision from
1987, suggests that the court believed the plaintiff's sex discrimina-
tion complaint was deficient because he admitted a belief that the
perpetrator did not wish to have sex with him.8 7 Yet Grose neglects
to cite Mogilefsky v. Superior Court,2 8 another California decision in
which the court criticized Hart and the trial court's reliance on it in
dismissing the action:
Hart is of questionable value as a legal precedent. The reviewing
court's failure to deal with the undeniably sexual nature of the
conduct to which Hart was subjected is, to say the least, trouble-
some. Such conduct, whether motivated by hostility or by sexual
interest, is always "because of sex" regardless of the sex of the vic-
tim. Indeed, real parties in interest herein admit that if Hart had
been a woman, the conduct alleged in that case would
"unquestionably have constituted sexual harassment under [the
applicable statute]." The Hart court's failure to mention, much less
discuss, this double standard leaves the opinion vulnerable to criti-
CiM289cism.
The Mogilefsky case makes clear that there need be no showing of the
homosexuality of the harasser for a case of same-sex sexual harass-
282. See id. at 389-90, 392.
283. See id.
284. Id. at 392.
285. See id. at 393.
286. 235 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (holding no sexual harassment of employee
when alleged harasser did not touch employee).
287. See id. at 70.
288. 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (finding sexually suggestive remarks with no
physical touching did not rise to level of sexual harassment).
289. Id. at 119.
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ment to proceed.
Grose also cites Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transportationm an early quid
pro quo same-sex sexual harassment case. In that case, the em-
ployee's supervisor approached him, placed his hands on the em-
ployee's genital area and solicited sex.y1 The court concluded that
the causation element of the claim was met because the supervisor
was a homosexual. 2 Although this same reasoning has been em-
ployed in other cases and is remarkably similar to the presumption of
heterosexuality employed in opposite-sex cases to render an evalua-
tion of the causation element superfluous, it has been questioned
and discarded in recent decisions as an unhelpful means of evaluat-
ing same-sex claims.25 Grose's point that courts focus on the orienta-
tion of the harasser and parcel out liability on that basis is thus un-
supported. The weight of current Title VII jurisprudence asserts that
Title VII prohibits harassing sexual expressions in the workplace re-
gardless of the sexual orientation of the harasser.
A recent case heard by the District Court of Wisconsin conflicts
with Grose's view. In Miller v. Vesta, Inc.,24 Elizabeth Miller, a female
heterosexual, brought a sexual harassment action under Title VII al-
leging that a lesbian at her work site had attempted to initiate a sex-
ual relationship. Miller complained to management, who then elic-
ited a promise from the lesbian that no further solicitations would be
forthcoming."' Thereafter the lesbian gave Miller a birthday card,
followed her into the restroom, and stared at her.m In her objec-
tions to the magistrate judge's conclusion that she had no claim,
Miller made reference to the "deeply repugnant" nature of homo-
sexuality in the workplace, and argued that she, a married hetero-
sexual female, should not have had to repel lesbian advances in or-
der to retain her employment.27 The court made it clear that the
actions at issue did not rise to the level of actionable sexual harass-
ment, and explicitly declined to hold that the homosexual character
of the harassment could be considered as an exacerbating factor
rendering the harassment more severe than comparable opposite-sex
290. 597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (identifying homosexual advances as prima facie
case of sexual discrimination).
291. Seeid.
292. See id.
293. See supra note 96; see also infra note 305.
294. 946 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (holding that plaintiff had no sexual discrimination
claim for same-sex harassment).
295. See id. at 708.
296. See id. at 708-09.
297. See id. at 711.
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harassmentY.8 The court stated that "[t]o hold that homosexual har-
assment of heterosexuals automatically creates a hostile environment
in violation of Title VII would grant protection based upon a plain-
tiff's sexual orientation. However, heterosexuality, as a sexual orien-
tation, is simply not a protected characteristic under 
Title VII.L "
Likewise, in an earlier case, Fox v. Sierra Development Co.,m three het-
erosexual males objected to their supervisors' "writing, drawing, and
explicitly discussing homosexual sex acts." '' The court concluded
that, although these acts were sexual in nature, evidence of discrimi-
natory hostility was lacking. The court based its conclusion on the
fact that "[p]ictures, literature and discussions of homosexual con-
duct do not inherently intimidate, ridicule, or insult men."3 3 The
court further commented that the plaintiffs may have experienced a
hostile work environment because they were heterosexual or homo-
phobic, but that "[s] uch discrimination, or harassment is not prohib-
ited.' 4 These cases are not mere anomalies in the case law treating
same-sex sexual harassment claims. Other courts have made clear
that, in judicial evaluation of sexual harassment claims, the sexual
orientations of the partiess 5 and any homosexual aspects of the con-
298. See zd. at 711-12.
299. Id. at 712.
300. 876 F. Supp. 1169 (D. Nev. 1995).
301. Id. at 1173.
302. See id. at 1174 ([T]he homosexual content of the alleged conduct is not relevant to
determining whether the alleged conduct adequately demonstrates a hostile environment.").
303. Id. at 1176.
304. Id. at 1175 n.6.
305. See, e.g., McCoy v. Macon Water Auth., 966 F. Supp. 1209 (M.D. Ga. 1997) (noting that
the sex of harasser and sex of harassed person are not relevant); Marciano v. Kash N' Karry
Foodstores, Inc., No. 94-1657 CIV-T-17A, 1996 WL 420879, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 1, 1996)
(explaining that the sexual orientation of either party is irrelevant); Wehrle v. Office Depot,
Inc., 954 F. Supp. 234, 236 (W.D. Okla. 1996) (explaining that allegation of the perpetrator's
homosexuality is irrelevant);Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403, 1411 (E.D. Wis. 1996)
(noting that the purported homosexuality of the perpetrator irrelevant; sexuality does not
prove that conduct were directed towards victim because of victim's gender; sexuality is not the
legal issue), affd, 125 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 1997); Shermer v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 937 F.
Supp. 781 (C.D. Ill. 1996) (stating that the sexual orientation of the perpetrator should not be
key to proof of sexual harassment); Gerd v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 934 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D.
Colo. 1996) (finding that sexual preferences of victim are irrelevant); Waag v. Thomas Pontiac,
Buick, GMC, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 393,402 n.10 (D. Minn. 1996) (stating that homosexual victims
are protected against same-sex sexual harassment); Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F.
Supp. 351, 355 (D. Nev. 1996) (stating that the sexual preferences of the victim and the har-
asser are irrelevant to Title VII claims and that "Title VII protects all persons, whether male or
female, heterosexual or homosexual, from discrimination based on sex" (citing Meritor Say.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986))); Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 7
(D.D.C. 1996) (noting orientation of harasser is irrelevant to same-sex sexual harassment
claims); Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 805, 807 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (determining
that same-sex sexual harassment is not an issue of homosexuality); Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l
Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1180 (N.D. Ind. 1995) ("[B]eing homosexual does not deprive
someone of protection from sexual harassment under Title VII, it is merely irrelevant to it.");
Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 5458, 1995 WL 640502, at *6 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1,
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duct are irrelevant 5 6
Given the foregoing, it is difficult to see just how Title VII supports
Grose's statement that "the legal system by definition privileges het-
erosexuality while denigrating homosexuality.0 °7  This is not of
course to say that no other areas of the law work "to the detriment of
homosexuality,"0 8 just that current Title VII sexual harassment juris-
prudence does not appear to do so.
2. Juries do not award higher damages in same-sex cases
Spitko claims that heterosexual expressions are not prohibited in
the workplace to the same degree as homosexual expressions. He
states that "any given sexual comment or behavior will be judged
more harshly by the finder of fact when the claimed victim of alleged
harassment is of the same sex as the alleged harasser than when he is
of the other sex"10 and thatjuries will issue disproportionately higher
damages awards in same-sex sexual harassment cases. According to
Spitko, this prejudicial distinction arises because societal heterosex-
ism views homosexual expressions as more harassing than analogous
heterosexual expressions.3 ' Both of these statements are belied by
current sexual harassment jurisprudence.
Spitko points to Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago,312 Caleshu
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,313 Ebert v. Lamar Truck
Plaza,314 and Johnson v. Ramsey County15 to support his position. In
Caleshu, the plaintiff complained of being subjected over a period of
five months to unwelcome offensive touching, forcible deep kissing,
and to her supervisor's exposure of his genitals. 6  As in Sneed v.
Montgomery Housing Authority,1 7 the finder of fact simply did not
1995) (stating that being homosexual does not deprive person of protection from sexual har-
assment).
306. See, e.g., Tanner, 919 F. Supp. at 356.
307. Grose, supra note 13, at 393.
308. Id. at 394.
309. See Spitko, supra note 20, at 73.
310. Id. at 85.
311. Seeid.
312. 90 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding no actionable claim of Tide VII sexual discrimi-
nation arose where opposite-sex incidents were relatively isolated).
313. 737 F. Supp. 1070 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (discussing employee's failure to establish Title VII
harassment and hostile work environment), aftd, 985 F.2d 564 (8th Cir. 1991).
314. 878 F.2d 338, 339 (10th Cir. 1989) (refusing to find sexual harassment against female
employees by opposite-sex employer).
315. 424 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (findingjudge liable for battery, although evi-
dence did not support finding of sexual harassment within statute of limitations period).
316. See Caleshu, 737 F. Supp. at 1070.
317. 956 F. Supp. 982 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (noting that sexual harassment complaints were not
shown to be a motivating factor in plaintiff s dismissal).
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credit Caleshu's allegations3 1 8 and emphasized that some of the events
were alleged to have occurred outside of work, rendering them ir-
relevant.1 9 Weiss, which was similar to Hart and relied upon by both
Grose and Spitko, has been criticized as inharmonious with other Ti-
tle VII sexual harassment decisions."' Ebert is similarly anomalous; in
that case the acts of alleged harassment were not found to have been
based on sex, a rarity in opposite-sex cases, as noted above. 2 ' This
determination was due to the female plaintiffs' having used language
as foul as that which the alleged perpetrators used, in addition to the
perpetrators' directing the language "indiscriminately at both male
and female coworkers. "3s' Finally, the claim in Ebert was undercut by
the employer's prompt response to the complaints.3 2s
Spitko's disproportionality theory is also based on the view that ju-
ries will issue higher damages awards in same-sex cases than in oppo-
site-sex cases.2 4 According to Spitko, these higher damages awards
will in turn inspire employers to discriminate against gays and lesbi-
ans.325 The only case upon which Spitko bases this view is Johnson v.
Ramsey County,26 a Minnesota battery suit. 27 Spitko describes Johnson
as a case in which a supervisor kissed his male subordinate, and the
subordinate won $375,000 in punitive and emotional damages, 28 but
Johnson involved much more than Spitko would have us believe. The
supervisor in question, Alberto Miera, was in fact a Minnesota district
court judge, appointed by Governor Rudy Perpich in 1983 and
elected in 1984," who sexually harassed his male court reporter
Johnson as well as female court employees.3 0 The court remitted the
jury's future, compensatory, and punitive damages awards of
$375,000 to a total of $125,000. This award was upheld on appeal.
The case received extensive exposure through the media,33' and
318. Note that in any sexual harassment case, an employer may raise the defense that the
allegations are untrue.
319. See Caleshu, 737 F. Supp. at 1076-78.
320. See Hernandez v. Wangen, 938 F. Supp. 1052, 1058 (D.P.R. 1996) (suggesting that
conduct such as repetitive sexual advances may be sufficiently severe to affect reasonable per-
son's work productivity).
321. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
322. See Ebert v. Lamar Truck Plaza, 715 F. Supp. 1496, 1499 (D. Colo. 1987), aff'd, 878 F.2d
338 (10th Cir. 1989).
323. See Ebert Lamar Truck Plaza, 878 F.2d 338, 339 (10th Cir. 1989).
324. SeeSpitko, supra note 20, at 84.
325. See id.
326. 424 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
327. Johnson's sexual harassment claim was time-barred and summary judgment was
granted on his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. See id. at 801,810.
328. See Spitko, supra note 20, at 58 n.120.
329. Seein reMiea, 426 N.W.2d 850,852 (Minn. 1988).
330. Seeid.at851.
331. See Ramsey County, 424 N.W.2d at 805.
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Miera decided not to seek re-election in 1990. The public outcry at
the time was less about Miera's sexual orientation than about his
breach of ethics and the public's trust 32 In fact, Miera was not only
held liable for battery but was publicly censured for his unethical ac-
tivities.3s  One month after the verdict, Miera was publicly repri-
manded for attorney and judicial misconduct pursuant to a discipli-
nary proceeding brought before the Supreme Court of Minnesota.3
The court invoked Canons 1 s and 2Ass6 of the Code ofJudicial Con-
duct to conclude that Miera, a public servant, had breached the pub-
lic's trust by engaging in disreputable and illegal behavior." ' The
court noted that "courts in other jurisdictions have reached similar
conclusions, imposing discipline for unwelcome sexual advances
even outside an employer-employee relationship,"' "8 and commented:
Judges must conform to a higher standard of conduct than is ex-
pected of lawyers or other persons in society.... The legal system
332. See, e.g., Letters from Readers, STAR TRIB., Oct. 9, 1989, at 10A.
The issue is not Miera's personality, as his mother implies, but the importance of an
honest and effective judiciary, free from scandal. Judges decide the lives, fortunes and
fates of numerous of their fellow citizens and must be held to the highest professional
ethical standards. To expect or to allow less is cheating the citizens of Minnesota and
Ramsey County.
Id.; Lettersfrom Readers, STAR TRIB., Sept. 27, 1990, at 18A ("Miera, in a recent Star Tribune in-
terview, made reference to an interpretation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Maybe he
should be more concerned with his own conduct, and how it is interpreted by the people he
serves." (quoting Tom Walker, New Hope)).
333. See Ramsey County, 424 N.W.2d at 805.
334. See Miera, 426 N.W.2d at 850.
335. A.B.A. CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 1 (1972). Canon 1 of the Code ofJudicial
Conduct requires judges to conform to a high standard of conduct "so that the integrity and
independence of the judiciary may be preserved." Id.
336. Id. Canon 2A. Under Canon 2A, judges must "respect and comply with the law" and
act "at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary." Id.
337. See Ramsey County, 424 N.W.2d at 800.
338. Miera, 426 N.W.2d at 856; see alsoJody Meier, Sexual Harassment in Law Firms: Should
Attorneys be Disciplined Under the Lawyer Codes?, 4 GEO.J. LEGALETHICS 169 (1991); Lauren Blau,
Holden Denies Harassing Former Secretary, LA_ DAILYJ., Oct. 24, 1995, at 2; Russ Bleemer, Censure
Urged for Judge Who Harassed Law Clerk, N.J. LJ., Feb. 1, 1993, at 7; Michael Booth, Publicity and
Sex Harassment Suits: Perfect Together, N.J. L.J., Dec. 11, 1995, at 1; Editorial, Bork Never Had It
This Bad, LA DALYJ., Oct. 10, 1991, at 6; Editorial, Military Injustice, LA DAILYJ., Nov. 28,
1995, at 6; Editorial, On Packwood... He Should Resign, LA DAILYJ., Dec. 23, 1992, at 6; Margo
L. Ely, Judge Convicted of Sexual Assault Wins Reversa4 CHi. DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 12, 1996, at 6
(reporting on judge's criminal prosecution for acts of sexual harassment and assault); Michael
J. Hall, Anita Hill, Hillary Clinton Address Packed House LA DAILYJ., Aug. 11, 1992, at 11; Mat-
thew Heller, Court Torn Apart; Sex Harassment Charges Against Judge Stun Victorville Attornes, LA
DAILYJ., May 23, 1996, at 1; Arleen Jacobius, Thomas Opponents Call on Senate to Delay Vote, LA
DAILYJ., Oct. 8, 1991, at 3; Susan McRae, Panel Reproves Judge Accused of Harassment, LA DAILY
L.J., Feb. 15, 1994, at 1; B.J. Palermo, Battery Case AgainstJudge Goes to the Jury, LA DAILYJ., Apr.
27, 1995, at 3; B.J. Palermo,Judge Attacked Her, Lawyer Says, LA DAILYJ., Apr. 21, 1995, at 3; BJ.
Palermo, Worker's CompJudge Convicted of Sexual Battery on Attorney, LA DAILYJ., May 1, 1995, at
1; Deborah Pines, Anita Hill Speaks on Harassment, NAT'L L.J., May 11, 1992, at 17;James Rowley,
Senate Delays Thomas Votefor a Week to Study Charges, LA DALYJ., Oct. 9, 1991, at 3.
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depends on public confidence in judges, whose power rests in large
measure on the ability to command respect for judicial decisions.
Whether or not directly related to judicial duties, misconduct by a
judge brings the office into disrepute and thereby prejudices the
administration ofjustice. 39
The court concluded that Miera's behavior 'jeopardizes confi-
dence in the integrity of the judiciary and brings the office into dis-
repute. ""O Miera was suspended from office without pay for one
year,"' and thereafter did not seek reelection.M2  The Miera case is
more an illustration of a breach of the public's confidence in a pub-
lic servant than it is of public outrage against homosexual expression
in the workplace. 3
These factors arguably undermine, at least in part, the notion that
the jury's verdict in Johnson was fueled by anti-gay animus. The level
of public censure in response to Miera's harassing acts would not
have arisen in the similar case of a private employer and thus this
case is unsupportive of Spitko's conclusion. Given the foregoing,
Miera's status as a public servant, a factor Spitko fails to mention,
contributed in large measure to any disproportion in the damages
awarded to Johnson.
Further undercutting the utility of Johnson as an example of how
juries' anti-gay bias will result in higher damages awards against gay
harassers is the fact that the most extraordinary awards in sexual har-
assment suits are invariably granted by juries hearing opposite-sex
cases. This is true in Minnesota, where the largest jury award, later
reduced, was $3.25 million to an individual employee. 344 California,
the jurisdiction used by Grose to support her conclusions of anti-gay
bias in the courts, also has a history of astronomical awards in oppo-
site-sex harassment cases. One such case was Weeks v. Baker & McKen-
zie,345 an opposite-sex case in which the legal secretary of one of the
339. Miera, 426 N.W.2d at 855.
340. Id. at 856.
341. Seeid.at859.
342. See Paul Gustafson, Judge Miera Won't Seek Reelection; Urges Perpich to Fill Seat with His-
panic, STAR TRIB. (MINN.), May 26, 1990, at IB; St. Paul; Rosas Joins District Court Bench, STAR
TRIB. (MINN.), Sept. 29, 1990, at 3B (reporting the swearing in of Salvador Rosas, the newest
judge on the District Court Bench, who replaced Judge Miera).
343. Note that another factor contributing to the large award may have been the fact that
court reporters undergo specialized training and have limited employment opportunities. See
David Peterson, Resolution of Hennepin Judge's Sex-Harassment Case Is Questioned, STAR TRIB.
(MINN.), May 25, 1993, at 1A ("The high court recognized in [Miera] that court reporters-
whom judges can fire at will, and who have specialized training suiting them for little else-are
'particularly vulnerable to abuse of power.'" (quoting Miera, 426 N.W.2d at 856)).
344. See Margaret Zack, Women Follow Suit; Burgeoning Sex-Harassment Charges Tell Shocking
Tales, STAR TRIB. (MINN.),July 20, 1992, at 1A. Anotherjury awarded $602,494 to a female in-
surance agent in December 1991. See id.
345. No. 943043, 1994 WL 636488, at *1 (Cal. Super. Sept. 30, 1994) (finding repeated sex-
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law firm's partners was awarded $50,000 in compensatory damages
and a total of $6,225,000 in punitive damages in a case involving
conduct far less egregious than found in most of the same-sex cases
cited in this Article.m6 The award did not include the plaintiffs at-
torneys' fees, which were estimated to exceed $500,000. A judge
later remitted the punitive damages award to $3.5 million. M
7
Furthermore, Spitko fails to discuss how the Johnson verdict and
Miera's future employment prospects might be different now that
Minnesota's human rights law forbids discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation and the Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized
same-sex sexual harassment as a viable claim. 48 Miera certainly could
recover damages under the law if he were discriminated against by
his new employer on the basis of his allegedly bisexual orientation!"
A new employer, though, would simply respond that she chose not to
hire (or chose to fire) Miera because he had been a sexual harasser.
Obviously, Spitko is less concerned about persons in Miera's position
and more concerned about the impact cases like Johnson will have on
job opportunities for gays and lesbians who are not known harassers.
This concern seems misplaced, based as it is on the assumption that
employers will presume that gays are more likely than heterosexuals
to harass their employees and in this way expose employers to astro-
ua harassment that was severe and pervasive).
346. In Weeks, the partner of a law firm placed candy in his secretary's breast pocket as they
walked out of a restaurant; lunged toward her with cupped hands as if he were going to grab
her breasts and stated, "What's wrong? Are you afraid I'm going to grab you?"; repeatedly in-
quired "What's the wildest thing you've ever done?" during a lunch at a local restaurant; and
.grabbed her butt" in the presence of two other employees as they were packing some items
into a van. See Cerisse Anderson, $4 Million Sexual Harassment Award Upset, N.Y. LJ., Apr. 3,
1992, at 1 (acknowledging that punitive damages are not available for most discrimination
claims in New York); Barry A. Hartstein, Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie: A Potential "Blueprint"for
Sexual Harassment Litigation, 20 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 657 (1995). Plaintiffs in opposite-sex har-
assment cases receive higher damages awards than plaintiffs in same-sex cases, even where the
conduct in opposite-sex cases is less egregious. $81 M Liability Delivered to UPS in Sex Bias Case
NAT'L LJ., Mar. 23, 1998, at A9 (reporting jury verdict of $80.75 million in opposite-sex har-
assment case involving stalking and poking in breast of individual employee).
347. SeeWilliam Vogeler, Record Verdict Cut; Judge Halves Harassment Award, ABA J., Feb.
1995, at 18 (commenting on reduction in punitive award from $6.9 million to about $3.5 mil-
lion).
348. See MINN. STAT. § 363.01(41), (45) (1997); Cummings v. Koehnen, 556 N.W.2d 586,
589 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), affd 568 N.W.2d 418 (Minn. 1997).
The definition of sexual harassment does not require an inquiry into the gender or
sexual orientation of either the harasser or the victim. The only requirement is that
the conduct or communication be of a sexual nature. Accordingly, we conclude a
plain reading of the statute allows a claim of sexual harassment, without regard to the
harasser or victim's gender or sexual orientation, if a victim can prove a harasser's
verbal or physical conduct or communication was of a sexual nature, and created an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment environment.
Id.
349. See Gallagher & Moss, supra note 279, at 78 (reporting "series of sizable awards" favor-
able to gays).
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nomical damages awards.3" Just the opposite appears likely, espe-
cially given that most sexual harassment suits involve victims and
perpetrators of the opposite sex, most workplaces are dominated by
heterosexual persons, and damages awarded in opposite-sex cases are
as extraordinary (or more so) than those awarded in same-sex
351cases.
Some developments on the landscape of same-sex sexual harass-
mentjurisprudence appear, at first blush, to support Spitko's theory.
As a closer look reveals, these cases offer questionable support for his
conclusion. In EEOC v. Walden Book Co.,52 the jury awarded the plain-
tiff $1.6 million in punitive damages and $75,000 in compensatory
damages."' Unlike most same-sex sexual harassment cases, however,
the plaintiff in Walden suffered "years of harassment by his gay super-
visor.014 It is likely that the jury's verdict reflected the pervasiveness
of the harassment, especially given that none of the incidents were
excluded from the action on the theory that they were time barred.3 5
In Ohio, an eight-member jury unanimously decided to issue a
350. It must be noted that Spitko's thesis focuses on "the gay defendant" in same-sex sexual
harassment cases. In most same-sex cases, however, the sexuality of the defendant is unknown
or is presumed to be heterosexual. "Defendant" may be a problematic or misleading term,
given that, although the harasser is often named as a defendant in these cases, for the most part
"individual employees cannot be held liable under Title VII." Dici v. Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542,
551-52 (3d Cir. 1996). To the extent Spitko in seeking to broaden his thesis conflates homo-
sexuality and same-sex conduct, see Spitko, supra note 20, at 85; see also Woodhouse, supra note
35, at 1159, he commits what he accuses Judge Richard Posner of doing inappropriately-
conflating homosexuality with sodomy. See Spitko, supra note 20, at 74 n.150. He ignores the
fact that same-sex sexual conduct is engaged in by self-defined heterosexual men as well.
351. See Kelly & Watt, supra note 31, at 132 (reporting larger verdicts in cross-sex cases, es-
pecially female-against-male cases, than in same-sex sexual harassment cases); see also $81 M
Liability Delivered to UPS in Sex Bias Case, supra note 346, at A9 (reporting jury verdict of $80.75
million in opposite-sex harassment case involving poking breast of and stalking individual em-
ployee); Patty Henetz, Getting to the Roots of Gender Discrimination; Discrimination Goes Beyond Sex,
Professor Says, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 15, 1998, at Al (reporting award of $2 million to plaintiffs
in opposite-sex harassment case and judge's reduction of award to $750,000);Jury Awards Ex-
Highway Worker $930,000; Men on the Job Harassed Her, Federal Suit Charged, ST. Louis POST
DISPATCH, Nov. 4, 1997, at D7 (case of opposite-sex, gender-based harassment); Matthew
Lubanko, Harassment Insurance a Hot Item, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 22, 1998, at Al (reporting
award of $6.6 million to "lone claimant" in opposite-sex harassment case).
352. 885 F. Supp. 1100 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).
353. See Harassment Victim Awarded $1.6 Million, 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 98 (May 22,
1995).
354. Id.
355. Under Title VII, a plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the
alleged violation. See42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1994). The limitations period commences on the
date that the discriminatory act occurred. See Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250
(1980). Under a continuing violations theory, a plaintiff is relieved from the burden of proving
that the entire violation occurred within the actionable period. See Berry v. Board of Supervi-
sors, 715 F.2d 971, 979 (5th Cir. 1983). Under this theory, a plaintiff may seek redress for un-
lawful discriminatory acts which took place in a period barred by the statute of limitations if
there occur related acts within the requisite period. See Cedeck v. Hamiltonian Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 551 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1977).
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$1.65 million award in favor of an allegedly heterosexual male plain-
tiff who sued his allegedly heterosexual male supervisor for sexual
harassment.356  The ongoing acts were described as denunciations
"that included a discussion of a sexual act.",5 7 Since the perpetrator
received only a reprimand from the company, the jury may have
wished to punish the company for not responding to complaints of
sexual harassment.'8 Notably, Ohio's human rights law does not
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation."" In Cali-
fornia, a Los Angeles Superior Court jury awarded $1.7 million in
compensatory and $2.5 million in punitive damages in a same-sex
sexual harassment case. After the verdict, however, the parties settled
the dispute for substantially less than that amount.M6 The post-verdict
settlement suggests that the parties understood that the award would
not survive judicial scrutiny and would be remitted, like the awards in
Johnson and Weeks, particularly given that verdicts in same-sex sexual
harassment cases in other countries 6' have been very low and in the
United States are frequently lower than the national average.m2 This
fact likely induces same-sex sexual harassment claimants to settle
their cases rather than take them to trial.6
Spitko's theory that juries will return disproportionate damages
awards in same-sex cases is speculative. In actuality, any disparity in
the outcomes of the cases seems better explained by the fact that the
inverse ratio of severity and pervasiveness "has not been consistently
applied in practice, '' 4 rather than by anti-gay bias. Spitko does not
mention that sexual harassment awards are often large, and does
356. SeeJames Ewinger, Juy Rules Worker Harassed by Boss; Same-Sex Suit Trial Was a First for
Ohio, PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 25, 1997, at lB.
357. See id.
358. See id.
359. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(A) (Banks-Baldwin 1994) (detailing what consti-
tutes unlawful discrimination in Ohio).
360. See Davis, supra note 165, at B1.
361. See STEPHEN 0. MURRAY, AMERICAN GAY 1 (1996) ("[T]he panicked mobilization
against homosexuals in the United States seems approached only by that in Canada and the
British Isles.").
362. See Kelly & Watt, supra note 31, at 132 (reporting larger verdicts in cross-sex cases, es-
pecially female-against-male cases, than in same-sex sexual harassment cases); see also Frank
Davies, Sexual Harassment Suit Takes a Twist, MIAMI HERALD, July 20, 1997, at B1 (reporting
award of reinstatement and $50,000 back pay in same-sex sexual harassment case); Gallagher &
Moss, supra note 279, at 78 (reporting award of $75,000 in Kentucky same-sex sexual harass-
ment case); Steve Salerno, An End to Harassment Hysteria, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1998, at A22
(average sexual-harassment plaintiff who wins her case in court is awarded $256,000).
363. See Davis, supra note 165, at B1 (mentioning that the parties in Quick v. Donaldson Co.
and Gerd v. United Parcel Service reached a settlement prior to trial).
364. McFarland, supra note 44, at 540.
365. See Beverley H. Earle & Gerald A. Madek, An International Perspective on Sexual Harass-
ment Law, 12 LAW & INE.J. 43, 44 (1993) (citing study estimating that sexual harassment costs
a large American company $6.7 million a year); Salerno, supra note 362, at A22 (average sexual-
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not mention mechanisms that, at least in theory, could provide more
consistency in this area, such as the trial judge's prerogative to vacate
or reduce an award, or to grant post-trial motions challenging the
verdict.' 6 In addition, Spitko fails to note that awards in sexual har-
assment cases have been on the rise across the board' 67 and that this
trend is explained by the advent of compensatory and punitive dam-
ages in Title VII cases.68
The few cases cited by Spitko as support for the proposition that
courts disproportionately censure homosexual expressions in the
workplace actually support the opposite view: courts disproportion-
ately trivialize homosexual expressions and award far less in damages
to plaintiffs who complain about them than to plaintiffs who com-
plain of advances by co-workers or supervisors of the opposite sex.
This problem is the real threat to gay civil rights. When homosexual
sexual expressions are found to be trivial or even humorous and are
excluded from the ambit of conduct proscribed by Title VII, such
treatment speaks to the attempted erasure of homosexual expres-
sions, not to their disproportionate prohibition and censure. Grose's
and Spitko's proposals hint that this result would be positive and lib-
erating for gays and lesbians, as it would remove homosexual expres-
sions from regulation by heterosexist institutions. As the following
section reveals, quite the opposite is true.
IV. THE POSITIVE EFFECTS OF RECOGNITION
The vision of commentators who are pessimistic about same-sex
sexual harassment claims is too narrow and fails to address two criti-
cal problems. First, a legal system without same-sex claims would fail
to emphasize to the heterosexual majority the limitations of em-
ployment discrimination proscriptions that fail to forbid discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation. Second, failure to litigate
same-sex claims would trivialize and dismiss homosexual conduct as
puerile, thereby valorizing heterosexual expression as more deserv-
harassment plaintiff who wins her case in court is awarded $256,000).
366. Spitko does admit, however, that the punitive damages award in Johnson was remitted
from $300,000 to $50,000. SeeSpitko, supra note 20, at 85 n.136.
367. SeeJolie Solomon, An Insurance Policy with Sex Appea, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 16, 1998, at 44
(reportingjump in record amount paid in EEOC case from $1.3 million in 1996, to $10 million
in 1998); Greg Weatherford, Increasingly, Courts Are Called Upon to Work Out Harassment Confu-
sion, RiCHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 23, 1998, at D15 (reporting increase in payments to
plaintiffs from $7.1 million in 1991, to $49.4 million in 1997, and an increase in 1997 of 81.5%
from 1996).
368. See Mathews, supra note 55, at 307 (noting concern "that juries will be prone to grant
damages far in excess of the actual injury, and that many uninjured workers nonetheless will
file lawsuits because of the potential lure of a large payoff').
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ing of attention, concern, and censure, and would exclude causes of
action that do not implicate sexual orientation but raise the issue of
gender stereotyping in the workplace. Litigating same-sex sexual
harassment claims is essential to prevent the problems wrought by
not litigating them from infecting Title VII jurisprudence.
A. Prohibition of Sexual Orientation Discrimination
Referring to same-sex sexual harassment, a lawyer who represents a
gay former sales trainee harassed by co-workers at a Wall Street secu-
rities firm recently commented, "[I] t's time for people who are het-
erosexual to stand up against this kind of behavior." Recognition
of same-sex sexual harassment claims will ensure that they do. Same-
sex sexual harassment jurisprudence, more than any other brand of
jurisprudence brought under Title VII, has already illustrated to het-
erosexuals their inability to advance claims of discrimination based
on sexual orientation. Through cases such as Miller and Fox, hetero-
sexuals have been exposed to the fact that heterosexuality is not pro-
tected under Title VII and that they may be harassed and demeaned
on the basis of that characteristic without recourse under the statute.
More such illustrations will fail to materialize if same-sex sexual har-
assment claims are not litigated, ultimately exacerbating Grose's con-
cern that heterosexuality is implicitly a characteristic protected by Ti-
tle VII. On the other hand, if such claims are litigated, and
heterosexuals are thereby further reminded that their sexual orienta-
tion is not protected by Title VII, they will have an incentive to lobby
for protections against discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion to make sure that heterosexuality-based discrimination cannot
be practiced with impunity.31° In light of surprising cases such as
Miller and Fox, some heterosexuals, who have most likely never con-
sidered that they could legally be discriminated against based on
their sexual orientation, will promote support for the passage of an
amendment to Title VII or for passage of the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act ("ENDA') to outlaw sexual orientation discrimi-
nation in the workplace. ENDA already commands significant sup-
port in both the Senate and the House of Representatives37 and
369. Davis, supra note 165, at BI.
370. See, e.g., Karpowicz v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., Civ. A. No. 96-10050-
MLW, 1996 WL 528372, at *1 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 1996) (addressing claim by heterosexual un-
der Massachusetts Law Against Discrimination, which proscribes sexual orientation discrimina-
tion).
371. At the last vote on this issue, forty-nine senators voted in favor of ENDA, just one vote
short of passing. "There is strong bipartisan support and strong public support for [ENDA].
An impressive majority of Americans-68%-support the Act." STATEMENT OF SENATOR
EDWARD KENNEDY ON THE EMPLOYMENT NON-DISCRIMINATION Acr (last modified Oct. 28, 1997)
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could well command even greater support by the heterosexual ma-
jority now that same-sex sexual harassment claims have been recog-
nized by Oncale.57 In the absence of same-sex claims, cases like Miller
and Fox, instrumental in focusing attention on the limitations for
heterosexuals of the lack of a prohibition of discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation,373 will not be litigated. The visibility that
these cases offer, and that cases involving homosexual persons fired
for their sexual orientation have not offered, will advance the cause
of obtaining protection against sexual orientation discrimination in
the workplace. Without same-sex claims, then, an opportunity for
majoritarian support of an amendment to Title VII to forbid dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation or of passage of ENDA
would be lost.
Apart from the potential benefit of passage of legislation to remedy
the gap in Title VII protection against sexual orientation discrimina-
tion is the certainty that litigation of same-sex sexual harassment
claims will focus attention on the impermissibility of gender stereo-
typing in the workplace. Emphasizing the impermissibility of dis-
criminatory gender stereotyping, which the courts already prohibit,
'37 4
will provide a vehicle for judicial recognition of sexual orientation
discrimination as sex discrimination because, as many scholars have
noted, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is in essence
rooted in sex stereotyping. s' These cases are more likely to arise in
<http: / /www.senate.gov/ member/ma/k ennedy/ general/ statements/ 72103enda.html>.
President Clinton has voiced his support for the bill, Statement by President Clinton Employ-
ment Non-Discrimination Act (last modified Dec. 11, 1997) <http://www.aclu.org/congress/
endaclinton.html>, but the House has yet to vote on the measure. See Price, supra note 279, at
C5; see also Stone-Harris, supra note 240, at 319 (advocating passage of federal legislation to ban
workplace discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
372. See Price, supra note 279, at C5 (noting that Oncale's decision that sexual harassment is
illegal only when it amounts to sex discrimination emphasizes the need for ENDA.)
373. See Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (stating that the relevant sex
and perspective are that of the victim, not the harasser).
374. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (finding that stereo-
typed remarks may evidence gender discrimination); Blake v. Grede Foundries, Inc., No. 96-
1322-JTM, 1997 WL 157126, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 20, 1997) (ruling that same-sex"harassment in
the form of gestures suggesting homosexuality because [plaintiff] was a male working in a tra-
ditionally female position" was actionable); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 658 (D.D.C.
1976) (noting that, although Congress did want to eliminate discrimination based on sexual
stereotypes, it also wished to forbid any discrimination based on sex); Zalewski v. Overlook
Hosp., 692 A.2d 131, 134 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (finding that same-sex harassment
claim based on gender stereotyping was cognizable); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc. 444 F.2d
1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971) ("In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals be-
cause of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women resulting from sex stereotypes."); Lindahl v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434 (9th
Cir. 1991); Franke, supra note 10, at 74 (positing that sexual harassment acts to reinforce gen-
der stereotypes in the workplace).
375. See, e.g., Arriola, supra note 264, at 22 (positing that discrimination on the basis of gen-
der nonconformism is sex discrimination); Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together?
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the context of sexual harassment rather than in the context of sex
discrimination claims not involving allegations of sexual harassment,
because discrimination on the basis of gender nonconformism often
takes the form of violence and is easier to hide where this violence
does not arise.376 Absent same-sex harassment claims, then, an oppor-
tunity for the judiciary to recognize sexual orientation qua sex dis-
crimination would be lost.
B. Presumptive Heterosexuality and Homosexual Expression
Current same-sex sexual harassment case law, while attempting to
focus exclusively on sexual conduct, at times defines such activity be-
tween persons of the same sex as juvenile and trivial, or vulgar and
boorish, but not, as Grose and Spitko have theorized, as more serious
and hostile than cross-sex expressions. This view of homosexual
expression has the effect of erasing its import and of reducing it in
importance vis-5.-vis similar expressions between persons of opposite
378sexes.
The erasure of homosexual expression is especially patent in same-
sex sexual harassment cases where the sexual orientation of the par-
ties is not knownsre In these cases, courts describe colorably homo-
Storytelling Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protections for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 511 (1992) (arguing that sexual orientation harassment is indistinguishable from gen-
der-based sexual harassment, for it is plainly sexual in nature, and it is based on gender stereo-
types); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187; Val-
des, Queers, supra note 264, at 23-25; Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the
Vonflation of Sex, Gender & Sexual Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALEJ.L. & HuMAN. 161, 169-70
(1996) [hereinafter Valdes, Hetero-Patriarchy]; Wehren, supra note 240, at 12-25 (arguing that,
because one's sexual orientation depends on a classification as a certain gender, sexual orienta-
tion discrimination is essentially discrimination based on gender); Capers, supra note 264, at
1183-84, 1186 (positing that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is essentially dis-
crimination based on sex stereotyping, and, as such, is prohibited by Tide VII, were the statute
to be applied consistently); Marcosson, supra note 97, at 3; Peluso, supra note 264, at 1536, 1560
(arguing that sexual orientation is a suspect or quasi-suspect classification and, as such, merits
protection under Tide VII).
376. See Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and the Construction of Maleness, 43
UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1103 (1996) (noting that adverse employment actions for gender noncon-
formity "will occur without explicit references to gender, or will involve a gender stereotype
couched in purportedly neutral language" and asserting that "[d]eviation from gender norms
incurs tremendous social disapproval, and even ritualized violence"); James D. Wilets, Concep-
tualizing Private Violence Against Sexual Minorities as Gendered Violence: An International and Com-
parative Law Perspective, 60 ALB. L. REv. 989, 990 (1997) (describing violence against women
and sexual minorities as predicated upon assumptions of gender polar construction).
377. See, e.g., Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697, 713 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (describing the
"the salient factor here as those of ajunior high school crush").
378. "We can choose to persecute or ignore sexual nonconformists within our culture-
either will do." Larry CatA Backer, Constructing a "Homosexual" for Constitutional Theory: Sodomy
Narrative, Jurisprudence, and Antipathy in United States and British Courts, 71 TULANE L. REv. 529,
542 n.32 (1997). In this regard, Spitko's alternative proposal is sound. See supra notes 285-86
and accompanying text.
379. See McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 n.5 (4th Cir.)
736
1998] SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS AFTER ONCALE 737
sexual activity as mere locker room antics and horseplay, even where
sexual solicitation and genital contact occur,o or where the conduct
is violent and coerced3s or involves threats of rape.82 The presump-
tion that the parties to these cases are heterosexuals8' drives this
evaluation and allows courts to redefine conduct aimed at the geni-
tals or elsewhere as "assuming a whole different meaning" in a same-
sex case on the mere basis that heterosexuals cannot be sexually at-
tracted to persons of the same sex.3 4 It is not entirely clear what this
wholly different meaning is, at least not initially. The meaning ap-
parently stops short of anything that could be related to sexual attrac-
tion between persons of the same sex. Judge John Nangle, dissenting
in Quick v. Donaldson Co., attempted the following explanation:
"When [squeezing of the genitals] occurs between heterosexual
males one is struck by the vulgarity of these actions. If this conduct
were to occur to females by males, however, the impression is entirely
different and the inference of sex discrimination is raised. 38
The suggestion here is that although a man's grabbing and squeez-
ing the genitals of another man is merely vulgar, his grabbing the
(noting that there was no proof that either the plaintiff or defendants were homosexual),cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996).
380. See id. at 1195 (dismissing hostile-environment claim because claim cannot lie where
alleged harassers and victim are of identical sex).
381. See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1381 (8th Cir. 1996) (Nangle,J., dissenting)
(stating that action of heterosexual males in singling out another unpopular heterosexual male
for harassment does not constitute a sexual harassment claim under Title VII).
382. SeeDoe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 574 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[Clourts by and large
have been unwilling to make the same assumption when a man harasses another man in the
workplace, however rife the harassment may be with sexual innuendo, sexual contact, and
other conduct of an explicitly sexual nature.") (citations omitted), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 1183
(1998); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., No. Civ. A. 94-1483, 1995 WL 133349, at *2 (E.D.
La. Mar. 24, 1995) (granting summary judgment for defendants because male plaintiff has no
cause of action for sexual harassment where defendants are male), afrd, 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir.
1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
383. See supra note 258 and accompanying text; see also Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the
Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 947
(1989) (stating that assumption of heterosexuality applies in almost all social interactions);
Locke, supra note 45, at 398 (explaining courts' reliance on stereotyped views of sexual interac-
tion and assumption that men are heterosexual unless proven otherwise); Schultz, supra note
35, at 1781 n.504.
384. See, e.g., Quick, 90 F.3d at 1381 ("'When the alleged offender and the alleged victim
share the same gender, similar sexually suggestive words and acts can take on a whole other
meaning.'" (quoting Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368, 1383 (C.D. Cal.
1995), rev'd on other grounds, 114 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam))); Martin v. Norfolk S.
Ry. Co., 926 F. Supp. 1044, 1049 (N.D. Ala. 1996) ("[Ifn the case of same-sex [presumed] het-
erosexual hostile working environment sexual harassment, the presumption of sexual gratifica-
tion and thus, sex discrimination, ceases to exist."). Note that the EEOC's position is that un-
welcome intentional touching of "intimate body areas" is sufficiently offensive to alter the
conditions of a working environment in violation of Title VII. SeeBARBARA LINDEMANN, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT 177 (1992).
385. Quick, 90 F.3d at 1381 (Nangle,J., dissenting).
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genitals of a woman is motivated by sexual attraction.m And yet the
only difference between these two scenarios is the victim's gender.
The existence of a sexual motivation for the oppressor's conduct is
thus dependent on this difference, because, according to the courts,
his actions towards these two must not mean the same thing.
7
The slippage in this reasoning may not be apparent if one takes for
granted that supporting it is the notion that most people in society
are heterosexual and have sexual attraction solely toward persons of
the opposite sex. While this hidden premise may be correct, it is cer-
tainly no reason to fail to recognize that some persons are not het-
erosexual, or at least not exclusively so.w The presumption of het-
erosexuality is perhaps especially misapplied to sexual harassment
cases where the conduct in question is arguably homoerotic, for ho-
moerotic urges by heterosexuals are not unknown38 and are not of
necessity paradoxicalH Presumptive heterosexuality hobbles the ar-
gument that the conduct in a given case is colorably homoerotic and
permits courts, sua sponte, as well as society in general to categorize
sexual behavior as non-sexual and ultimately as reflective of accept-
386. See Doe, 119 F.3d at 578 ("Likewise, when a woman's breasts are grabbed or when her
buttocks are pinched, the harassment necessarily is linked to her gender.").
387. See Torres v. National Precision Blanking, 943 F. Supp. 952, 960 n.14 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
("[A]n inference [that the harassment was based on sexual attraction] cannot be created by
harassment between members of a single gender.").
388. See ROBIN BAKER, SPERM WARs: THE SCIENCE OF SEX 242 (1996) (maintaining, without
authority, that "the vast majority (80 percent) of those who have sex with men also have sex
with women"); EDWARD LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY 299 (1994)
(reporting on study showing that 10.1% of men experience same-gender sexuality, whether
based on behavior, desire or identity); id. at 301 (noting, in study, sizable groups who do not
consider themselves to be either homosexual or bisexual but have had adult homosexual expe-
riences or express some degree of desire). Notably, eleven percent of the men in the Lau-
mann study who had had a same-gender sex partner in the year prior to the survey did not re-
port either same-gender desire or identity. SeeLAUMANN ETAL., supra, at 388 n.18.
389. SeeJanet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument
from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 537, 546 (1994) (describing the"layered instabilities" of
public heterosexual identity and describing inclusion in J. Michael Bailey and Richard C. Pil-
lard's study of male twins "self-described heterosexuals with high scores for homoerotic fan-
tasy"); ArthurJ.Jacobson, Legal Emotion: The Women's Story in Totem and Taboo, 16 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1139, 1159 (1995) (describing heterosexual practice, with reference to Sigmund Freud's
Totem and Taboo, as an early form of veiling homoerotic aims); Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights,
Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REv. 45, 55 (1996) (noting the difficulty of maintaining"'that het-
erosexuality is pure of sodomitic practice and homoerotic impulse'" (quotingJanet E. Halley,
Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721,
1738 n.51 (1993))); Teemu Ruskola, Note, Law, Sexual Morality, and Gender Equality in Qing and
Communist China, 103 YALE LJ. 2531, 2548 (1994) (noting that in Qing, China, the right of men
to buy sex from women, as well as men, was respected).
390. See LAUMANN ETAL., sup-a note 388, at 291 ("[W)e have identified three dimensions of
homosexuality: same-gender sexual behavior (and its associated practices), same-gender desire
and sexual attraction, and self identity as a homosexual."); id. at 301 ("[H]omosexuality is fun-
damentally a multidimensional phenomenon that has manifold meanings and interpretations,
depending on context and purpose.").
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able gender norms.3' Although presumptive heterosexuality de-
pends on the existence of homosexuality, 2 it acts as a mask, hiding
any association of heterosexual self-definition with homoerotic con-
ducte"3 and allowing acts of genital fondling, assaults on the genitals
and threats of rape-94 to be dismissed under the rule "boys will be
boys. 395 In addition, presumptive heterosexuality drives the conclu-
sion drawn in some cases that the harassment in question reveals bias
against homosexuals instead of any degree of sexual attraction of the
harasser toward the victim,s9 thus reinforcing acceptable gender
391. The military has entertained its troops throughout this century with drag shows involv-
ing a practice known as "camping" whereby troops flaunt their gender roles by cross-dressing
and same-sex flirting. These practices are said to provide entertainment and foster bonding
among heterosexual men. An excellent example of such a show was put on by nurses and
troops in the musical South Paific. See William N. Eskridge,Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L.
REv. 607, 627 (1994).
392. See Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1827-29 (1996) ("The constitution of homosexuals is also the constitu-
tion of heterosexuals, heterosexuals now liberated to engage in homosocial or homoerotic acts
that fall short of their being branded as homosexual themselves.").
393. See BAKER, supra note 388, at 245-47.
Sexual hypocrisy is of particular interest. This is because there are some aspects of
sexual behavior for which the most successful exponents are those who try, through
force or criticism, to prevent other people from behaving in a particular way while se-
cretly behaving in precisely that way themselves. We should not be surprised, there-
fore, whenever we find that rule makers and enforcers are in fact the people who most
indulge in behavior they seek to prevent in others.
Id.; see also Eskridge, supra note 391, at 627-28 (relating evidence that the military depends on
homoerotic expression between heterosexual men, but must keep its reliance hidden); Ken-
neth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV.
499, 576 (1991) ("In the process of self-definition we [males] define the Other-the feminine,
the homosexual-for the purpose of repressing the Other in ourselves.").
394. See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Rape, Race, and Representation: The Power of Discourse, Discourses
of Power, and the Reconstruction of Heterosexuality, 49 VAND. L. REv. 868, 946 n.215 (1996) ("Gang
rape effectuates male bonding for a variety of purposes, [among these] the expression of oth-
erwise repressed homoerotic affinities.") (internal citations omitted); L.M. Sixel, Wrongs With-
out Remedy; Federal Laws Offer Little Relief from Same-Sex Harassment, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 17,
1995, at 1 (describing hazing-like ritual in which a new worker's pants are forcibly removed by
other employees who then rub grease around the worker's genitals and buttocks).
395. Eskridge, supra note 391, at 629 ("If the military publicly acknowledged the gay pres-
ence in this male subculture, the shower room camaraderie might shatter, and the boot camp
game might lose its zip.").
396. See BAKER, supra note 388, at 247 ("Inevitably, some homophobes are also hypocrites,
displaying public homophobia while secretly behaving bisexually."); Henry E. Adams et al., Is
Homophobia Associated with Homosexual Arousal?, 105 J. ABNORMAL PSYCH. 440, 444 (1996)
(presenting evidence that homophobia in males is a product of shame over homosexual
arousal); Halley, supra note 389, at 946.
It is a truism in the gay and lesbian communities that such self-identified heterosexu-
als, in order to maintain their counterfactual denial of their own homoerotic experi-
ence, zealously foment the very stigma they are so concerned to avoid. They, more
than any other group, are concerned that the line between gay and straight be rigid,
immovable, bright.
Id.; see also Polly v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 803 F. Supp. 1, 5 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (stating
that the harassment was not "demanding sexual favors, rather the acts that were committed
were done with jealous or malicious animus").
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norms.17  Presumptive heterosexuality in sexual harassment cases
may be taken advantage of not only by self-styled heterosexual defen-
dants but by homosexual individuals exhibiting conformity with such
gender norms;3" in such cases, conduct Title VII should proscribe
will not be captured. Notably, although the presumption of hetero-
sexuality operates in courts that recognize same-sex sexual harass-
ment claims, it also likely drove the reasoning of courts that refused
altogether to recognize claims of same-sex sexual harassment.'
Albeit fatal to victims of same-sex sexual harassment whose claims
are dismissed as alleging mere horseplay, presumptive heterosexual-
ity allows claims of opposite-sex harassment to proceed unfettered by
judicial scrutiny of causation.4 The reason for this is unclear, espe-
cially in a court system eager to issue summary judgment in employ-
ment discrimination cases in the interest ofjudicial economy. These
same courts scrutinize with great care the causation element in same-
sex cases and express concern that without such caution, mere het-
erosexual horseplay will be actionable.4 '  The reason for this is
equally unclear, given that "[s] exual harassment law already provides
the means for distinguishing between isolated instances of non-severe
harassment and the truly hostile working environment."402
397. Many times anti-homosexual discrimination is more about reaffirming one's own het-
erosexuality than it is about any malice toward homosexuals. See Halley, supra note 389, at 955-
56.
398. See MURRAY, supra note 361, at 20.
To encourage heterosexuality and to deter exploration of and identification with ho-
mosexuality, many societies reward those who engage in homosexual behavior with-
out appearing gender-deviant to remain invisible .... Masculine gay men and femi-
nine lesbians have been and continue to be rewarded for not announcing
homosexual desires and behavior publicly-or even recognizing it in themselves.
Id.; see also id. at 250-51 (arguing society's equation of homosexuality and effeminacy is rein-
forced by masculine-appearing men passing as straight).
399. See, e.g., Polly, 803 F. Supp. at 4-5. In this case, the perpetrator exposed his genitalia to
the victim, grabbed and squeezed the victim's genitalia, pinched his buttocks and chest, and
forced a broom handle against his anus. See id. at 4. The court concluded that this physical
abuse exceeded mere horseplay but granted summaryjudgment on the ground that Title VII's
"ordinary and historical" meaning did not encompass this type of claim. See id. at 6.
400. It should be noted, however, that courts routinely issue summary judgment against
plaintiffs in opposite-sex cases on the basis of the conduct's not being severe or pervasive or on
the basis of the employer's swift response to complaints of sexual harassment. See Olson v. City
of Lakeville, No. C3-97-390, 1997 WL 561254 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 1997) (affirming sum-
mary judgment for employer where same-sex harassment was neither severe nor pervasive);
OMILIAN & KAMP, supra note 30, § 22.09 (describing pattern of dismissing cases derived from
collection of cases); see also Schultz, supra note 35, at 1721 (suggesting that courts dismiss claims
for lack of severity and pervasiveness because they look only at sexual conduct).
401. See McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195-96 (4th Cir.)
(contend-ing that dismissal of same-sex sexual harassment claim is compelled by causation lan-
guage requiring that discrimination be "because of" the plaintiff's sex; to extend the statute to
include this conduct would broaden unmanageably its protections to "matters of sex"), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996).
402. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 575 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 1183
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Francisco Valdes would see the discrepancies wrought by presump-
tive heterosexuality in sexual harassment law as the product of the
androsexism and heterosexism" 3  that underlie the current
"analytically misguided and practically impotent anti-discrimination
status quo in contemporary law."4 4 For Valdes, the current state of
the law devalues relations deemed lacking in instrumental poten-
tial.05 To counteract this devaluation, he encourages women and
sexual minorities to strive for legal recognition and protection of
these relations' 6 In contrast to Grose and Spitko, who argue for ex-
clusion of same-sex sexual harassment claims from the ambit of Title
VII,j°7 Valdes calls for "informed and principled applications of exist-
ing rules ... in order to cohere law with reality in a way that actually
helps to check the full gamut of sex/gender discrimination.""4 8
This coherence of law and reality will not occur absent recognition
of same-sex sexual harassment claims. The courts must go farther in
their movement toward a focus on sexual conduct,4° and must not
only abandon inquiries into the sexual orientation of the victim and
the perpetrator in such cases, as some commentators have argued,
but must abandon presumptive heterosexuality as well. Presumptive
heterosexuality obstructs the streamlining and uniformity that is de-
sirable in employment discrimination jurisprudence by establishing
(1998).
403. Androsexism refers to the form of sexism biased in favor of the male; heterosexism is
biased in favor of cross-sex relationships or heterosexuality. See Valdes, Hetero-Patriarchy, supra
note 375, at 162 n.4. The combination of these two forms of sexism is defined as the privileg-
ing of masculine, heterosexual men and the subordination of all other sex/gender types under
hetero-patriarchy. See id. at 169-70.
[T] he ideology of compulsory hetero-patriarchy rests on four key tenets: the bifurca-
tion of personhood into "male" and "female" components under the active/passive
paradigm; the polarization of these male/female sex/gender ideals into mutually ex-
clusive, or even opposing, identity composites; the penalization of gender atypicality
or transitivity; and the devaluation of persons who are feminized. The combined im-
pact of these four tenets is compulsory hetero-patriarchy.
Id. at 170.
404. Valdes, Hetero-Patriarchy, supra note 375, at 169.
405. See id. at 164 (noting that this results in devaluation of the social and legal values of
human desire and intimacy).
406. See id. at 209 (asserting that reevaluating desire, pleasure and intimacy as important
parts of human life should be part of the search for liberation undertaken by women and sex-
ual minorities).
407. Seesupra notes 257-78 and accompanying text.
408. Valdes, Queers, supra note 264, at 304.
409. See Cullen P. Cowley, Same-Gender Harassment and Homosexuality in Title VII Sexual Har-
assment Litigation, 50 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 443, 460 (1996) (advocating that courts
ignore the sexual orientation of the harasser and focus on the harasser's conduct and the vic-
tim's gender); Christopher W. Deering, Comment, Same-Gender Sexual Harassment: A Need to Re-
Examine the Legal Underpinnings of Title VII's Ban on Discrimination "Because Of' Sex, 27 CUMB. L.
REV. 231, 295-96 (1996) (arguing that courts should not focus on the harasser's sexual orienta-
tion in determining whether a plaintiff was harassed because of his or her sex, but should focus
instead on the conduct of the harasser).
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analytical distinctions based on the genders of the parties that are ul-
timately unjustified under a reasoned interpretation of Title VII.
4 10
Moreover, a requirement that a victim of harassment allege and
prove the sexual orientation of her harasser imposes a burden of
proof not anticipated by case law interpreting the statute.411  Fur-
thermore, it diverts the focus of the inquiry from the effect of the
conduct on the plaintiffs working environment to considerations,
nebulous at best, of the intent and motivation of the perpetrator. 2
Sexual harassmentjurisprudence to date has not exhibited a concern
for the subjectivity of the perpetrator in such cases,13 and no convinc-
ing argument has been advanced for doing so now.
CONCLUSION
Now that the Supreme Court has recognized same-sex harassment
claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, much
work remains to be done in the courts regarding the disagreement
over how such claims should be evaluated. In evaluating the causa-
tion prong of the test for sexual harassment, some courts have ruled
that a showing by the plaintiff that the perpetrator is homosexual is
crucial for a same-sex case to escape dismissal, but other courts have
disapproved of this approach and have focused squarely on whether
sexual attraction can be inferred from the conduct or whether the
victim would have been treated similarly had he or she been of the
opposite sex.
Among lower courts, there is a movement at present toward label-
ing the conduct in sexual harassment cases as sexual or non-sexual,
depending on its content. Conduct permitting inferences of sexual
or romantic interest has been deemed sexual in nature, while other
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an element of plaintiffs case would overburden the statute), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996).
412. See id. (stating that requiring evidence of sexual orientation would lead to difficult and
elusive pursuit for the harasser's "true" sexual preferences).
413. See Block, supra note 45, at 252 (sexual harassment must be judged by the perspective
of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's situation rather than by the motives of the harasser);
Locke, supra note 45, at 400 (inappropriateness of relying on harasser's motives in determining
whether sexual harassment has occurred); see alsoAndrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1483
(3d Cir. 1990); id. at 401 n.95 (attributing significance to absence from EEOC guidelines of
mention of harasser's motives as "necessary precondition to a finding of harassment" (citing 29
C.F.R § 1604.11 (a) (1994))); Lisett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 895 (1st Cir. 1988); Cal-
houn v. Acme Cleveland Corp., 798 F.2d 559, 561 (1st Cir. 1986). In disparate treatment cases,
however, intent is important. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 n.1 1 (1 1th Cir.
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conduct has been deemed mere horseplay-even when it has dis-
played an arguably homoerotic cast-ostensibly due to the presumed
heterosexuality of the parties.
Similarly, commentary on same-sex sexual harassment reflects
disagreement among scholars over how same-sex sexual harassment
claims should be evaluated. Some scholars advance the view that
same-sex claims, according to a faithful reading of Title VII should be
evaluated according to the same criteria used in opposite-sex cases.
Other scholars, describing what they see as the likely adverse impact
of same-sex claims on the civil rights of gays and lesbians, state that
same-sex sexual harassment claims should not be evaluated at all.
In this vein, Carolyn Grose has argued that litigation of same-sex
claims will perpetuate heterosexist regulation of homosexual expres-
sion in the workplace in ways that will subordinate gays and lesbians.
Professor Gary Spitko has expressed his fear that the higher damages
awards juries issue in same-sex sexual harassment cases, as compared
to opposite-sex cases, will inspire employers to discriminate against
gays. Both Grose and Spitko believe that the harassing acts of gays
and lesbians will be sanctioned disproportionately to analogous acts
of heterosexuals. They therefore argue that plaintiffs must not bring
same-sex sexual harassment claims under Title VII until the legisla-
ture or the judiciary prohibits employment discrimination based on
sexual orientation.
Both approaches to the question fail to recognize certain salutary
effects that will arise from the Supreme Court's recognition of same-
sex claims. On the one hand, recognition that same-sex sexual har-
assmerit claims are consistent with Title VII's purposes does not ad-
dress the current disjunction in the courts between the analysis of
opposite-sex claims and the analysis of same-sex claims. Specifically,
this position ignores that the application of presumptive heterosexu-
ality to opposite-sex cases alleviates the need for courts to evaluate
the causation prong of a sexual harassment claim, while its applica-
tion in same-sex cases renders the causation prong the object of
much attention and analysis. On the other hand, commentators pes-
simistic about same-sex claims base their positions on unsupportable
premises, ultimately exaggerating the dangers same-sex claims pose
to gays and lesbians in the workplace and failing to recognize the
more serious dangers created and opportunities lost did these claims
not exist.
In attempting to cohere sexual harassment analysis and the situa-
tions to which that analysis is applied, courts must first address the
most patent disjunction between the inquiry in opposite-sex cases
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and the inquiry in same-sex cases. Whereas presumptive heterosexu-
ality is employed in most opposite-sex cases to render analysis of the
causation element unnecessary, in same-sex cases, causation is an is-
sue with very nearly a life of its own. In a judicial system desirous of
benefiting from the streamlining offered by summary dismissals and
judgments, this disjunction is troubling and speaks to the eagerness
of courts to avail themselves of more ways to dispose of same-sex dis-
putes than are used to dispose of opposite-sex disputes. Particularly
troubling is the conclusion in certain cases that conduct that is ar-
guably the product of homoerotic attraction is merely heterosexual
horseplay. Given that courts making this assessment offer no bright
line by which to distinguish between heterosexual horseplay and sex-
ual conduct, the air of certainty with which courts make these deter-
minations is not only curious but risks denying a class of plaintiffs Ti-
tie VII protection on the tenuous basis that courts deem
heterosexuals incapable of homosexual expression.
In an effort to capture all cases of sexual harassment as sex dis-
crimination, courts must dispose of the presumption of heterosexual-
ity in both opposite-sex and same-sex cases. A full analysis of the cau-
sation prong should occur as a matter of course in all sexual
harassment cases and should focus on defining the conduct in a sex-
ual harassment case as sexual or non-sexual. In effecting this evalua-
tion, due regard must be given to instances where the sexually harass-
ing conduct has been aimed at the victim's genitals, where the victim
has been subjected to willful exposure of the harasser's genitals or to
violent acts of simulated sexual activity and to other such circum-
stances which are difficult, if not impossible, to classify as non-sexual.
It is not yet time to conclude that the law can have no effect on co-
hering law with reality in the domain of sexual harassment law. For
gays and lesbians, given that presumptive heterosexuality in sexual
harassment jurisprudence trivializes or altogether ignores homosex-
ual subjectivity and desire, same-sex sexual harassment claims may
seem an unattractive avenue for avoiding further subordination by
heteropatriarchy. Litigation of same-sex sexual harassment claims,
though, presents greater benefits than does failure to litigate them.
Litigation of these claims is, for example, more likely to lead to pro-
hibition of sexual orientation discrimination than if these claims did
not exist, since same-sex sexual harassment cases are finally making
clear that heterosexuality is not a protected characteristic under Title
VII. Further, an alignment of the analysis in opposite-sex claims with
the focus on sexual conduct analysis marking recent same-sex sexual
harassment decisions in the lower courts will offer the courts insight
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into the wide spectrum of human sexual conduct which has been ob-
scured by resort to presumptive heterosexuality.
In forging an encompassing jurisprudence more reflective of the
goals of Title VII, an obvious first step is for the courts to view same-
sex sexual harassment claims in the same way they do opposite-sex
claims. The courts must harmonize the analysis in sexual harassment
cases generally by discarding reliance on presumptions of hetero-
sexuality or homosexuality and focusing squarely on the conduct in
such cases and whether such conduct can reasonably be character-
ized as sexual. The threshold in this inquiry should be low, in order
to allow juries to evaluate the conduct with due regard to the circum-
stances surrounding it. Judicial economy will not be sacrificed by this
approach; the causation element will receive increased scrutiny in
cases of opposite-sex harassment, and both opposite-sex and same-sex
harassment cases will be subject to dismissal based on the isolated or
genuinely trivial nature of the conduct or an employer's prompt re-
sponse to its knowledge of harassment. Such an alignment of the
analysis of sexual harassment claims should be a reasonable and just
application of Oncale's recognition of same-sex sexual harassment
under Title VII.
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